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TAKING BEHAVIORALISM SERIOUSLY: 
SOME EVIDENCE OF MARKET MANIPULATION 
Jon D. Hanson* & Douglas A. Kysar** 
Over the last ten to fifteen years, economists and legal scholars have become 
increasingly interested in and sensitive to behavioralist insights. In a companion 
article, Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar argued that those scholars have nevertheless 
given short shrift to what is, at least for policymaking purposes, perhaps the most 
important lesson of the behavioralist research: individuals' perceptions and preferences 
are highly manipulable. According to Hanson and Kysar, one theoretical implication of 
that insight for products liability law is that manufacturers and marketers will 
manipulate the risk perceptions of consumers. Indeed, to survive in a competitive 
market, manufacturers and marketers must do so. 
In this Article, Hanson and Kysar present empirical evidence of market 
manipulation - a previously unrecognized source of market failure. The Article begins 
by surveying the extensive qualitative and quantitative marketing research and 
consumer behavioral studies that discern and influence consumer perceptions. It then 
provides evidence of market manipulation by reviewing common practices in everyday 
market settings, such as gas stations and supermarkets, and by examining familiar 
marketing approaches, such as environmentally oriented and fear-based advertising. 
Although consumers may be well-aware of those practices and approaches, they appear to 
be generally unaware of the extent to which those tactics are manipulative. 
The Article then focuses on the industry that has most depended upon market 
manipulation: the cigarette industry. Through decades of sophisticated marketing and 
public relations efforts, cigarette manufacturers have heightened consumer demand and 
lowered consumer risk perceptions. Because consumers are aware that smoking may 
pose significant health risks, the tobacco industry's success in manipulating risk 
perceptions constitutes especially strong evidence of the power of market manipulation. 
The Article concludes by arguing that the evidence of market manipulation may 
justify moving to a regime of enterprise liability. Indeed, according to Hanson and 
Kysar, the evidence of market manipulation confirms the intuitions of the first 
generation of product liability scholars, who worried about manufacturers' power to 
manipulate and called for just such a regime. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Only so far as current tastes and appetites are reliable indices of human 
utility, only so far as we can identify the desired with the desirable, is the 
evolution of customary standards of life a sound human art. But it is 
needless to cite the ample evidence of the errors and wastes that are repre- 
sented in every human standard of consumption. 
--John Hobson' 
A. The Development of Products Liability Scholarship 
In recent decades, the law and economics paradigm has dominated 
products liability scholarship.2 By applying macroeconomic concepts 
of behavior to consumers and manufacturers within products markets, 
theorists have explored the efficiency ramifications of a variety of pos- 
sible legal standards for products liability. Central to the dialogue has 
been the question whether enterprise liability - that is, a legal regime 
in which manufacturers are liable for the costs of all product-caused 
accidents - can be justified on efficiency grounds. In many respects, 
the evolution of products liability scholarship generally, and the debate 
over enterprise liability particularly, reflects the development and in- 
creasing sophistication of economic theory as a mode of legal analysis. 
For instance, early products liability scholars and judges based 
their justification of enterprise liability largely upon their intuitive 
view of market conditions. They believed that consumers frequently 
lack vital information about product risks, and that manufacturers of- 
ten exert exploitative market power that manifests itself in coercive 
sales practices and warranty terms.3 Given those premises, the case 
for enterprise liability was irresistible.4 As more complex and nuanced 
notions of macroeconomic behavior infiltrated the legal academy, how- 
ever, the tide began to turn against enterprise liability. A second gen- 
I JOHN A. HOBSON, WEALTH AND LIFE: A STUDY IN VALUES 47 (I929). Although we agree 
with Hobson's thesis, we respectfully disregard his view that citation of evidentiary support is 
needless. 
2 See George L. Priest, The Inevitability of Tort Reform, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 70I, 704-05 
(I992) ("[T]here are few articles within the last ten years and no articles of importance within the 
last five years written about modern tort law that have not addressed, either as the principal the- 
sis or as the subject to which the thesis of the article is responding, the functional economic analy- 
sis [of law]."). 
3 See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for En- 
terprise Liability, 9i MICH. L. REV. 683, 706-i0 (I993). Early advocates of enterprise liability 
also argued that product-accident insurance provided by manufacturers through the price mecha- 
nism could accomplish the otherwise infeasible spreading of accident risks. This contention, 
which some say has been rendered moot by the widespread availability of first-party insurance, 
such as health insurance, is revived in Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insur- 
ance Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. I29, 
I37-59 (i990), arguing that there remain good economic justifications for mandating manufac- 
turer-provided insurance. 
4 See Croley & Hanson, supra note 3, at 7I2. 
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eration of products liability thinkers attacked enterprise liability for 
failing to provide consumers with sufficient incentives to take care.' 
Indeed, some argued that allowing full recovery for product-caused ac- 
cidents encourages consumers to make careless decisions, both in pur- 
chasing and in utilizing products.6 Those scholars rejected enterprise 
liability and instead called for policymakers to solve any imperfect in- 
formation problems with product warning requirements.7 This second 
generation of products liability scholars saw themselves as engaged in 
a more sophisticated economic analysis than their predecessors.8 In- 
deed, as one of the most prominent second-generation scholars charac- 
terizes it, the second generation's arguments resulted from "careful, 
scientific study,"9 rather than the "extremely crude"10 models of early 
enterprise liability advocates. 
In a companion article to this one,11 we noted that in light of a 
growing body of evidence about human decisionmaking, the second 
generation's models have come to appear somewhat crude themselves. 
By exploring empirical evidence of individual decisionmaking proc- 
esses, we highlighted several ways in which predominant assumptions 
about macroeconomic behavior are wrong. More importantly, we also 
identified a crucial feature of markets that to our knowledge has never 
been recognized by law and economics scholars: because individuals 
exhibit systematic and persistent cognitive processes that depart from 
5 See id. at 720-2i; Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical 
Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 356 (i988) ("The imperfect information rationale for today's strict 
liability assumes that consumers cannot make rational investments in safety. This assumption is 
incorrect; consumers need to know fewer and simpler things to behave carefully than they need to 
know to choose among contract clauses allocating product risks. It is therefore a mistake to relax 
consumers' obligation to take care."). These scholars also took issue with the first generation's 
assumption that manufacturers are generally in a better position to evaluate product safety issues. 
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Product Liability Law, io CARDOZO 
L. REv. 2I93, 2205 (i989) ("[W]hy should manufacturers, out of possession of the product at the 
time of injury, be conclusively and universally presumed to be in a better position to avoid loss 
than 'helpless' consumers in possession of the goods? There is little reason to think that this odd 
balance of prevention capabilities has ever been true in the general case - possession gives both 
control and information."); George Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L. REv. i, 
5-6, I3 (i987) (citing the "growing empirical evidence that ... the consumer's role in accident 
prevention swamps any effects of differential technological investments by providers" as reason to 
believe that expansions in manufacturer liability have caused an increase in product accidents). 
6 See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explanation 
for Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. I, 23 n.89 (iggi) (citing numerous 
examples). 
7 See Croley & Hanson, supra note 3, at 787 n.420 (citing numerous examples). 
8 See generally id. at 7I3-20 (summarizing the second generation's rebuttal of the first gen- 
eration's case for enterprise liability). 
9 George L. Priest, The Best Evidence of the Effect of Products Liability Law on the Accident 
Rate: Reply, 9 I YALE L.J. 13 86, 1400 ( I98 2). 
10 Priest, supra note 2, at 702. 
11 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of 
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 632 (ig99) [hereinafter, Hanson & Kysar, TBS I]. 
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axioms of rationality, they are susceptible to manipulation by those ac- 
tors in a position to influence the decisionmaking context. Moreover, 
the actors in the dominant position must capitalize on this manipula- 
tion or eventually be displaced from the market. We believe that this 
problem of market manipulation represents a previously unrecognized 
threat to markets' allocative efficiency a new source of market fail- 
ure. 
Our conclusion about incentives for manipulation also supports the 
notion of early products liability scholars that manufacturers engage in 
manipulative sales conduct and that enterprise liability is justified in 
part for that reason. Foes of enterprise liability have never squarely 
rebutted that contention. Instead, they have treated it as pure specula- 
tion emerging not from economic theory or empirical evidence, but 
from soft intuitions. In this Article and its companion, we address 
both the direct argument that product warnings suffice to overcome 
consumer information problems and the indirect argument that con- 
cern for manufacturer manipulation is theoretically and empirically 
unfounded. We argue that, because a multitude of nonrational factors 
influence individual decisionmaking, consumers cannot be expected to 
engage in efficient product purchasing analyses - regardless whether 
manufacturers are required to supply product warnings. More impor- 
tantly, we provide evidence that, for the same reason, manufacturers 
do manipulate consumer perceptions and preferences, consistent with 
the hunches of early products liability scholars. Thus, we help to re- 
new the case for enterprise liability by providing both the theoretical 
basis for and the empirical evidence of market manipulation. 
B. The Problem of Market Manipulation 
In our companion article, we introduced the concept of market 
manipulation. We began by reviewing the burgeoning literature of be- 
havioralism, a body of research that lies at the intersection of econom- 
ics and psychology. In this field, cognitive psychologists and behav- 
ioral researchers study the decisionmaking processes of individuals, 
with an eye toward comparing actual behavior with that of rationalis- 
tic ideals. It turns out that individuals frequently process information 
and make decisions in ways that depart from the expected-utility 
maximizer of economic models, both because maximizing expected 
utility is often not the goal of individual decisionmaking and because 
even when it is, errors of calculation and reasoning frequently prevent 
individuals from achieving that goal.12 One significant and surprising 
feature of such departures from rationality is that they are consistent 
12 For a review of these departures, see Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, cited above in note ii, at sec- 
tion I.B. 
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and predictable - that is, they are "neither rational, nor capricious."''3 
We noted that because those cognitive biases, as they are often called, 
are predictable, they also can be tractably modeled. Thus, many legal 
economists attempt to incorporate them into the classical economic 
conception of the rational actor. As three leading commentators put it, 
"behavioral economics allows us to model and predict behavior rele- 
vant to law with the tools of traditional economic analysis, but with 
more accurate assumptions about human behavior."'4 
Although we are sympathetic to the goal of using more accurate as- 
sumptions about human behavior, we believe that the commitment of 
other scholars to maintain the tractability of basic economic models 
may have prevented them from seeing the more dramatic implications 
of the behavioral research. Whereas other scholars treat cognitive bi- 
ases as essentially exogenous influences that must be incorporated into 
the individual decisionmaker model, we argued in our companion arti- 
cle that the presence of unyielding cognitive anomalies requires both 
inclusion of the biases in the model and restructuring of the model to 
capture the endogenous influence of other actors on the individual. 
For instance, we explained that one must account not only for the pos- 
sibility of endowment effects' altering an individual's preferences (an 
exogenous application of behavioralist findings), but also for the possi- 
bility that other actors will take advantage of endowment effects to in- 
fluence individual preferences for their own gain (an endogenous ap- 
plication). We argued, in essence, that the most significant message of 
the behavioral research is that individuals are vulnerable to manipula- 
tion by those in a position to influence the decisionmaking context. 
Also in our companion article, we attempted to highlight this dif- 
ference in approach through a careful review of products liability 
scholars' previous assessments of the behavioral research. Those 
scholars tend to fall into one of two camps: one group emphasizes evi- 
dence that individuals underestimate product risks, and the other 
group emphasizes evidence that individuals overestimate product risks. 
Members of both camps share the same basic methodology: they re- 
view each of the cognitive biases in isolation, considering whether each 
particular anomaly would cause consumers to overestimate or underes- 
timate product hazards, and then they attempt to sum the biases to de- 
termine their net effect. In short, they treat the cognitive biases as 
13 Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, Probability Blindness: Neither Rational nor Capricious, Bos- 
TONIA, Mar./Apr. i99i, at 28, 28. 
14 Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, I474 (i998). 
15 At the moment when an individual comes to possess an item and to feel as though the item 
is part of her endowment, she values that item more than she did prior to possessing it. Behav- 
ioralists refer to that phenomenon as the endowment effect. See Hanson & Kysar, TBS 1, supra 
note iI, at notes I92-99 and accompanying text. 
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fixed, exogenous influences on consumer perceptions.16 We argued 
that this methodology is ultimately futile because the behavioral re- 
search presents too many conflicting and overlapping biases to make 
confident overall predictions about consumer perceptions. 
It is our view instead that the findings of behavioral research reveal 
the endogenous nature of consumer perceptions. Rather than simply 
asking how a particular anomaly will influence the typical consumer, 
the more probative question is how the presence of cognitive anoma- 
lies will influence all actors in the market. With that distinction in 
mind, we explained that manufacturers have every incentive to utilize 
cognitive biases to lower consumer appreciation of product risks. Such 
manipulation, we argued, is simply another form of cost externaliza- 
tion, a practice that manufacturers naturally pursue in an effort to 
avoid costs and increase profit margins. We noted also that this ma- 
nipulation of consumer perceptions should occur whether or not 
manufacturers are cognizant of it. That is, the competitive forces of 
the market should drive manufacturers to act as if they are utilizing 
behavioral findings to exploit consumer perceptions, regardless of 
manufacturers' awareness of the processes. Thus, we argued that the 
relative indeterminacy of the behavioral research is irrelevant to prod- 
ucts liability theory because manufacturers operating under the evolu- 
tionary influence of the market will untangle the various cognitive 
forces at play in the consumer's mind even if behavioral researchers 
and legal scholars cannot. 
We concluded by presenting a theoretical account of more concrete 
ways in which manufacturers, consistent with our predictions, might 
manipulate consumer perceptions. In so doing, we drew frequently 
from articles in which marketing scientists specifically apply the find- 
ings of behavioral research in an effort to study and ultimately influ- 
ence consumer behavior. The mere existence of such articles lends a 
degree of credibility to our theory of manufacturer manipulation. 
Nonetheless, ultimately to support such a theory, we need to offer 
market evidence of actual manufacturer manipulation of consumers. 
In this Article, we offer that evidence. 
C. Overview 
In Part I, we introduce the reader to the field of marketing research 
and consumer behavior studies. Although our treatment is basic, we 
believe it is the first serious attempt to consider the legal policy impli- 
cations of that vast body of research. Our goal is to provide the reader 
with an appreciation for the type and volume of consumer behavior 
studies that manufacturers are conducting. We then provide case 
studies of apparently innocuous consumer markets and reveal sus- 
16 See id. 
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tained and deliberate efforts by manufacturers and retailers to ma- 
nipulate consumer product perceptions. 
In Part II, we provide a history of industry practices in one not-so- 
innocuous consumer market - the market for cigarettes. In addition 
to recounting some of cigarette manufacturers' well-known manipu- 
lative practices, we also examine some industry conduct that has only 
recently been uncovered. After reviewing the history of cigarette mar- 
keting, we revisit the scholarly debate over how well consumers under- 
stand the health risks of smoking. We argue that our theoretical and 
empirical accounts of market manipulation help to explain the growing 
body of evidence that strongly indicates that consumers underestimate 
those risks. This evidence is of special importance to our thesis be- 
cause it presents a strong case not only that manufacturers attempt to 
manipulate consumer risk perceptions, but also that their manipulation 
succeeds. 
We conclude by arguing that our account of behavioral research 
and evidence of market manipulation vindicates the intuitions of early 
advocates of enterprise liability, who claimed that manufacturers exert 
undue influence over consumers within the product-purchasing con- 
text. One goal of this Article and its companion is to strengthen the 
case for enterprise liability by providing both a theoretical basis for 
and empirical evidence of the type of market manipulation envisioned 
by those early products liability thinkers. A key implication of our 
analysis for products liability law is that consumer susceptibility to 
manufacturer manipulation significantly weakens otherwise consider- 
able market-provided incentives for safety. More specifically, because 
of the problem of market manipulation, many consumers are likely 
purchasing too many risky products. Consequently, the intellectual 
case for enterprise liability is, in our view, more compelling than ever. 
I. SOME MODEST MARKET EVIDENCE 
OF CONSUMER MANIPULATION 
Our thesis is admittedly a provocative one, requiring support be- 
yond the theoretical argument that we offered in our companion arti- 
cle. In this Part, we provide some modest market evidence to show 
that manipulation of consumers is in fact occurring in product mar- 
kets. We hope to demonstrate that the possibility of market manipula- 
tion is not only compelling in theory, but also borne out in practice. 
We do so by offering a brief overview in section A of the vast array of 
marketing research and consumer behavior analyses available to 
manufacturers. We do not intend to offer a comprehensive treatment 
of the science of marketing research; we hope merely to give the unini- 
tiated reader a flavor of the type and degree of research that manufac- 
turers undertake and apply to actual product markets. 
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In section B of this Part, we provide examples of how manufactur- 
ers manipulate general consumer perceptions - that is, product per- 
ceptions not specifically related to safety attributes - in the purchas- 
ing context, with particular attention to perhaps the ultimate 
achievement of marketing researchers, the modern supermarket. The 
evidence of manipulation of general product perceptions supports an 
inference of risk perception manipulation by manufacturers as well: if 
manufacturers manipulate perceptions of non-risk-related product at- 
tributes, they likely do the same for risk attributes."7 Ultimately, this 
Part goes further and begins to replace inference with empirical evi- 
dence. In section C, we examine specific examples of risk perception 
manipulation by manufacturers in a variety of industries. Taken to- 
gether, the evidence reviewed in this Part suggests that the theoretical 
argument presented in our companion article is a plausible account of 
the actual operation of consumer product markets. 
A. An Overview of Marketing Research18 
Manufacturers spend $8 billion per year studying consumer be- 
havior and psychology.'9 They hire researchers and marketing spe- 
cialists to conduct "day after" phone surveys to gauge the effectiveness 
of advertisements, organize focus groups in shopping malls, and en- 
courage fantasy role-playing among consumers of household products. 
They track customer search patterns within stores using hidden cam- 
eras, monitor eye responses to magazine ad layouts with ultrasensitive 
equipment, and target the $I50 billion annual spending power of chil- 
dren by seeking out "virgin respondents"20 for interview sessions. 
17 We are not the first to draw such an inference. George Priest took a similar logical step in 
his famous article on consumer product warranties. See George L. Priest, A Theory of the Con- 
sumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. I297 (i98i). By offering evidence that manufacturers and 
consumers efficiently allocate the risk of product service and repair needs, Priest argued that 
manufacturers and consumers could be expected to allocate product safety risks efficiently as 
well. See id. at I307-I3. Priest is also a proponent of the use of empirical evidence in legal 
scholarship. See Priest, supra note 9, at I40I ("I am currently attempting to obtain more complete 
and direct data of the effects of modern products liability law, but to date no better data have 
been found. I challenge ... others to find better data as well - data sufficiently detailed to sup- 
port or cast doubt on our modern theories of product warranties."). 
18 The American Marketing Association defines marketing research as follows: 
Marketing research is the function that links the consumer, customer, and public to the 
marketer through information - information used to identify and define marketing oppor- 
tunities and problems; generate, refine, and evaluate marketing actions; monitor marketing 
performance; and improve understanding of marketing as a process. 
Marketing research specifies the information required to address these issues, designs the 
method for collecting information, manages and implements the data collection process, 
analyzes the results, and communicates the findings and their implications. 
NARESH K. MALHOTRA, MARKETING RESEARCH: AN APPLIED ORIENTATION 9 (2d ed. i996). 
19 See JOEL R. EVANS & BARRY BERMAN, MARKETING I7 (7th ed. I997). 
20 SELINA S. GUBER & JON BERRY, MARKETING TO AND THROUGH KIDS 46 (I993) (advising 
that effective child marketing research requires using children who have not previously partici- 
pated in focus groups). 
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They poke, prod, and ponder consumer subjects in order to determine 
how best to allocate the $350 billion that they spend each year on ad- 
vertising and promotion.2' Through this process, manufacturers 
amass an extensive body of research that they can use to manipulate 
consumer behavior in precisely the manner predicted by the theoretical 
discussion in our companion article. 
i. Quantitative Research: Listening to the Market. - Most con- 
sumers are familiar with the A.C. Nielsen rating system. Most would 
probably also recognize that its purpose is to provide advertisers with 
information about the size of television audiences. How many would 
know, however, that the Nielsen system can also be used in conjunc- 
tion with an electronic scanner diary in which participating households 
record all consumer product purchases? That this data is correlated 
with advertising records to measure ad effectiveness? That Nielsen 
technology even allows for the unnoticed transmission of test commer- 
cials into selected households?22 
All of these efforts are typical of marketing research firms in their 
drive to acquire objective data on consumer behavior. The resulting 
amount of data collected is staggering. For instance, consider the fol- 
lowing description of a typical tracking study that manufacturers con- 
duct to monitor product performance: 
Every week these organisations capture, in their computers, fresh informa- 
tion on a new sample of consumers. The information covers all players in 
the market. It covers the state of play for that week in regard to people's 
behaviour, attitudes, brand awareness, brand image as well as direct 
communication effects such as advertising recall, advertising recognition 
and message take-out. This is then related to other information such as 
media data indicating what advertisers were on air during that week, at 
what times and at what advertising weight.23 
Tracking is a typical example of quantitative marketing research, 
by far the predominant form of marketing research. Broadly speaking, 
quantitative research entails the statistical measure of some data point 
such as market share, advertisement recall, brand recognition, re- 
peat purchasing behavior, lifestyle preferences, and income levels- 
relevant to the marketing of a product. The ubiquitous marketing sur- 
vey is the most widely used form of quantitative research, though re- 
searchers often also rely on pre-existing data such as U.S. Census re- 
ports.24 Whichever method is employed, the ultimate end of 
quantitative research is "the systematic and objective identification, 
21 See EVANS & BERMAN, supra note i9, at I7. 
22 See MALHOTRA, supra note i8, at I35-38. 
23 MAX SUTHERLAND, ADVERTISING AND THE MIND OF THE CONSUMER II2 (1993). 
24 See MICHAEL R. SOLOMON, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR: BUYING, HAVING & BEING I 2 (4th ed. 
' 999). 
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collection, analysis, and dissemination of information for the purpose 
of improving marketing."25 
How does quantitative research improve the effectiveness of mar- 
keting? In addition to providing manufacturers with straightforward 
feedback on current product sales, quantitative research can be used to 
analyze advertising viewership and its effect on consumer purchasing 
decisions.26 The well-known Starch Readership Survey assesses the 
effectiveness of print advertisements by data, such as ad recall rates, 
recognition rates, and percentage of copy read.27 Similar surveys are 
conducted continuously for television, radio, and other media. 
To keep an eye on competitors' products and to identify more gen- 
eral product usage trends, marketers also provide an extensive array of 
surveys of consumption behavior. For example, the Gallup Organiza- 
tion surveys fifteen thousand households annually about their con- 
sumer product purchases; the National Menu Census inquires about 
the consumption of food products in the home; and Trendex devotes its 
quarterly survey to uncovering data about the consumption of durable 
goods, such as appliances and electronics.28 
Surveys can also be used to uncover social trends far more subtle 
than simply who is watching and what they are buying. The Yanke- 
lovich Monitor, for example, is a widely used and frequently updated 
lifestyle survey of a nationally projectable sample of twenty-five hun- 
dred adults.29 Its aim is to provide early identification of significant 
developments in the American lifestyle that marketers can incorporate 
into advertising themes. The makers of Campbell's Soup, for instance, 
adopted an advertising campaign featuring a husband preparing soup 
only after the Yankelovich Monitor reported that such gender role 
shifting was occurring and therefore was acceptable to audiences.30 A 
competing service from the Roper Organization brags that its lifestyle 
survey is customizable: clients can take advantage of a "tack-on cus- 
tom question service" to gather information from Roper's sample of 
25 MALHOTRA, supra -note i8, at 8. 
26 Consider this example: 
By obtaining single-source data on product consumption, media consumption, and demo- 
graphic characteristics, Campbell [Soup Company] found that demographically similar TV 
audiences consume vastly different amounts of V-8. For example, on an index of ioo for 
the average household's V-8 consumption, [the audience for] General Hospital had a be- 
low-average 80 index while [the audience for] Guiding Light had an above-average I 20 in- 
dex.... Using this information, Campbell rearranged its advertising schedule to raise the 
average index. 
Id. at I4I. This example is striking not only because of the amount of detail that the marketing 
research provides, but also because of the casual tone that the author uses to report that the index 
could be raised merely by "rearranging" the advertising. 
27 See id. at I33. 
28 See id. at I33-34. 
29 See id. at I32. 
30 See id. at I33. 
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two thousand regularly interviewed adults.31 Manufacturers have 
used lifestyle surveys widely to respond to trends, such as the in- 
creased concern for conservation and the desire for a healthier diet. As 
social currents turn in new directions, manufacturers respond in kind: 
"A few years ago McDonald's introduced its McLean Deluxe reduced- 
fat beef patty with great fanfare, but now the chain is test-marketing 
the Mega Mac, a half-pound burger with cheese and sauce."32 
We argued in the first of these articles that the market evolves to 
reward manufacturers who manipulate consumer perceptions.33 We 
also noted that manufacturers do not need to exploit these opportuni- 
ties consciously: they merely need to recognize that a particular type of 
advertising produces superior results. Quantitative research provides 
manufacturers with precisely that information - any manufacturer 
who engages in manipulative advertising, even if inadvertently, will 
see the profit-maximizing results in "day after" ad recall surveys, 
brand loyalty polls, and weekly sales figures. Those manufacturers 
will in turn continue to engage in the manipulative ad campaigns. 
2. Qualitative Research: Manipulating the Market. - Marketing 
research encompasses much more than simply tabulating advertise- 
ment data. Manufacturers and advertisers employ the social sciences 
to determine not just whether a particular advertisement failed or suc- 
ceeded, but also why. Such qualitative research provides some of the 
most fascinating insights into consumer behavior. 
For example, researchers have discovered that consumers have de- 
veloped a system of market beliefs that enable them to reduce time 
spent searching for the right product.34 Pervasive market beliefs in- 
clude the following: large stores offer better prices than small stores; 
larger containers are cheaper per-unit than smaller ones; and when you 
are not sure what features you need in a product, it is a good idea to 
invest in the extra ones, because you will probably wish you had them 
later. Manufacturers, armed with knowledge of those market beliefs, 
can easily manipulate consumer perceptions. Consumers may buy 
larger containers without a per-unit cost reduction because they will 
still perceive the product as cheaper than the same product sold in 
smaller containers. Similarly, larger stores can capitalize on the per- 
ception that they are "discount" stores, while advertisers can empha- 
size "added" or "extra" product features on more expensive models be- 
cause consumers will believe that they may someday desire those 
31 Id. at I34. 
32 SOLOMON, supra note 24, at I95. 
33 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note ii, at notes 447-48 and accompanying text. 
34 See Calvin P. Duncan, Consumer Market Beliefs: A Review of the Literature and an Agenda 
for Future Research, in 17 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RESEARCH 729, 729 (Marvin E. Goldberg, 
Gerald Gorn & Richard W. Pollay eds., i990). 
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features.35 In each case, the manufacturer is able to capitalize on the 
consumer's market beliefs instead of her empirical product analysis.36 
The similarity between those market beliefs and the cognitive heu- 
ristics identified by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, two princi- 
pal founders of behavioral research, is striking.37 Both market beliefs 
and cognitive heuristics allow people to simplify decisionmaking 
through short cuts or rules of thumb; both mechanisms, when ma- 
nipulated by researchers or marketers, can also lead to consistently 
misguided decisionmaking. 
Marketing experts employ a variety of methodological techniques 
when engaging in qualitative research. Perhaps most commonly used 
and well-known is the focus group. Researchers at several hundred fa- 
cilities across the country continuously conduct focus group studies at 
a total cost of more than $400 million a year.38 Such studies typically 
involve a moderated discussion among "five to nine people who have 
been screened on some basis, often to represent demographic charac- 
teristics of the target market of interest."39 Focus groups are designed 
to reveal "consumers' perceptions, preferences, and behavior concern- 
35 The manufacturer can sometimes convince consumers that they really do desire the added 
feature, even when the addition is objectively pointless: 
Pepsi-Cola accomplished this by stamping freshness dates on soda cans. The company 
spent about $25 million on an advertising and promotional campaign to convince consum- 
ers that there's nothing quite as horrible as a stale can of soda - even though it has been 
estimated that 98% of all cans are consumed well before this could be a problem. Six 
months after introducing the campaign, an independent survey found that 6i% of respon- 
dents felt that freshness dating is an important attribute .... 
SOLOMON, supra note 24, at 287. 
36 Richard Thaler has conducted a fascinating experiment illustrating similar heuristic rea- 
soning that could lead to exploitation. He gave two groups of subjects the following question, 
with the bracketed material varying between groups: 
You are lying on the beach on a hot day. All you have to drink is ice water. For the past 
hour you have been thinking about how much you would enjoy a nice cold bottle of your 
favorite brand of beer. A companion gets up to go make a phone call and offers to bring 
back a beer from the only nearby place where beer is sold, [a fancy resort hotel] (a run- 
down grocery store). He says that the beer might be expensive and so asks how much you 
would be willing to pay for the beer. He says he will buy the beer if it costs as much or 
less than the price you state, but if it costs more than the price you state he will not buy it. 
You trust your friend, and there is no chance of bargaining with the [bartender] (store 
owner). What price do you state? 
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and the Assumptions of Eco- 
nomics, 59 J. Bus. S285, S287-88 (i986) (summarizing the experiment). The median response for 
the fancy hotel beer was $2.65, whereas the median response for the run-down grocery store ver- 
sion was $I.50. See id. at S288. "Evidently, people are willing to pay different amounts for a beer 
to be consumed on the beach, depending on where it was purchased." Id. Preference structures 
like this allow the fancy hotel to charge a higher price than the grocery store for an identical 
product, even when that product will not be consumed on the premises and no benefit accrues 
from the store's atmosphere. 
37 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note ii, at notes I34-63, 242-50 and accompanying text 
(reviewing those heuristics). 
38 See MALHOTRA, supra note i8, at i66. 
39 MICHAEL R. SOLOMON, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR: BUYING, HAVING, AND BEING 30 (3d ed. 
I996). 
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ing a product category."40 Sometimes focus groups are used for the 
benign purpose of gathering information on product improvements 
that almost everyone would agree have utility. A sugar manufacturer, 
for instance, recently used focus group interviews to learn that con- 
sumers would prefer sugar packaged in easy-pour containers similar to 
milk cartons.41 At other times, the researcher may probe beyond mere 
self-reporting of preferences and venture into psychological territory of 
which the consumer herself is only vaguely aware. After a cleaner, 
more efficient alternative to cockroach spray sold well below expecta- 
tions in rural areas of the Southern United States, researchers assigned 
to the problem asked a focus group of representative women to draw 
pictures of cockroaches and describe their feelings about them. To the 
researchers' surprise, all the insects were drawn as males and the sto- 
ries accompanying the drawings clearly revealed feelings about the 
men in the subject women's lives. Researchers learned that for these 
women, "killing the roaches with a bug spray and watching them 
squirm and die allowed [them] to express their hostility toward men."42 
The cockroach study is an example of the use of projective tech- 
niques in qualitative research: "A projective technique is an unstruc- 
tured, indirect form of questioning that encourages respondents to pro- 
ject their underlying motivations, beliefs, attitudes, or feelings 
regarding the issues of concern."43 Such methods are typically associ- 
ated with motivational research, which attempts to discern "the identi- 
fication of consumers' motives ... [through] oblique techniques for ex- 
posing hidden motives."44 Actual examples of this type of research 
might strike the reader as bizarre: 
A group of housewives [is] standing in a room. Unknown to them, ob- 
servers with video cameras are watching through a one-way glass window. 
One woman starts to advance on another only to be met with protests: 
"Go away, you rotter. You'll scratch me, upset me ...." 
... These women have been stopped in the street and persuaded to re- 
veal their innermost feelings about kitchen cleaners. In this particular 
part of the session, they are gameplaying. The woman doing the protest- 
ing ... is playing a kitchen sink! The objects of her words are women 
acting out the part of two competing brands, one of which she obviously 
does not like.45 
40 Id. 
41 See MALHOTRA, supra note i8, at i63. Squeeze bottle containers for ketchup might repre- 
sent another example of the results of such benign information-gathering. 
42 DAVID A. STATT, UNDERSTANDING THE CONSUMER: A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH I07 
(I997) (quoting C. Fischer, It's All in the Family: Empty Nesters, Kids Moving Back Home, 
ADVERTISING AGE, April I992, at 27) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
43 MALHOTRA, supra note i8, at I78. 
44 GORDON R. FOXALL & RONALD E. GOLDSMITH, CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY FOR MARKET- 
ING i6 (I 994). 
45 ERIC CLARK, THE WANT MAKERS 79-80 (i988). 
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Not all motivational research is this esoteric, however. Often re- 
searchers use familiar techniques such as word association, sentence 
completion, role playing, or "psychodrawings" (in which subjects, like 
the women in the cockroach case described above, "draw" their feel- 
ings about certain products). The ultimate goal in each case is to un- 
cover the subject's true feelings or beliefs about the relevant product. 
A fabled (among marketing researchers) triumph of this type of re- 
search involved a Betty Crocker instant cake mix. Originally, the mix 
required the addition of only water. Then researchers showed women 
two grocery lists, one that included ingredients for a cake and one that 
substituted the mix. The women reported that users of the second list 
were more likely to be lazy or irresponsible. From those reports, the 
researchers concluded that women would feel guilty or inadequate us- 
ing the instant cake mix if it only required the addition of water, so 
product engineers redesigned the mix to call for the addition of both 
water and an egg.46 A more recent example of motivational research 
involved a firm that conducted a picture response test in which re- 
spondents were asked to describe a picture of people consuming high- 
calorie foods. "A significant number of the respondents defended the 
behavior of the people in the picture by explaining that the increased 
stress in everyday life has caused people to turn ... to comfort 
foods."47 Among the "[m]any marketers [who] have capitalized upon" 
the absence of negative associations with fattening foods is Haagen- 
Dazs, which introduced an ultra-rich Extraas line of ice cream that 
raised the company's market share by two percent.48 
Motivational research has its origins in psychoanalytic theory.49 
Other consumer behavior research draws from such disciplines as op- 
erant conditioning,50 cognitive learning theory,5' cultural anthropol- 
46 Sales, of course, increased. See id. at 78. 
47 MALHOTRA, supra note i8, at i8i. 
48 Id. at i8i-82. 
49 See SOLOMON, supra note 39, at I36. 
50 See id. at 78-80. Insights gleaned from this subdiscipline include the importance of repeti- 
tion in successful product advertising, the ability of manufacturers to generalize established stim- 
uli (that is, well-known brands) through family branding or product line extensions, and the bene- 
fits to producers from providing positive feedback to consumers through product rebates or 
frequent flier points. See id. at 73-76. 
51 See STATT, supra note 42, at 85-92. Researchers have applied cognitive learning theory in 
extensive studies on consumer memory to learn how the timing and frequency of advertising can 
be used to maximize campaign effectiveness, how mnemonic slogans aid consumers in product 
recall, and how picture placement increases the chance that consumers will read ad copy. See 
SOLOMON, supra note 24, at 88-9i. One surprising application of cognitive psychology is in the 
use of time compression to accelerate commercial narration to about I20% to 130% of normal 
speaking pace. In addition to allowing marketers to convey more information in 30 seconds, some 
researchers claim that time compression "has been shown to increase persuasion in some situa- 
tions." SOLOMON, supra note 39, at 64. 
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ogy,52 and socialization theory.53 Each subdiscipline advances a set of 
theories about consumer behavior and a corresponding methodology 
for studying that behavior. For instance, "retail anthropologist" Paco 
Underhill records about fifteen thousand hours of videotape per year 
monitoring customer behavior and maintains a video library of over 
one hundred thousand hours of noteworthy footage.54 By studying the 
tape, Underhill has identified such phenomena as the "Decompression 
Zone," in which customers "downshift" for approximately fifteen feet 
upon entering a store, and the "Invariant Right," when customers "in- 
variably and reflexively" turn to the right after making it through the 
Decompression Zone.55 Because customers lack focus while "down- 
shifting," retailers tend to leave the Decompression Zone free of prod- 
uct displays; the area on the Invariant Right - where consumers re- 
gain their focus - is often so valuable that retailers can rent it to 
manufacturers at a significant premium. 
Underhill has also vocally supported one of the latest explosions in 
marketing research: the study of child consumers.56 Because children 
spend around $7 billion and influence the expenditure of an additional 
$I50 billion annually, marketing researchers have begun to pay them a 
significant amount of attention.57 Although marketers have applied 
conventional research methods to children, they have also learned that 
children require some special treatment: "Undertaking market research 
with children not only requires skill in framing questions, analyzing 
responses, and utilizing the other tools of the trade .... [Kids] take 
spontaneity seriously. Marketers who venture into their world 
shouldn't squelch that - it's in those wonderful, spontaneous mo- 
ments that smart marketers make the most amazing discoveries."58 
Observing children, researchers have determined the following: toy 
store "real estate" near the cash register is the most valuable to manu- 
facturers because parents have already removed their wallets59 and are 
52 See STATT, supra note 42, at I74-91. For a discussion of insights obtained from cultural 
anthropology methodologies in retail environments, see the discussion below on page I436. 
53 See STATT, supra note 42, at 130-43. Socialization theory has played a major role in under- 
standing consumer behavior, primarily in unraveling family, gender, age, and class influences on 
individual preferences. See id. at 113-73. A great deal of recent attention has centered on what 
causes some consumers to be "innovators" or "early adopters" (that is, willing to try new products 
and technologies). By understanding what motivates these consumers, manufacturers hope to 
capitalize on the social clout such individuals typically have within their peer groups. See 
SOLOMON, supra note 24, at 533-34. 
54 See Jean E. Palmieri, Retail Consultant Paco Underhill on the State of the Store, DAILY 
NEWS REC., Oct. 29, I997, at io. 
55 Malcolm Gladwell, See Me Feel Me Touch Me Buy Me, THE INDEP. (LONDON), Feb. i, 
1997, Shopping Section, at 8. 
56 See Paco Underhill, Kids in Stores, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, June I, 1994, at 22, 22. 
57 See GUBER & BERRY, supra note 20, at 3. 
58 Id. at 43. 
59 Id. at I 2 I. Purchases resulting from temper tantrums at the cash register are representative 
of a broader phenomenon: "Parental yielding occurs when a parental decision maker is influenced 
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generally eager to dodge scene-causing tantrums; in order to avoid al- 
ienating parents who object to the hard-sell tactic of putting candy in 
the checkout aisle, retailers should place sugarless gums and trail 
mixes next to the candy;60 and retailers of adolescent products should 
locate stores in shopping centers because the mall provides kids with 
an audience for their purchases "[a]t any age [when] peer approval is 
critical."6' Because the study of children is a relatively new subdisci- 
pline of marketing research,62 experts believe that the field will con- 
tinue to grow and reveal extensive new marketing opportunities for 
manufacturers. 
We could continue indefinitely to describe the various iterations of 
qualitative research and consumer behavior theory. Our aim, however, 
is not to bore (or scare) the reader but simply to show that manufac- 
turers are studying consumer psychology and behavior, much as cogni- 
tive psychologists and behavioral economists are studying human deci- 
sionmaking behavior. Although we argued in our accompanying 
article that manufacturers need not deliberately attempt to manipulate 
consumer perceptions,63 we believe that the existence and magnitude 
of qualitative research provides evidence that they are engaging in de- 
liberate manipulation. 
3. Broader Implications of the Consumer Culture. - Along with 
these increased efforts by manufacturers to understand the consumer, 
there has been a decline in the consumer protection movement. At 
least one commentator, John Kenneth Galbraith, believes that this de- 
cline is not merely coincidental: 
With the development, perhaps one should say exploitation, of the modern 
consumer economy has come a marked change in social concern as regards 
consumer products. There was once the consumer movement - a deter- 
mined investigation of, and report on, the value and utility of various con- 
sumer products and supporting public regulation and education. This 
continues but with a diminished sense of social urgency. The poor still 
need guidance on what they buy, including protection against consumer 
scams. For the more affluently supplied there is no similar urgency. 
There is no social need for according guidance on the purchase of a 
Cadillac or a Mercedes Benz. Or for that matter, designer jeans or a vast 
by a child's request and 'surrenders.'" SOLOMON, supra note 24, at 388. Retailers seek to maxi- 
mize parental yielding. 
60 See GUBER & BERRY, supra note 20, at ii9. Note that the marketing researchers do not 
recommend removing both the candy and the healthy items from the checkout aisle - to do so 
would mean removing one of the most valuable instigators of unplanned purchases. See infra p. 
I446. 
61 GUBER & BERRY, supra note 20, at I22. 
62 See id. ("[Tihe demographic burst of baby boomers reaching parenthood has focused so 
much attention on children and family that marketers both of traditional children's products and 
service categories and of those from other fields are studying the market more closely than has 
ever been done before."). 
63 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS 1, supra note i i, at notes 542-43 and accompanying text. 
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range of other affluent products. As consumer necessity yields to fashion 
and persuasion, concern for consumer protection and choice inevitably re- 
cedes.64 
One need not take Galbraith's view to recognize that today's con- 
sumers face a difficult path if they desire to live up to the consumer 
sovereignty model.65 Typical car lots, for example, are now filled with 
some 300 kinds of vehicles, and the average supermarket contains over 
twenty-one thousand different products.66 Obtaining relevant quality 
and safety information about these products is often infeasible for con- 
sumers, especially when the search must occur amid the cacophonous 
din of $350 billion worth of advertising each year. 
Of course, one might object that consumers need obtain only in- 
formation on the limited class of products that they need or want. 
However, "needs" and "wants" are complicated concepts that are influ- 
enced by factors both internal and external to the consumer: "A domi- 
nant, perhaps the dominant social and technological determinant of 
behavior in affluent societies has been summed up as 'consumer cul- 
ture,' and, more specifically, 'retail culture."'67 Each day, eighteen bil- 
lion display ads appear in newspapers and magazines throughout the 
United States;68 each year, fourteen billion shopping catalogs are 
mailed to consumers' homes.69 Inflation-adjusted per capital expendi- 
tures on advertising have increased eightfold since I935.70 Even if 
these pervasive advertising efforts do not artificially "create" consumer 
needs, they almost certainly do much more than merely convey infor- 
mation about products that consumers already desire. Some commen- 
tators have argued that the impact of advertising includes a dramatic 
rise in the incidence of clinical depression in developed countries as 
commodities are substituted for social networks,71 an acute sense of 
personal dissatisfaction among women and the elderly as advertisers 
idealize unrealistic body images and youth,72 and a reckless disregard 
64 John Kenneth Galbraith, Foreword, to THE CONSUMER SOCIETY at i, xxii (Neva R. Good- 
win, Frank Ackerman & David Kiron eds., I997) (emphasis added). 
65 The consumer sovereignty model, which depicts consumers as the ultimate dictators of the 
type and quantity of commodities purchased, assumes that consumers are well-informed and that 
the market is otherwise efficient. 
66 See STATT, supra note 42, at I3. 
67 FOXALL & GOLDSMITH, supra note 44, at i (citations omitted). 
68 See MICHAEL JACOBSON & LAURIE ANN MAZUR, MARKETING MADNESS: A SURVIVAL 
GUIDE FOR A CONSUMER SOCIETY i8 (I995). 
69 See ALAN THEIN DURNING, How MUCH Is ENOUGH? THE CONSUMER SOCIETY AND 
THE FUTURE OF THE EARTH I22 (I992). 
70 See JACOBSON & MAZUR, supra note 68, at I5. 
71 See, e.g., Robert E. Lane, The Road Not Taken: Friendship, Consumerism, and Happiness, 8 
CRITICAL REV. 52I (I994) (examining the destructive relationship between consumerism and so- 
cietal depression). 
72 See, e.g., Richard W. Pollay, The Distorted Mirror: Reflections on the Unintended Conse- 
quences of Advertising, J. MARKETING, Apr. i986, at i8, 26-2 7. 
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for the environmental costs of consumption.73 Whether these charges 
are accurate, they nonetheless indicate that the effects of the consumer 
culture are far more complicated than classical economics would ad- 
mit. As Galbraith puts it, economistsst, one could only conclude, did 
not (still do not) watch television."74 
Although we find this debate over the ultimate impact of advertis- 
ing fascinating, our purpose here is far more limited: to show that 
manufacturers have in place a well-funded and extensive research sys- 
tem for studying consumer behavior. In fact, they have the fruits of $8 
billion per year in marketing research expenditures when it comes to 
understanding consumer behavior and psychology.75 The resulting 
studies and analyses provide the tools that manufacturers need to 
shape consumer perceptions of their products, to alter consumer be- 
havior in the purchasing context, and to influence consumer-safety risk 
assessments.76 Moreover, as one can see, this research substantially 
overlaps with general behavioral research. Sometimes this overlap is 
explicit: a recent textbook on consumer behavior, for instance, included 
an entire section on "Heuristics."77 Even without an explicit reference, 
perusal of the literature gives one a sense that marketing researchers 
are keenly aware of the works of Kahneman, Tversky, and other be- 
havioral researchers. Indeed, Tversky once remarked that his findings 
would have been familiar to "advertisers and used-car salesmen," even 
though his findings were not familiar to classical economists.78 
B. Evidence of Manufacturer Manipulation 
of General Product Perceptions 
We have stressed that manufacturers invest $8 billion per year 
studying consumer psychology and behavior, but do they ever put the 
resulting knowledge into practice? Do they, in other words, actually 
manipulate consumer risk perceptions and preferences? In this sec- 
tion, we offer evidence that they do. Our evidence is primarily con- 
73 See, e.g., DURNING, supra note 69, at 49-6i. 
74 Galbraith, supra note 64, at xxi. 
75 See supra p. I429. 
76 One might also argue that the competitive market drives out fruitless research investments, 
so that the continued practice of marketing research is evidence of its veracity. See infra pp. 
I507-09. 
77 See STATT, supra note 42, at 228-30i; see also Irwin P. Levin & Gary J. Gaeth, How Con- 
sumers Are Affected by the Framing of Attribute Information Before and After Consuming the 
Product, I5 J. CONSUMER RES. 374, 377-78 (i988) (framing effects); Itamar Simonson, Choice 
Based on Reasons: The Case of Attraction and Compromise Effects, i6 J. CONSUMER RES. I58, 
170-72 (i989) (context effects); Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff 
Contrast and Extremeness Aversion, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 28i, 28i (I992) (context effects); 
Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, i J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 
43-47 (i98o) (endowment effects). 
78 Roger Lowenstein, Outsider Who Challenged Dismal Science, WALL ST. J., June 6, i996, at 
Ci (quoting Tversky) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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fined to two particular product markets: the gas station and the su- 
permarket. We have selected these markets because intuition suggests 
that gas and grocery shopping would present relatively few opportuni- 
ties for perceptual manipulation - after all, for most consumers, these 
purchases are the most frequent ones that they make. If there were 
any places where consumers should be savvy to manufacturer ma- 
nipulation, they would be the supermarket and the gas pump.79 The 
truth, however, is disappointing. 
Before turning to those markets, we offer two examples of ma- 
nipulation from a market that almost everyone recognizes as employ- 
ing manipulative tactics - the market for used cars. As most used-car 
sellers know, potential customers should never be shown just one car.80 
When the seller introduces irrelevant options, the consumer becomes 
biased in favor of options that she originally disfavored.81 Thus, the 
car that did not seem attractive at first becomes more attractive as ad- 
ditional cars are added to the mix. An equally popular tactic among 
car dealers is to display a sticker price prominently on each car. Al- 
most everyone knows that the eventual sale price will be less than the 
sticker price, but the dealer nonetheless gains an advantage from set- 
ting the initial price. Why? Because, as Kahneman and Tversky note, 
the final price will be biased toward the "anchor," in the dealer's fa- 
vor.82 Unlike openly fraudulent tactics, such as turning back the 
79 We acknowledge that there is an alternative view: because grocery purchases tend to in- 
volve small dollar amounts, consumers' incentives to ferret out exploitation may be comparatively 
weak. Our own view is that the repeat-purchase nature of gas and grocery shopping might coun- 
teract that factor. Uncovering a particular manipulative practice may save the consumer only a 
few cents per item, but over a year or a lifetime of purchases, the savings should add up signifi- 
cantly. In any event, other products liability scholars have maintained that the information prob- 
lem facing consumers is not as great as it might seem because of the repeated purchases that con- 
sumers make of the same products. See, e.g., Patricia M. Danzon, Comments on Landes and 
Posner: A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability, I4 J. LEGAL STUD. 569, 572 (i985) 
("Thus for many common consumer products, repeat purchase undermines the argument that it is 
not rational for consumers to process information about low-probability events."); Epstein, supra 
note 5, at 2204 ("[T~he de minimis argument is flawed, for while the frequency of accidents may 
be low, the number of repeat purchases is very large, so that contracting with the consumer would 
be worthwhile if the manufacturers wanted to disclaim the risk.'). Moreover, even assuming that 
consumers might not recognize these long-term benefits (quite likely, given myopic discounting, 
see Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note iI, at notes 2ii-i8 and accompanying text), the sheer 
frequency and duration of the gas and grocery purchasing experiences should give the consumer 
ample opportunity to uncover manipulation, regardless of how small the potential savings. After 
all, what else does one do while waiting at the pump? Finally, we hasten to mention that when 
selling automobiles and homes - two consumer purchases presenting a far greater potential for 
savings - retailers appear to adopt many of the same practices found at supermarkets and gas 
stations. See infra p. 1442. Thus, it would appear that manipulative practices persist in both 
high-frequency, low-cost markets and in low-frequency, high-cost markets. 
80 See Lowenstein, supra note 78, at Ci. 
81 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note i i, at note 483 and accompanying text. 
82 See id. at notes 158-63 and accompanying text (describing the anchoring effect). For the 
same reason, consumer guides to automobile purchasing typically recommend that consumers ob- 
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odometer, those two tactics represent examples of more subtle, cogni- 
tive manipulation - manipulation that most consumers do not experi- 
ence as such. 
The consumer encounters similar tactics at the next stop after her 
car purchase, the gas station. Much attention has been given to the 
notion of offering cash discounts rather than credit card premiums.83 
"Indeed, the credit card lobby is said to insist that any price difference 
between cash and card purchases should be labeled a cash discount 
rather than a credit surcharge."84 The credit card industry does so be- 
cause a "cash discount" takes advantage of framing effects. As we dis- 
cussed in our companion article, the frame within which information is 
presented can significantly alter one's perception of that information, 
especially when one can perceive the information as a gain or a loss.85 
By avoiding the perception that paying by credit card results in a loss, 
gas retailers also avoid a decrease in demand from credit card consum- 
ers. 
Another notable pricing tradition among gas stations is the extra 
nine-tenths of a cent that retailers add to the price of each gallon of 
gas. It is a common tactic among all retailers to set prices below some 
"round" number (for example, $1.99, $4.95, $0.99). Marketing re- 
searchers recently offered the following explanation for this phenome- 
non: 
In the terms of [Kahneman and Tversky's] prospect theory, the high ac- 
cessibility of the sending round-number price may cause a 9-ending price 
to be framed as a round-number amount along with a small gain. Be- 
cause of prospect theory's negatively accelerated function for the value of 
gains, the perception of a small gain would be expected to improve the 
tain information on the dealer's invoice price. These guides are arguably encouraging consumers, 
rather than dealers, to drop the bargaining anchor. 
83 See, e.g., Jimmy Thornton, Law Bans Credit Surcharges, Not Cash Discounts, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., Oct. 3I, i985, at E2 available in LEXIS, News Library, SDUT File (noting that 
California has joined six other states in banning the practice of charging credit card premiums 
over and above a posted price, but not the practice of offering cash discounts below the posted 
price). 
84 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. 
Bus. S254, S26i (i986). 
85 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note ii, at notes 242-43 and accompanying text. Some 
commentators have explained the discount/surcharge disparity in terms of prospect theory: 
Station A wisely suggests a higher regular price ($I.30) as an implicit reference point for 
buyers and then rewards buyers who pay cash with a discount, that is, a gain relative to 
the reference point. But station B unknowingly turns buyers away by framing its price dif- 
ferently. It establishes a lower regular price ($I.20) as a reference point and then penalizes 
buyers who use credit cards with a perceived loss. 
Gerald E. Smith & Thomas T. Nagle, Frames of Reference and Buyers' Perception of Price and 
Value, 38 CAL. MGMT. REV. 98, IOO (I995). 
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evaluation of a price to a degree disproportionate o the perceived gain's 
small size.86 
In other words, consumers think they are getting a better deal than 
they really are. How else could one explain the fact that in one study 
unit sales of margarine increased only sixty-five percent when the price 
was reduced from $o.89 to $0.7i, but soared a whopping 222% when 
the price was dropped to $o.69?87 
The addition of nine-tenths of a cent, however, seems unique to gas 
stations. The custom appears to capitalize on what one commentator 
calls "probability blindness near the extremes."88 This phenomenon 
can be explained with a simple illustration: "[W]e are ready to pay 
good money for a lottery ticket that gives us a 99 percent chance to 
win a coveted prize, but are not ready to pay a penny more to increase 
that probability to 99.9 percent. We do not see the difference."89 
Similarly, when gas retailers price their product at $i.i99, they may be 
counting on consumers' inability to perceive the difference between 
that price and $i.i9, thereby exacting an extra nine-tenths of a cent 
from consumers with every gallon of gas. Indeed, if one considers that 
price blindness might extend to the second decimal place as well as the 
third, then gas station operators may be extracting far more. For in- 
stance, if consumers cannot perceive the difference between $I.I5 and 
$i.i9', then they forfeit four and nine-tenths cents with every gallon. 
Although one might think that this last example is less plausible 
than consumers' failure to see the superscripted "9" at the gas station, 
there are reasons to believe that consumers display price blindness in a 
variety of pricing contexts. Indeed, even in the contexts of car sales 
and home sales - probably the two largest and most deliberative pur- 
chases that most consumers make - we see the same pricing strategy 
that we find at the gas station. Casual perusal of home ads in any 
newspaper, for example, will reveal that home sellers typically ask an 
amount below some "round" number (for instance, $I95,000). In this 
manner, they take advantage not only of price blindness at the ex- 
tremes, but also of consumers' mental accounting habit of setting a 
budget limit prior to searching for a house.90 Because home buyers 
generally set this limit at a "round" number (for instance, $200,000), 
the home will remain within the consumer's buying range. What is 
significant is that the home may be worth, and the consumer may 
value it at only, say, $i87,000. Through the combination of price 
blindness and mental accounting forces, however, the consumer will 
86 Robert M. Schindler & Patrick N. Kirby, Patterns of Rightmost Digits Used in Advertised 
Prices: Implications for Nine-Ending Effects, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. I92, I93 (I997) (citations 
omitted) (citing research by Kahneman and Tversky, as well as by Thaler). 
87 See Smith & Nagle, supra note 85, at iio tbl.3. 
88 Piatelli-Palmarini, supra note I3, at 33. 
89 Id. at 33-34. 
90 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS 1, supra note i I, at notes 5o6-23 and accompanying text. 
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find the $I95,000 price agreeable - or at least far more palatable than 
a price of, say, $20I,000. 
The foregoing discussion of pricing customs highlights the some- 
what imprecise nature of identifying manufacturer manipulation. 
Citing four prominent marketing researchers and a principal research 
associate at M.I.T.'s Center for Cognitive Science, we have offered 
three different explanations for the omnipresent practice of putting a 
"g" in the right-most digit of any price. Despite this lack of consensus 
among expert observers on the rationale for the practice, the reader 
should note that one group is in agreement about the value of the 
practice - manufacturers and retailers. For whatever reason, the 
market has evolved to a point at which only manufacturers who capi- 
talize on the pricing practices have survived, an indication of the prac- 
tices' ability to increase sales. We therefore believe that this pricing 
example illustrates the potential of manipulative manufacturer tactics 
to outpace the understanding of behavioral researchers, a possibility 
we raised in our companion article.9' 
One might object to the superscripted "9" at the gas station as a 
fairly tame example. Consumer demand may be inelastic over that 
nine-tenths of a cent anyway, such that the manipulation has no real 
impact. Consider, then, the case of high octane fuel: oil company ad- 
vertising has led many consumers to conclude that such premium fuel 
will make their car start more easily, get better mileage, and last 
longer.92 Oil industry officials acknowledge, however, that only vehi- 
cles with high-performance engines (less than ten percent of the mar- 
ket) actually benefit from high-octane fuel.93 The result is that con- 
sumers are sold between $i billion and $3 billion worth of high-octane 
gas that they do not need.94 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
has been aggressively challenging this practice for some time. A recent 
settlement with Exxon required the company to undertake an educa- 
tional marketing campaign that explains to consumers that high- 
octane gas will not improve performance in most vehicles.95 The prac- 
tice persists, however, and consumers continue to purchase high-octane 
fuel in far greater numbers than could possibly benefit from the pre- 
mium gasoline. We suspect that this industry practice results in a so- 
91 See id. at notes 448-49 and accompanying text. 
92 See SOLOMON, supra note 24, at 22. 
93 See Matthew L. Wald, Looking for Savings as Gas Prices Rise, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, i989, 
at 48, 48. Indeed, one advertising executive speculates that the only purpose for buying higher- 
octane fuel is "the use of premium as an expression of self-worth." Id. 
94 See, e.g., Chris Reidy, FTC, Exxon Settle Gas Ad Dispute, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. i8, I997) 
at C2 (quoting American Automobile Association estimates that "US motorists have spent $I.7 
billion a year more than necessary'). 
95 See FTC, Exxon Settles FTC Charges - Ground-Breaking Educational Ad Campaign Or- 
dered (June 24, I997) (news release available at <http://ftc.gov/opal Igg7/g7o6/exxon.html>) (on 
file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
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cial loss more serious than the nine-tenths of a cent described above. 
Equally serious, perhaps, is another way in which gas station operators 
may replicate behavioral research concepts to manipulate consumer 
perceptions: by offering several different grades of octane, gas station 
operators may be taking advantage of the irrelevant-third-option ef- 
fect. For example, even if consumers prefer eighty-seven octane fuel 
when their choice is between eighty-seven and eighty-nine, they may 
opt in favor of eighty-nine when sellers introduce a third option, 
ninety-three octane fuel.96 
The lesson from this brief trip to the gas station is simple: in a very 
competitive market in which we all make routine yet significant pur- 
chases, there are numerous overt forms of manipulation that consum- 
ers do not perceive as manipulation. We find the fact that such prac- 
tices are obvious yet undetected to be extremely revealing. In our 
view, it represents fairly strong evidence that manufacturers are capa- 
ble of manipulating consumer perceptions in just the manner predicted 
by the model in our companion article. 
The gas station, however, is marketing child's play when compared 
to the consumer's next stop, the modern supermarket. In large part 
because the market for groceries in the United States is so sizable and 
competitive, marketing researchers have devoted more attention to the 
supermarket than to any other retail environment. The cumulative re- 
sult of their efforts is a marketing marvel, a shopping climate scientifi- 
cally calibrated to induce as many unplanned purchases as can possi- 
bly be wrought from the "sovereign" consumer. We discuss this 
phenomenon in depth, because we believe it vividly illustrates con- 
sumer susceptibility to manipulation. A market capable of producing 
the modern supermarket is a market capable of untold manipulation. 
The experience begins the moment one walks through the auto- 
matic doors. In that instant, one is first exposed to atmospherics, the 
"conscious designing of space to create certain effects in buyers."97 
The goal, of course, is to induce in the consumer a particular state 
predisposed to relaxed consumption: "[Atmospheric] factors . . . may be 
designed into or manipulated within retail spaces in order to produce 
emotional and, in turn, behavioral effects in consumers."98 This design 
is not mere speculative showmanship on the part of retailers. By 
studying psychological analyses of mood states, marketers have deter- 
mined that "a mood state (either positive or negative) biases judgments 
96 Many consumers would be surprised to learn that gas stations typically use only two differ- 
ent grades of fuel to deliver several options. Thus, a station offering 87, 89, 9I, and 93-octane fuel 
might have only tanks containing 87 and 93 and blend those two grades to get 89 and 9i. See 
IVAN L. PRESTON, THE GREAT AMERICAN BLOW-UP: PUFFERY IN ADVERTISING AND SELLING 
i06-07 (i996). 
97 Philip Kotler, Atmospherics as a Marketing Tool, 49 J. RETAILING, Winter 1973-1974, at 48, 
50. 
98 FOXALL & GOLDSMITH, supra note 44, at I89. 
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of products and services in that direction."99 Therefore, a consumer in 
a positive mood "pay[s] less attention to specifics of the message and 
rel[ies] more on heuristic processing."100 That is, by inducing the 
proper mood, retailers can encourage the use of heuristics, or market 
beliefs, in shoppers. As we observe in section A, the use of heuristics 
by consumers creates an opportunity for manipulation by manufactur- 
ers.'01 Moreover, as we explained in our companion article, develop- 
ing positive affect within consumers with respect to a particular prod- 
uct or a particular shopping venue can greatly enhance the perceived 
utility - and significantly lower the perceived risk -that those con- 
sumers attribute to the product or the shopping venue. 102 Thus, when 
marketers seek to manipulate consumer "mood states," they are at- 
tempting to capitalize on the nonrational, experiential mode of infor- 
mation processing that consumers utilize when in affective response 
modes. 103 
Atmospherics can encompass a wide range of manipulable factors: 
"The ability of physical surroundings to shape consumer behavior is 
nowhere greater than in retail environments. The range of social, 
physical and temporal features ... which ... impinge on consumer 
behavior in such environments is enormous: lighting, aisle width, store 
size, heating, crowdedness and so on."104 Atmospherics involve more 
than just knowing that blue color schemes impart calm sensations105 
and that shoppers "walk more slowly and spend more time when the 
music is slow in tempo."'06 They also involve knowing that piped 
aromas (fake, of course) can increase bakery sales'07 and that a 
butcher's white apron should never be blood-stained.'08 They involve 
knowing that deli selections can be used to create the illusion of 
99 SOLOMON, supra note 1 4, at 3 I I. 
100 Id.at 33. 
101 See supra p. 1432. 
102 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note ii, at notes 475-78 and accompanying text. 
103 Id. 
104 FOXALL & GOLDSMITH, supra note 44, at I75. 
105 See Joseph A. Bellizzi & Robert E. Hite, Environmental Color, Consumer Feelings, and 
Purchase Likelihood, 9 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 347, 359-6i (I992). 
106 STATT, supra note 42, at 245-46. Although the effects of "functional music" such as Muzak 
on shoppers are fairly well-known, some applications are less familiar: 
Research shows that workers tend to slow down during midmorning and midafternoon, so 
Muzak uses a system it calls "stimulus progression," in which the tempo of its music in- 
creases during those slack times. Muzak has been linked to reductions in absenteeism 
among factory workers, and even the milk and egg output of cows and chickens is claimed 
to increase under its influence. 
SOLOMON, supra note 24, at 48. 
107 This phenomenon has been recognized by George Loewenstein, whose account of visceral 
forces provides an explanation of such consumer behavior; Loewenstein also proposes to incorpo- 
rate those forces into standard economic analysis. See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note ii, at 
notes 229-4I (summarizing Loewenstein's work on visceral factors). 
108 See Jack Hitt, The Theory of Supermarkets, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. I0, i996, ? 6 (Magazine), at 
56. 
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choice'09 and that spraying water on waxed produce can cause visceral 
improvements in customer perception. In short, they are about "store 
gestalt." 10 
The aim of atmospherics, like all supermarket sleights-of-hand, is 
to maximize unplanned purchases. Observers estimate that two out of 
every three supermarket purchases are not planned. "' For some 
products the ratio is even higher: "[Approximately] 85 percent of candy 
and gum, almost 70 percent of cosmetics, and 75 percent of oral hy- 
giene purchases are unplanned."112 However, just because a purchase 
is unplanned does not mean that it is irrational or suboptimal. Re- 
searchers attribute approximately one-third of unplanned buying to in- 
store recognition of new needs."13 Still, combining this figure with the 
earlier report that two-thirds of all supermarket purchases are un- 
planned indicates that fully forty-four percent of all supermarket pur- 
chases can be considered impulse buying, or splurchases as they are 
known in the trade. This statistic is not surprising because the aver- 
age time to make buying decisions in a supermarket is a matter of sec- 
onds."14 Even when products require label reading, the decision to 
buy takes an average of only thirty-eight seconds."l5 The aim of su- 
permarket science, therefore, "is to use merchandising techniques that 
maximize the number of opportunities for impulse buying."'6 Careful 
manipulation of atmospherics is only the beginning of that odyssey. 
An enormous amount of attention has also been paid to in-store 
advertising. For instance, manufacturers spend $I3 billion each year 
for point-of-purchase stimuli to induce impulse shopping."7 Point-of- 
purchase stimuli range from simple product displays or coupon dis- 
pensers to elaborate retail theaters."18 For example, the manufacturers 
of Charmin built on their "Don't squeeze the Charmin" theme by de- 
ploying the Charmin Squeeze Squad to hide behind stacks of toilet tis- 
sue and jump out, blowing horns at unsuspecting squeezers. Market- 
ers working for a rat poison company devised a rat funeral 
109 See id. at 57 (describing the use of imported cheeses as visual stimuli rather than as poten- 
tial sales because "the luxury of feeling consumed by that blizzard of choice only gained its pleas- 
ure from the security of not having to make one"); see also STATT, supra note 42, at 284 (noting 
that in Britain, nine different varieties of apples are typically available in supermarkets, although 
2000 different varieties have actually been produced in Britain, reflecting a common "tendency to 
present the appearance of abundant choice while in fact drastically narrowing down the options 
available to the consumer"). 
1 10 SOLOMON, supra note 2 4, at 3 I 7. 
111 See id. at 316. 
112 Id. 
113 See id. at 3I7. 
114 See K.W. Kendall & Ian Fenwick, What Do You Learn Standing in a Supermarket Aisle?, in 
6 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER ESEARCH I53, i56 (William L. Wilkie ed., I978). 
115 See id. 
116 STATT, supra note 42, at 247. 
117 See SOLOMON, supra note 24, at 3I8. 
118 See id. at 3I4. 
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complete with somber music and a black shroud for the deceased ro- 
dent - to promote its product. Elizabeth Arden designed a computer 
dubbed "Elizabeth" that allows customers to see their appearance with 
different makeup styles without actually applying the product."19 Al- 
though these point-of-purchase stimuli may seem to represent a lot of 
squandered creative energy, they have been shown to increase splur- 
chases by at least ten percent.120 Other examples of in-store advertis- 
ing include the following: audio product announcements over the su- 
permarket's existing Muzak system (Muzak claims that such 
techniques can increase sales by almost thirty percent in certain prod- 
uct categories, such as toothpaste and cold medicine);'2' shopping carts 
with computer screens that automatically display advertisements in 
appropriate areas of the store;'22 and the Checkout Channel, a televi- 
sion programming effort of the Thrner Broadcasting System designed 
specifically for supermarkets.123 
Dead rats and toilet paper police seem like mere gimmicks when 
compared to the scientific exactitude with which the field of product 
placement is conducted. By now, many consumers understand that 
staples such as milk, bread, and eggs are placed at opposite extremes 
of the supermarket to force shoppers to cover as much store real estate 
as possible. Some consumers may also know that most produce aisles 
are designed as mazes to encourage meandering among the many fruits 
and vegetables on display (which are, of course, waxed and freshly 
sprayed for appearance). Of course, knowing of such techniques does 
not necessarily render one immune to their effects. Regardless, how 
many consumers would know that "many supermarkets have installed 
wider aisles to encourage browsing, and the widest tend to contain 
products with the highest margin"?'24 Or that aisle length is cali- 
brated to encourage meandering down well-stocked corridors (because, 
of course, "customers within short aisled areas ma[ke] fewer impulse 
purchases")?125 Or that factors such as "block shape, aisle orientation, 
[and] linear checkout arrangements" are studied in order to determine 
the optimal tradeoff between store friendliness and traffic effi- 
ciency?126 The point of these endeavors is simple: "Store managers use 
the layout of the store . . . to keep customers longer in the store with- 
119 See id. at 320. 
120 See id. at 318; see also STATT, supra note 42, at 248 ("There is no question that sales of the 
products are often increased as a result of these displays.'). 
121 See SOLOMON, supra note 24, at 319. 
122 See id. at 320. 
123 See id. 
124 Id. at 318. Consumers purchase low-margin items frequently enough that they are willing 
to expend higher search costs; thus, these items are stacked inconveniently in narrow aisles. See 
id. 
125 FOXALL & GOLDSMITH, supra note 44, at i85. 
126 Id. at i84-85. 
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out irritating them."1127 Placing staples in the far corners of the store, 
although still a mainstay of supermarket management, is only the first 
step: "The layout and location of products in any retail outlet is used 
to lead shoppers along a particular route that will give them optimum 
exposure to what is on sale and maximum encouragement to buy it.''128 
Having used store layout to maximize the customer's shopping 
time, managers turn to analyzing the effectiveness of shelves, aisles, 
and product displays within the selected layout. Some of this analysis 
is obvious: "At some point . . . [a] child will take the initiative to ask 
for a product or, if they have climbed out of the cart, toddle over and 
pick it out himself or herself. Grocers know this happens; that's why 
children's brands are usually on the lowest shelves in the store."'129 
Other shelving decisions require more thought: marketers have deter- 
mined, through careful study, that the strongest selling areas in super- 
markets are "the outer aisles, service areas (e.g., for vegetables, meat 
and bread), the start and end of the aisles, and the checkout area."''30 
Readers will recognize immediately why the checkout area is a strong 
selling space - the inevitable checkout line wait encourages impulse 
buying. It is no coincidence that candy and gum, with an unplanned 
purchase rate of eighty-five percent, occupy the checkout gauntlet. 
The start and end of the aisles are prime store real estate for a similar 
reason: the process of turning between aisles forces shoppers to slow 
down, thereby garnering more eye exposure for the products lucky 
enough to occupy the corner space. Finally, it is common practice 
among supermarket retailers to place large items such as pet food, 
laundry detergent, and diapers in the final aisles that shoppers reach 
- because, of course, the large packages would otherwise have pre- 
vented the shopper from filling her cart with other items along the 
way.131 
Even in the same aisle, not all space is equal. For example, the 
right side of the aisle is preferred to the left,132 and "[b]ecause the best 
viewing angle is I5 degrees below the horizontal, the choicest elevation 
on any aisle has been measured at 5I to 53 inches off the floor."133 
Not surprisingly then, "[s]tudies have shown that toothbrushes, if 
placed at eye level, will increase in sales by 8 percent."'134 Perhaps for 
such reasons, products with the highest per-unit price tend to be lo- 
cated on the right side of store aisles, at eye level. In addition, as we 
127 Id. at i85. 
128 STATT, supra note 42, at 248. 
129 GUBER & BERRY, supra note 20, at 117 (emphasis added). 
130 FOXALL & GOLDSMITH, supra note 44, at i85. 
131 See WILLIAM RATHJE & CULLEN MURPHY, RUBBISH! THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF GARBAGE 
152 (1992). 
132 See FOXALL & GOLDSMITH, supra note 44, at I85. 
133 Hitt, supra note io8, at 59. 
134 Id. 
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mentioned in our previous article, marketing researchers have discov- 
ered that stocking soup cans out of alphabetical order can greatly in- 
crease sales by forcing customers to search through a variety of 
cans.'35 Perhaps mindful of this information, many supermarkets sub- 
stantially rearrange all items throughout the store about twice a year. 
Yet another intra-aisle "behavior-triggering device[]"'36 consists of 
stocking merchandise in an "integrated" fashion, such as placing dips 
near chips. This technique can be especially effective when combined 
with other techniques. For example, high-margin crayons can be 
placed near lower-profit food items like children's cereal (both on the 
lower shelves, of course). 
Pricing has become still another method of manipulation. Super- 
markets often price staples such as milk and eggs very competitively, 
counting on consumers to use the low milk or egg price as a proxy for 
other items in the store. This practice may be an example of Kahne- 
man and Tversky's law of small numbers; that is, the erroneous belief 
that a small sample of a population - the prices of milk and eggs- 
will yield representative results for the entire population - the prices 
of all items in the store.'37 A second type of price manipulation relies 
on what researchers have termed the Just Noticeable Difference 
(JND).138 The JND refers to the fact that humans exhibit various 
thresholds of awareness such that a certain degree of change in a sen- 
sory stimulus is required before the change becomes noticeable to ob- 
servers. Psychologists study these thresholds in labs using different 
degrees of light brightness or sound pitch; marketers use them to im- 
plement hidden price increases: "In order to keep the price of a prod- 
uct fairly stable manufacturers will often decrease its size, in incre- 
ments carefully calibrated to be less than the consumer's JND."139 
Similarly, at the low end of certain product markets, where sensitivity 
to quality is less acute, manufacturers can respond to increased costs 
by degrading quality - again, below the consumer's JND.140 
Marketers can even use price discounts to manipulate consumers. 
Apparently, "for many shoppers it is the idea rather than the actuality 
135 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note ii, at note 545 and accompanying text; Hitt, supra 
note io8, at 58. 
136 FOXALL & GOLDSMITH, supra note 44, at i85. 
137 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note iI, at notes 149-52 and accompanying text. 
138 See STATT, supra note 42, at 45. 
139 Id. This strategy of product down-sizing is ubiquitous. An investigation by the New York 
Attorney General's office in i99i discovered 29 down-sized products on grocery shelves next to 
their former, larger incarnations. See Martin Sloane, Reducing Product Sizes Is a Growing Prac- 
tice, Hous. CHRON., May 22, i99i, at 4. Culprits included Rice-a-Roni (down IS% from 8 to 6.8 
ounces), Hershey's chocolate milk mix (down 9.4% from i6 to I4.5 ounces), and Ragu spaghetti 
sauce (down 9.7% from I5.5 to I4 ounces). See id. In each case, the product's price and package 
appearance remained the same. See id. 
140 See STATT, supra note 42, at 45 (describing the use of such a tactic for lowest-grade tea bags 
and instant coffee). 
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of the 'good deal' that seems to be important."''4' Armed with this 
knowledge, marketers can employ a host of techniques to convey the 
idea of a good deal, without actually offering one. For instance, one 
can often find eye-catching signs marked "Special" placed on super- 
market items that are not on sale. One study determined that forty 
percent of supermarket shoppers did not check the price of goods they 
chose, and less than half could identify the price of goods that they 
had just put in their shopping cart.'42 Thus, one can see how a seem- 
ingly obvious tactic, such as marking products "Special," can never- 
theless be an effective device for boosting sales. Manufacturers offer 
product rebates for a similar reason: only five to ten percent of product 
purchasers actually redeem them.'43 At the time of purchase, however, 
consumers anticipate the rebate and perceive the sticker price as lower. 
The foregoing discussion indicates that the study of opportunities 
for supermarket manipulation is a serious and fruitful affair: "The po- 
tential of these sources of influence over consumer behavior should not 
be underestimated, as they are readily usable techniques. They are 
particularly appealing to store owners and managers as they form one 
of the most cost-effective tools for generating increases in sales."''44 We 
believe that this sustained and deliberate strategy to induce impulse 
purchases represents strong evidence of manufacturer manipulation of 
consumer perceptions. The problem is not simply that supermarkets 
attempt to bias consumer decisions, but also that they do so with a 
battery of behavioral studies and psychological analyses at their dis- 
posal.'45 There seems to be no reason that manufacturers could not 
employ this same methodology to shape consumer risk perceptions. 
Indeed, in light of consumers' apparent susceptibility to manipulation 
of other product-attribute perceptions, it would be inexplicable if 
manufacturers did not attempt to engage in similar manipulation of 
risk perceptions. In the next section, we provide some modest evi- 
dence of precisely that type of manipulation. 
141 Id. at 248. 
142 See PR. Dickson & A.G. Sawyer, The Price Knowledge and Search of Supermarket Shop- 
pers, J. MARKETING, July I990, at 42, 42. 
143 See William M. Bulkeley, Rebates' Secret Appeal to Manufacturers: Few Consumers Actu- 
ally Redeem Them, WALL ST. J., Feb. IO, i998, at Bi. 
144 FOXALL & GOLDSMITH, supra note 44, at i85 (citation omitted). 
145 Indeed, as we argue above on page I427, one sometimes gets the impression that marketing 
researchers are discovering consumer behavioral quirks faster than behavioral researchers can 
explain them. For instance, although marketing researchers have discovered that placing a "limit" 
of twelve cans of soup per person can cause soup sales nearly to double, the behavioral literature 
does not seem to supply a ready explanation for this odd increase in demand. See Pamela Sebas- 
tian, Three-for-$3 and Other Numerical Pitches Work Marketing Magic in Stores, WALL. ST. J., 
Mar. I2, i998, at AI (summarizing a study by researchers at the University of Illinois, Urbana- 
Champaign). The simple idea that the "limit" creates an illusion of scarcity does not seem to cap- 
ture the phenomenon. 
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C. Evidence of Manufacturer Manipulation 
of Product Risk Perceptions 
Although we believe that the evidence presented in sections A and 
B of this Part is strongly suggestive of manufacturer manipulation of 
product risk perceptions, we admit that the evidence is only indirect. 
We argue that because consumers display susceptibility to manipula- 
tion in many features of product perception, we can also expect them 
to be susceptible to manipulation of product risk perceptions. This 
conclusion may not follow if manufacturers face particularly strong 
disincentives to manipulate these perceptions in particular. For in- 
stance, manufacturers might restrain their manipulative impulses in 
the belief that FTC or Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regula- 
tions prohibit such manipulative practices. Or they might feel the 
pinch of morals that counsel against manipulative conduct. Our gen- 
eral response to that possibility, which we explore in Part III, is simple, 
if disheartening: no force exerts a more significant influence on manu- 
facturer behavior than the force of the market. Neither the adminis- 
trative rules of government nor the inner tenets of morality can match 
the power of market forces to compel manipulation by manufacturers 
- and the market, of course, demands manipulation of both risk and 
non-risk perceptions. The evidence that we present in this section 
supports that contention directly by recounting a variety of incidents 
of deceptive or manipulative conduct aimed squarely at influencing 
consumer risk perceptions. 
I. Food Products. - One way in which "an adroit marketer can 
influence the buyer's perception"1146 is through the use of framing ef- 
fects, which refer to the tendency for information format (as opposed 
to content) to influence perceptions and behavior.147 Manufacturers of 
food products, for instance, have learned that labeling a food product 
seventy-five percent non-fat instead of twenty-five percent fat can 
greatly increase sales.148 If consumers behaved rationally with respect 
to product risk attributes, then sales figures would be unchanged re- 
gardless of the frame that marketers used to present nutritional infor- 
mation. Nonetheless, consumers do not behave rationally in this re- 
spect - frames do matter in product perceptions - and 
manufacturers are well aware of that fact. Consumers' response to 
framing effects is of crucial importance to our analysis, because the fat 
content of a food product can pose a serious health risk to consumers. 
If consumers purchase more of a food item when it is framed as sev- 
enty-five percent non-fat rather than as twenty-five percent fat, then 
we have reason to suspect that manufacturers are framing consumer 
146 Smith & Nagle, supra note 85, at I I4. 
147 See supra Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note i1, at 242-50. 
148 See SUTHERLAND, supra note 23, at 2 I. 
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risk perceptions and that consumer consumption levels may be in ex- 
cess of the optimal level.149 
As more consumers have become aware that food products raise 
health and safety issues,150 manufacturers have attempted to depict 
their product as a "health food," even when that depiction is inaccu- 
rate. Consider three manufacturer claims, each of which recently 
prompted action by the FTC: 
The operators of Pizzeria Uno, a national restaurant chain, reached 
a settlement with the FTC over claims that they had advertised their 
thin crust pizza as "low-fat" when in fact the pizza contained up to 
thirty-six grams of fat per serving - an amount well above both FTC 
and FDA guidelines for "low-fat" claims."5' When the makers of Ma- 
zola Corn Oil suggested that "eating chicken fried in Mazola oil or 
margarine reduces serum cholesterol,"'52 the FTC stepped in to require 
that the company provide further relevant information to consumers, 
including the fact that only a diet generally low in saturated fats and 
cholesterol could achieve the claimed health effects.153 The FTC also 
challenged the "Soup Is Good Food" advertising campaign of the 
CamDbell Soup Company for claiming that Campbell's soups "may 
help reduce the risk of some forms of heart disease,"154 when many of 
the extolled soups contained sodium levels above FDA recommended 
levels. Because the Campbell's campaign failed to disclose both the 
sodium levels of the soups and the link between high-sodium diets and 
heart disease, the FTC deemed it misleading.155 
149 Such considerations may have led the state of Maryland to force the Mid-Atlantic Milk 
Marketing Association to agree to refrain from advertising that whole milk is "less than 4% fat" or 
otherwise representing that milk is a low-fat food. NATIONAL Ass'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., 
CONSUMER PROTECTION REP., Oct. i988, at 7. It seems that the "4%" refers to weight, not to 
calories, and that when the fat content of whole milk is measured as a proportion of calories, the 
product fails federal low-fat guidelines by a wide margin. Cf. Judith Blake, 2 Percent is Not as 
Lean as 'Lowfat' Label Implies, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 20, I995, at Fi (noting that 2% low-fat 
milk, when measured as a proportion of calories, becomes 38% fat milk). 
150 See, e.g., Richard M. Cooper, Richard L. Frank & Michael J. O'Flaherty, History of Health 
Claims Regulation, 45 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 655, 657 (i990) (noting that thereee is no doubt 
that the growth of knowledge and information about the relationships between diet and health 
has resulted in important changes in the American diet"). 
151 See Charles R. Whitt, Pizzeria Uno Restaurant Chain Settles FTC Charges of Misleading 
"Low Fat" Thin Crust Pizza Ads, 9 Loy. CONSUMER L. REP. 2, 2-3 (I997). 
152 Elisabeth A. Sachs, Health Claims in the Marketplace: The Future of the FDA and the 
FTC's Regulatory Split, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 263, 277 (I993). 
153 See CPC International, Inc., 56 Fed. Reg. 5693, 5693 (F.T.C. i99i) (consent order); CPC In- 
ternational, Inc., 55 Fed. Reg. 25,371, 25,371-72 (F.T.C. i990) (proposed consent agreement). 
154 Cooper, Frank & O'Flaherty, supra note iso, at 670. 
155 See Campbell Soup Co., 57 Fed. Reg. 39,687, 39,687 (F.T.C. I992) (consent order); Campbell 
Soup Co., 56 Fed. Reg. I5,88o, I5,88o-8I (F.T.C. i99i) (proposed consent agreement). 
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Health claims156 such as those described above are nothing new in 
advertising. In I927, the William J. Wrigley Company penned this 
poem for its chewing gum: 
Little Miss Muffet 
Sits on a tuffet 
Eating of curds and whey; 
After she's through 
She will Double Mint chew - 
It keeps indigestion away!157 
Modern practices are somewhat more sophisticated. Advertisers 
frequently appeal to the authority of experts or to scientific studies be- 
cause, "[t]o the modern consumer, information labeled as 'scientifically 
proven' often assumes a posture of 'mystic infallibility.'`158 This con- 
sumer reverence creates an opportunity for manipulation. For in- 
stance, the manufacturers of Gerber baby food products recently 
agreed to stop claiming that four out of five pediatricians recom- 
mended Gerber products, after an FTC investigation revealed that 
only twelve percent of surveyed pediatricians recommended Gerber. 
The company left out pediatricians who did not recommend using 
baby food at all.159 Likewise, the nation's largest food supplement 
manufacturer, General Nutrition, Inc., paid a fine of $2.4 million to 
settle FTC charges that it "failed to substantiate disease-treatment, 
weight-loss, muscle-building, and endurance claims for over forty 
products."160 
As a result of practices like these, the FTC and the FDA have de- 
veloped a complex regulatory relationship in an effort to ensure that 
product labels and advertisements are not misleading or deceptive.16' 
Nevertheless, with health messages included in over $i billion worth 
156 Regulations promulgated under the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of I990, 2I 
U.S.C. ?? 32I, 337, 343, 343-I, 345, 37I (I994), define "health claims": 
Any claim ... that expressly or by implication, including "third party" references, written 
statements . . , symbols (e.g., a heart symbol), or vignettes, characterize the relationship of 
any substance to a disease or health-related condition. Implied health claims include those 
statements, symbols, vignettes, or other forms of communication that suggest, within the 
context in which they are presented, that a relationship exists between the presence or level 
of a substance in the food and a disease or health-related condition. 
2I C.F.R. ? IOI.I4(a)(I) (i998). 
157 Cooper, Frank & O'Flaherty, supra note I5o, at 656. 
158 Charles J. Walsh & Marc S. Klein, From Dog Food to Prescription Drug Advertising: Liti- 
gating False Scientific Establishment Claims Under the Lanham Act, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 
389, 392 (I992). 
159 See Gerber Prods. Co., I23 F.T.C. I365, I374-76 (I997). 
160 Justin Dingfelder & Sandra Brickel, To Protect Consumers, the FTC Means Business, 45 
FED. LAW. 24, 27 (I998). 
161 See generally Douglas W. Hyman, The Regulation of Health Claims in Food Advertising: 
Have the FTC and the FDA Finally Reached a Common Ground?, 5i FOOD & DRUG L.J. i9i 
(i996) (reviewing the regulations). 
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of food advertising in the United States each year,162 it is difficult for 
the agencies to conduct an adequate review of food product advertise- 
ments. The effect has been that deceptiveie ads for foods or supple- 
ments are a dime a dozen."1163 The cumulative impact of these numer- 
ous health claims by food product manufacturers is staggering. As one 
consumer psychology textbook author writes, "not only do buyers have 
to 'beware', they really have constantly to scrutinize and assess all the 
advertising, labeling and packaging of virtually everything they pick 
up in the supermarket - and a PhD in nutrition would be of great 
help too."'164 That informational onus complicates the consumer's al- 
ready daunting task, as we describe above in section B, of navigating 
the impulse-purchasing labyrinth created by supermarket managers. 
Under those circumstances - packaged-foods manufacturers and 
supermarket retailers conspiring to create a weekly ritual of misguided 
consumption - it is naive to presume that consumers can rationally 
process all the information necessary to optimize their purchases. Per- 
haps the informational challenge facing consumers partly explains why 
the incidence of obesity has risen in recent years to become one of 
America's most significant health threats.165 A national survey con- 
ducted by Dr. C. Everett Koop's nonprofit organization, Shape Up 
America!, revealed that although sixty-seven percent of obese respon- 
dents knew that limiting fat intake could provide numerous health 
benefits, about seventy percent were unknowingly consuming foods 
high in fat.166 The health threats presented by this type of mispercep- 
tion are not limited to obesity: in a survey conducted by the manufac- 
turers of Green Giant products, ninety-five percent of respondents had 
difficulty identifying high-sodium foods.'67 Thus, consumer misper- 
ceptions could affect the occurrence of heart disease as well as obesity. 
Indeed, when "you find a household name like Quaker Oats willing to 
claim, untruthfully, that its bran cereals reduce the risk of heart at- 
tack,"'168 it is easy to see how consumers might become confused about 
many aspects of dietary health. 
162 See FDA's Continuing Failure to Regulate Health Claims for Food: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations of the House Comm. on Gov't 
Relations, ioist Cong. 2 (i989) (statement of Rep. Ted Weiss, chairman). 
163 Ad Nausea, NUTRITION ACTION, Sept. I997, at 3, 3. 
164 STATT, supra note 42, at 282. 
165 See David Schardt, How's Your Weight?, NUTRITION ACTION, Dec. 1997, at II (summa- 
rizing studies indicating that 59% of men and 50% of women in America are "overweight" or 
"obese" under World Health Organization standards and collecting evidence of ill health effects of 
obesity). 
166 See Denise Mann, Web Site Offers Hints on Dieting, ARIz. REPUBLIC, May 29, 1997, at 
HL4 (summarizing study) (available at <http://newslibrary.krmediastream.com>) (on file with the 
Harvard Law School Library). 
167 See Libby Clark, Consumers Unaware of the Salt in Their Food, L.A. SENTINEL, Dec. 4, 
I997, at C7 (summarizing study). 
168 STATT, supra note 42, at 282. 
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Regardless whether manufacturers originally caused such consumer 
misunderstanding of dietary health issues, it is our contention that 
their packaging, labeling, and promotional efforts exacerbate it. This 
confusion poses serious health threats to consumers. As the FTC has 
warned, "false [health] claims may induce consumers to change their 
diets in a way that actually harms their health . . . [or] may discourage 
consumers from making essential dietary changes or seeking essential 
medical treatment."169 At the very least, false health claims may in- 
duce consumers to pay a premium for products that should not com- 
mand one.170 
2. Pharmaceutical Drug Products. - Another industry in which 
compelling examples of consumer manipulation exist is the pharma- 
ceutical drug industry, in which both consumption and advertising 
levels have recently exploded. "The use of medicines in the United 
States has increased more than the use of any other health resource 
over the past thirty years."1'' Nearly two-thirds of all patient visits in 
the United States now end with the doctor's writing a prescription.172 
From i988 to I994, the amount spent annually on direct-to-consumer 
advertising increased by an order of ten to $250 million.'73 Similarly, 
promotional efforts by pharmaceutical companies directed toward 
physicians now total approximately $2.5 billion per year.174 Those 
marketing efforts are relevant to our analysis because the pharmaceu- 
tical drug market poses obvious health and safety risks to consumers: 
"it is estimated that more than I25,000 Americans die annually as a re- 
sult of ingesting prescription medicines,'75 while millions of others ex- 
perience health-related side effects. In short, with prescription medi- 
cine sales totaling as much as $70 billion per year,176 manipulation of 
both consumer risk perceptions and physician prescribing behavior 
presents manufacturers with a significant opportunity for gain. 
In recent years, pharmaceutical companies have reversed long- 
standing practices and have begun marketing directly to consumers.'77 
169 Walsh & Klein, supra note I58, at 398. 
170 See id. 
171 Susan Heilbronner Fisher, Note, The Economic Wisdom of Regulating Pharmaceutical 
"Freebies", I 99 I DUKE L.J. 2 o6, 2 o6. 
172 See id. 
173 See Barbara J. Tyler & Robert A. Cooper, Blinded by the Hype: Shifting the Burden When 
Manufacturers Engage in Direct to Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 2 I VT. L. REv. 
I073, IO97-98 (I997). 
174 See Fisher, supra note I7I, at 2 IO. 
175 Bryan Christopher Moody, Prescription Medication and Consumer Protection: A Time for 
Reform, 5 J. PHARMACY & L. I9, I9 (I995). 
176 See Fisher, supra note I7i, at 2o6. 
177 See Michael C. Allen, Comment, Medicine Goes Madison Avenue: An Evaluation of the Ef- 
fect of Direct-to-Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising on the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 20 
CAMPBELL . REv. 113, II5 (1997) (noting the rise of direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical adver- 
tising). 
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Upjohn Company was the first drug manufacturer to do so. Its hair 
loss treatment, Rogaine, targeted male consumers by asking, "Can an 
emerging bald spot ... damage your ability to get along with others, 
influence your chance of obtaining a job or date or even interfere with 
your job performance?"1178 Another ad featured an attractive female 
stating unequivocally, "I know that a man who can afford Rogaine is a 
man who can afford me."179 Other drug manufacturers have followed 
suit: "Since the introduction of [direct-to-consumer] promotions and 
advertisements for prescription drugs in i980, almost all pharmaceuti- 
cal companies have engaged in this direct marketing practice."180 As 
one commentator notes, these campaigns bring to "bear all the slick 
pressure of which Madison Avenue is capable."181 
The difficulties that accompany this practice are manifest. "The 
marketing gimmick used by the drug manufacturer often provides the 
consumer with a diluted variation of the risks associated with the drug 
product."1182 Even without such manipulation, televisionin spots last- 
ing 30 or 6o seconds are not conducive to 'fair balance' [in presenta- 
tion of risks]."1183 Given such constraints, pharmaceutical ads often 
contain warnings of a general nature. However, researchrh indicates 
that general warnings (for example, see your doctor) in [direct-to- 
consumer] advertisements do not give the consumer a sufficient under- 
standing of the risks inherent in product use."1'84 Consumers often in- 
terpret such warnings as a "general reassurance" that their condition 
can be treated, rather than as a requirement that "specific vigilance" is 
needed to protect them from product risks.185 This lulling effect has 
been recognized by at least one court in refusing to shield a drug 
manufacturer from liability under the traditional learned intermediary 
doctrine:186 "[Intrauterine device] (IUD) manufacturers, through mass 
advertising and merchandising practices, generated a general sense of 
product quality, making it difficult for consumers to fully understand 
the risks involved with the use of an IUD."'187 The Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals seems to have understood intuitively that creating 
178 Tyler & Cooper, supra note I73, at I073-74. 
179 Id. at I074. 
180 Id. at i096. 
181 Eric P. Cohen, Direct-to-the-Public Advertisement Of Prescription Drugs, 3I8 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 373, 374 (i988). 
182 Tyler & Cooper, supra note 173, at I095. 
183 Cohen, supra note i8i, at 374 (citation omitted). 
184 Tyler & Cooper, supra note I73, at I097. 
185 Id. 
186 According to this doctrine, "the prescribing physician acts as a 'learned intermediary' be- 
tween the manufacturer and the patient, and 'the duty of the ethical drug manufacturer is to 
warn the doctor, rather than the patient ...."' MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 
65, 69 (Mass. i985) (quoting McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 528 P.2d 522 (Or. I974)). 
187 Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d io64, I070 (8th Cir. i989). 
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positive affective responses in consumers toward IUDs could signifi- 
cantly dull the consumers' appreciation of the risks of the devices.'88 
The most prevalent method for marketing pharmaceutical drugs, 
however, remains direct solicitation of physicians. The magnitude of 
such promotions should not be underestimated: the salespersons re- 
sponsible for making personal visits to physicians and hospital staff, 
often called detailers, spent more than $5000 for every physician in the 
United States in i988.189 Physicians meet with detailers an average of 
three to five times every week.'90 Detailers leave behind "reminders in 
the form of notepads, pens, rulers, and other useful 'freebies' engraved 
with the logo of the drug company and the product name."191 They 
frequently treat doctors and residents to lunches or dinners during 
which the detailers plug new pharmaceutical products. At other times, 
doctors are given large honoraria to speak at conferences sponsored by 
drug manufacturers.192 
Those practices seem fairly innocuous compared to the frequent 
prescriber program instituted by Wyeth-Ayerst after its blood pressure 
medication Inderal went off-patent: "To succeed in the tougher market 
[containing generics], the company offered frequent-flyer miles on 
American Airlines to physicians who prescribed the drug. Doctors 
who wrote fifty prescriptions would receive a free round-trip ticket to 
any destination in the continental United States."''93 Equally question- 
able is the practice of drug manufacturers' granting continuing medi- 
cal education credits to physicians for attending lavish, all-expense- 
paid conferences in exotic locales with their spouses and other 
guests.'94 Apart from the dubious educational value of such confer- 
ences, the receipt of credits - which are often required by state li- 
censing bodies - is sometimes contingent upon doctors' prescribing a 
product manufactured by the sponsoring company. When Janssen 
Pharmaceutical, a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, launched a new 
antihistamine, it gave "credits to doctors who prescribed the drug and 
read the company monograph."''95 
These promotional efforts have an impact on physicians and their 
prescribing behavioral96 Numerous studies have attempted to deter- 
188 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS 1, supra note ii, at notes 475-78 and accompanying text. 
189 See Fisher, supra note I7i, at 209-IO. 
190 See id. at 210. 
191 Id. 
192 See id. at 2II-12. 
193 Id. at 2I. 
194 See id. at 212 & n.27 ("Drug companies spent $5 million on symposia in 1974 and $85 mil- 
lion in I988. The locations now include resorts such as Palm Springs, Monte Carlo, and Aca- 
pulco. The drug companies provide rooms, meals, travel expenses, and, in some cases, cash hono- 
raria as high as $iooo to physicians who attend.'). 
195 Id. at 212. 
196 There is, of course, a strong argument that these detailers serve a valuable information- 
providing purpose. Although we do not doubt this proposition as a theoretical matter, we do 
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mine the influence of pharmaceutical marketing practices on physi- 
cians, but most of those have relied upon physician self-reporting. One 
study tried to overcome this potential bias by comparing physicians' 
own opinions with objective records of their actual prescribing his- 
tory.197 The study selected two classes of drugs, the efficacy of which 
commercial messages trumpeted even though scientific sources such as 
medical journals indicated that the drugs were ineffective. By consid- 
ering physician beliefs about the drugs alongside prescribing behavior, 
the study determined that physicians were significantly affected by 
pharmaceutical marketing practices: "Although the vast majority of 
practitioners perceived themselves as paying little attention to drug 
advertisements and detail men, as compared with papers in the scien- 
tific literature, their belief about the effectiveness of the index drugs 
revealed quite the opposite pattern of influence in large segments of 
the sample."1998 Other studies have supported this finding by observing 
that detailers generally provide a physician's first contact with a new 
product. 199 
Questionable manufacturer advertisements may also exert persua- 
sive influences on physician prescribing behavior. A study in the An- 
nals of Internal Medicine determined that ninety-two percent of a 
sample of pharmaceutical advertisements in professional journals 
failed to comply with FDA criteria in one or more of the twenty-eight 
categories examined.200 Of those advertisements, twenty percent "were 
judged to have no educational value," thirty-seven percent had little, 
thirty-three percent contained some, and only four percent included a 
great deal of educational value.201 Regarding the kind of impact such 
advertisements could have upon prescribing behavior, "[o]nly 44% of 
reviewers felt that the advertisement would lead to proper prescribing 
if a physician had no other information about the medicine other than 
that presented in the advertisement."202 The reviewers also stated that 
doubt whether it is borne out in practice. For instance, one study of detailer employment adver- 
tisements found that only four out of 99 advertisements for detailers stated that knowledge of 
drugs was an advantage. See Joel Lexchin, Doctors and Detailers: Therapeutic Education or 
Pharmaceutical Promotion?, I9 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVS. 663, 665-68 (i989). Consider also this 
rallying cry issued to detailers by Merck prior to a drug campaign: "Tell 'em [doctors] again, and 
again, and again. Tell 'em until they are sold and stay sold.... Take off the kid gloves.... Now 
every extra bottle of ioo Indocid that you sell is worth an extra $2.80 in incentive payments. Go 
get it. Pile it in!!!" Id. at 667. 
197 See Jerry Avorn, Milton Chen & Robert Hartley, Scientific Versus Commercial Sources of 
Influence on the Prescribing Behavior of Physicians, 73 AM. J. MED. 4, 4 (I982). 
198 Id. at 7. 
199 See Dale B. Christensen & Patricia J. Bush, Drug Prescribing: Patterns, Problems and Pro- 
posals, 15A SOC. SCi. MED. 343, 346 (i98i). 
200 See Michael S. Wilkes, Bruce H. Doblin & Martin F. Shapiro, Pharmaceutical Advertise- 
ments in Leading Medical Journals: Experts' Assessments, ii6 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 9I2, 9i6 
(I992). 
201 Id. at 9I7. 
202 Id. 
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only four percent of the ads would have been acceptable without 
change under peer review guidelines typical for professional journal 
articles.203 The physician-authors of this study deemed those discov- 
eries especially significant: "[A]dvertisements profoundly influence the 
way prescription drugs are used in our society.... Yet, too often, they 
are the decisive source of information about new pharmaceutical 
products."204 
All of these findings suggest that drug manufacturer promotional 
efforts may influence physician prescribing behavior in ways that are 
possibly detrimental to optimal patient care. Several physicians note: 
If we are to continue to practice medicine based on scientific data and its 
appropriate dissemination by medical journals and not industry-sponsored 
promotional medical education programs and/or public relations-inspired 
media efforts, we must take a stand against the type of prescribing pres- 
sure [that has been applied recently]. Otherwise, we might just as well 
give our prescription pads to our media and industry colleagues.205 
Even if the situation is not as dire as those commentators suggest, 
one should at least consider the possibility that the combination of di- 
rect-to-consumer advertising and promotional efforts targeted at phy- 
sicians has resulted in suboptimal prescribing and consumption of 
pharmaceutical drugs. When physical insecurities about baldness are 
consciously targeted in consumer ads, when fifty-seven percent of ads 
directed at physicians are judged to have little or no educational value, 
when physicians are rewarded with airline tickets for increasing the 
number of prescriptions they write - when those and other similar 
promotional efforts characterize the pharmaceutical drug market 
one might justifiably surmise that the concomitant demand for medi- 
cines is excessive. 
3. Environmentally Marketed Products. -Food and drug prod- 
ucts present a ripe opportunity for manufacturer manipulation because 
they are "credence goods" possessing qualities that are difficult for con- 
sumers to evaluate through normal use.206 In such a setting, manufac- 
turers "may be willing to incur risks that are socially unacceptable; 
and consumers have little ability to obtain or interpret risk information 
beyond that which the manufacturers supply."1207 Similar opportunities 
203 See id. 
204 Michael S. Wilkes, Bruce H. Doblin & Martin F. Shapiro, In Response, II7 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 6i8, 6i8-i9 (I992). 
205 Marvin Moser et al., Commentaries, Who Really Determines Your Patients' Prescriptions?, 
265 JAMA 498, 500 (I99I). 
206 Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, i6 J. 
L. & ECON. 67, 68-69 (I973); see also Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. 
POL. ECON. 3II, 3I2 (I 970) (distinguishing among "search goods," the quality of which consumers 
can evaluate prior to purchase, "experience goods," which consumers can evaluate only after pur- 
chasing and consuming, and credence goods, which consumers cannot reliably evaluate even after 
purchasing and consuming). 
207 PETER ASCH, CONSUMER SAFETY REGULATION 55 (i988). 
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for manipulation exist for manufacturers of products that pose envi- 
ronmental threats. Consumers began to exhibit significant awareness 
of environmental safety issues in product markets in the early 1990S.208 
As a consequence, manufacturers developed an entirely new promo- 
tional strategy, green marketing, which generally seeks to create the 
perception that a product is of some benefit to the environment or is 
less harmful to the environment than competitors' products. This 
trend has been highly influential;209 it has also led to many misleading 
claims by manufacturers. 
Because consumers display a "lack of ... knowledge about the 
meaning of vague environmental marketing claims such as 'recycla- 
ble,' 'degradable,' or 'environmentally friendly,"'210 manufacturers 
have ample opportunity to manipulate consumer perceptions of envi- 
ronmental risks. For instance, McDonald's apparently printed on 
hash-brown containers the three-arrow symbol that generally denotes 
recycled paper, even though McDonald's officials conceded that the 
containers were not made of recycled paper, were not being recycled, 
and probably could not be recycled due to a promotional label glued to 
each package.21' Likewise, the manufacturer of Mr. Coffee boasted 
that its coffee filters were produced through a "chlorine-free process;" 
in fact, the company had merely switched from a process using pure 
chlorine to one using a chlorine compound.212 In other instances, the 
misrepresentations are more brazen: the Orkin Exterminating Com- 
pany claimed that its lawn care pesticides were "practically non-toxic," 
and Safe Brands Corporation advertised its antifreeze as "essentially 
non-toxic" and "the ultimate in . . . environmental safety."'213 In both 
cases, the FTC found that the products actually created significant 
risks of harm to health and the environment.214 
We could provide many more examples. In each case, manufactur- 
ers are apparently attempting to dull consumer perceptions of the en- 
vironmental risks posed by their products. Sometimes this manipula- 
208 See Jeremy Rosen, Note, Requirements for Environmental Marketing Claims Under the 
Federal Trade Commission's Guides, 4 ENVTL. L. 24I, 24I (I997) ("After i990, the American pub- 
lic began to exhibit significant concern over manufacturers' promotion of the environmental bene- 
fits of their products and the products' packaging."). 
209 "Green marketing has become the marketing strategy of the i990s." Todd A. Rathe, Note, 
The Gray Area of the Green Market: Is It Really Environmentally Friendly? Solutions to Confu- 
sion Caused by Environmental Advertising, I 7 J. CoRp. L. 4I9, 420 (1992). 
210 Rosen, supra note 208, at 24I. 
211 See Rathe, supra note 209, at 421. 
212 Rosen, supra note 208, at 245 ("Because the new process continued to release a significant 
amount of dioxins and furans associated with chlorine bleaching, the FTC objected to Mr. Cof- 
fee's use of the phrase 'chlorine-free."'). 
213 Id. at 247 (quoting Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 6i Fed. Reg. 
53,3II, 53,3I5 (i996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We also feel obligated to call the 
reader's attention to the corporate name selected by the antifreeze manufacturer. 
214 See id. 
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tion simply capitalizes on existing consumer information asymmetries. 
A Proctor & Gamble magazine advertisement picturing a fertile "soil 
enhancer" claimed that "[n]inety days ago, [the soil enhancer] was a 
disposable diaper."'215 Consumers, unaware that the waste manage- 
ment technology necessary to accomplish such degradation of diapers 
was not available in most areas of the country, perceived Proctor & 
Gamble's diapers as less environmentally harmful than they really 
were.216 In other cases, the manipulation creates its own informational 
problems: the manufacturer of Saab automobiles caused significant 
confusion among consumers when it made the scientifically unfounded 
claim that its catalytic converters removed "ozone-punching hydrocar- 
bons."'217 Regardless of the mechanism by which consumer percep- 
tions are manipulated, the implication is the same: as a result of the 
green marketing blitz by manufacturers, consumers are prone to un- 
derestimate the environmental hazards posed by many products.218 
4. Products Marketed to Thrillseekers. - The foregoing discussion 
explored how manufacturers might seek to blur consumer perceptions 
of product risks. Manufacturers might also market hazardous prod- 
ucts by advertising only to those consumers who already underesti- 
mate the risk of the product or otherwise do not consider the risk to 
themselves significant. The widely used marketing tactic of targeting 
thrillseekers may reflect just such a strategy. Marketers have uncov- 
ered a valuable insight from psychology research regarding one class of 
consumers and their attitudes toward risk: "[A] personality type, Type 
T (for 'thrillseeker') has been identified in the United States" as a type 
who "actively looks for risk when making consumer decisions."'219 
Estimated at twenty-five percent of the U.S. population,220 thrill- 
seekers represent a substantial segment of consumers who are arguably 
under-appreciative of product risks and therefore susceptible to ma- 
nipulation by manufacturers.221 "Car ads emphasizing speed and ex- 
215 Rathe, supra note 209, at 425 n-53. 
216 See id. 
217 Id. at 423 (quoting Peter Knight, Business and the Environment: Tarnish Forms of the 
Green Image, FiN. TIMES, Apr. I7, i99i, at I2) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
218 Largely for this reason, the FTC has promulgated "Guides for the Use of Environmental 
Marketing Claims." See Rosen, supra note 208, at 243-56. 
It is also worth noting that to the extent that some consumers are unconcerned with the envi- 
ronmental implications of their purchases, manipulation of those consumers' perceptions will not 
affect demand. The evidence indicates, however, that environmental marketing claims do signifi- 
cantly influence buying behavior. See John M. Church, A Market Solution to Green Marketing: 
Some Lessons From the Economics of Information, 79 MINN. L. REV. 245, 250-54 (I994) (de- 
scribing evidence that nearlyry one in every two consumers has altered his or her purchasing deci- 
sions to help protect the environment"). 
219 STATT, supra note 42, at 59. 
220 See id. 
221 An alternative view would be that thrillseekers simply represent consumers who do not 
share the average person's aversion to risk. Although we believe that differing levels of risk aver- 
sion might partially explain the existence of the thrillseeker class, we also believe that cognitive 
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otic adventure are obviously aimed at this group,"222 as are the rash of 
in-line skating, mountain biking, snowboarding, and other adventure 
sport ads that have appeared in recent years to chase the $40 billion 
that Americans spend annually on sporting goods.223 Like automo- 
biles, these "extreme sports" - a moniker concocted by marketers224 
pose obvious safety risks: "In-line skating alone sent I05,000 people 
to the emergency room in I995."225 Consumers may inadequately ac- 
count for such hazards in the wake of advertisements deliberately de- 
signed to appeal to the thrillseeking aspect of their behavior. Indeed, 
mindful of those efforts, one might conclude that the Chevrolet Cor- 
vette's marketing rather than its machinery caused it to have the worst 
death rate of any automobile in the United States.226 
5. Products Utilizing Fear Appeals. - In contrast to thrillseekers, 
some consumers might behave pessimistically with respect to safety 
risks. When consumers overestimate the safety risks associated with a 
particular product, manufacturers might attempt to transform that 
overestimation into a selling opportunity. Because those consumers 
display an excessive appreciation of the product risks, they may be es- 
pecially responsive to marketing appeals that target consumer fears. 
In fact, evidence of marketing practices is consistent with this hy- 
pothesis: one widely used advertising strategy is the fear appeal.227 
"Fear appeals highlight the negative consequences that can occur un- 
less the consumer changes a behavior or an attitude."228 Such appeals 
bias factors, such as overconfidence, the illusion of control, and cognitive dissonance, contribute 
to the formation of the Type-T personality. See, e.g., Kim Pierce, High Risk, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, Mar. 24, i998, at Ci (quoting Dr. Frank Farley, past president of the American Psycho- 
logical Association and coiner of the term 1ype-T Personality, as saying that "T-types ... tend to 
believe they are in control of their fate"). In that respect, marketing strategies that encourage con- 
sumer risk-seeking behavior among thrillseekers are at least partially inefficient insofar as they 
rely upon cognitive bias factors in their appeal. 
222 STATT, supra note 42, at 59. 
223 See Brendan I. Koerner, Extreeeme: The Peril, the Thrill, the Sheer Rebellion of It All, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., June 30, I997, at 5I, 52. 
224 See id. 
225 Id. at 53. 
226 See Bill Adair, Is Your Car Safe? Here Are Real Figures, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 27, 
i99i, at iA. Howard Latin specifically anticipated this conclusion. See Howard Latin, "Good" 
Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 4I UCLA L. REV. II93, I234 (I994) ("Con- 
sumers must evaluate many products with both positive and negative attributes: A Corvette, for 
example, may be fast and stylish but also dangerous and costly. If people are attracted by attrib- 
utes such as style or power, dissonance may lead them to undervalue safety considerations."). 
227 Economists also seem to be aware of this phenomenon. Professor Viscusi, for instance, has 
studied situations under which "[n]ew information about risks may generate alarmist actions that 
are not commensurate with the magnitude of the risks." W. Kip Viscusi, Alarmist Decisions with 
Divergent Risk Information, I07 ECON. J. i657, i657-58 (I997). Viscusi, however, examined the 
implications of these alarmist reactions in the context of government policy toward disclosure of 
environmental hazards, see id. at i658-59, rather than in the market context of manufacturer 
manipulation of consumer susceptibility to alarmist reactions. 
228 SOLOMON, supra note 24, at 253. 
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are widespread, appearing in over fifteen percent of all television 
ads.229 Many of the ads emphasize the hazards that the product is de- 
signed to alleviate, to the exclusion of the often significant hazards 
posed by the product itself. The manufacturers of Contac cold medi- 
cine, for instance, conducted a survey of 8oo consumers that revealed 
that people feel widespread anxiety over losing their jobs. The manu- 
facturers quickly designed an advertising campaign featuring a con- 
struction worker wading through a rainstorm, saying that he needed to 
take Contac in order to get to work that day. Staring into the camera, 
the worker added the ominous message, "No work, no pay."230 
We admit that one might view this type of advertising as manipu- 
lative of consumer risk perceptions generally but not manipulative of 
consumer product risk perceptions in particular.23' This distinction, 
however, does not always render the manipulation irrelevant to prod- 
ucts liability analysis. If the fear appeal is used to elevate demand for 
a product that is itself risky, then consumers may end up consuming 
too much of the risky product by virtue of the manufacturer's ma- 
nipulative marketing.232 A powerful illustration of this phenomenon 
can be seen in the gun industry's attempt to "capitaliz[e] on women's 
fears regarding personal protection and home defense."233 The Na- 
tional Rifle Association (NRA) has identified women as a potentially 
lucrative consumer group for gun manufacturers to target - some fif- 
teen to twenty million women already own guns. To further increase 
demand, the NRA placed its own ads in national magazines, depicting 
a woman walking through a dark garage with her young daughter.234 
Taking a similar approach, several manufacturers have introduced 
guns designed specifically for women: one company makes a .32 mag- 
num model called a "Bonnie" to go with a .38 "Clyde" for couples 
shooting, and another introduced the LadySmith, a revolver with a 
slimmed-down grip.235 The manufacturers' advertisements, contain- 
ing such lines as, "[t]he world is different today than when you grew 
229 See Lynette S. Unger & James M. Stearns, The Use of Fear and Guilt Messages in Television 
Advertising: Issues and Evidence, in i983 AMA EDUCATORS' PROCEEDINGS i6, i8 tbl. (Patrick 
E. Murphy et al. eds.). 
230 SOLOMON, supra note 24, at 253. 
231 Nevertheless, it does show that when consumers appear to overestimate the severity of a 
threat, manufacturers can attempt to capitalize on that fear through a certain type of marketing. 
Such tactics are equally effective when the threat in question comes from the product itself. 
232 For instance, users of Contac cold medicine, in a heightened emotional state because of irra- 
tional fears about losing their jobs, may not properly account for costs associated with the prod- 
uct's side effects. 
233 SOLOMON, supra note 24, at 254. 
234 See Kevin Goldman, NRA Says Its Ads Aimed at Women Are Educational, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 28, 1993, at B6. 
235 See SOLOMON, supra note 24, at 254. 
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up" and "personal security is a very real issue," have been criticized for 
being directed unfairly at women's fears.236 
From the perspective of products liability theory, the gun industry's 
advertising strategy is relevant because it seeks to increase weapon 
sales by utilizing one threat - the possibility of being a victim of vio- 
lence by some third party - while ignoring another, possibly more 
significant safety threat - the possibility of being harmed by one's 
own gun, either by accident or through capture and use by an attacker. 
At least twelve hundred people die yearly as a result of handgun acci- 
dents.237 Moreover, "possession [of a gun] is [statistically] more likely 
to result in injury to one's self or to a loved one, rather than to an in- 
truder."238 To compound the problem, research indicates that female 
gun owners display, on average, less concern than their male counter- 
parts for proper gun care, operation, and storage.239 Not surprisingly, 
manufacturers avoid mentioning the dangers that may result from this 
lack of education: "While fear appeals and personal protection themes 
have been used quite often in a manner that heightens a woman's 
sense of insecurity, clearly the majority of handgun marketers have 
chosen to ignore the subject of education."240 Thus, by exploiting 
women's fear of violence to increase demand for weapons among fe- 
male consumers, the gun industry may have caused women to dis- 
count, in a dangerous fashion, the intrinsic threat of death or injury 
from weapon ownership. 
An analogous example of manipulation occurred when manufac- 
turers of infant formula used a combination of fear appeals and other 
marketing techniques to increase the use of formula among mothers in 
developing countries. Beginning in the I950s, Nestle S.A. and other 
multinational corporations began marketing infant formula to those 
women.24' Marketing efforts included supplying free formula to hospi- 
tals (to the extent that fifty percent of doctors and seventy-five percent 
of nurses interviewed by an international health organization believed 
it was a good idea for formula company representatives to visit newly 
delivered mothers242); employing widespread appeals to the desire of 
236 Carrie Goerne, Gun Companies Target Women: Foes Call It "Marketing to Fear", MAR- 
KETING NEWS, Aug. 31, I992, at I (quoting Smith & Wesson ad) (internal quotation marks omit- 
ted). 
237 See Debra Burke et al., Women and Guns: Legal and Ethical Implications for Marketing 
Strategy, I2 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 393, 394 (I993). 
238 Id. 
239 See id. at 395. 
240 Id. at 396 (relying upon a study of 125 gun advertisements, all of which targeted women 
and none of which warned of the need for education). 
241 See Caryn L. Finkle, Comment, Nestle, Infant Formula, and Excuses: The Regulation of 
Commercial Advertising in Developing Nations, I4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 602, 603 (I994). 
242 See Nancy Ellen Zelman, Comment, The Nestle Infant Formula Controversy: Restricting 
the Marketing Practices of Multinational Corporations in the Third World, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 
697, 7I2 (I990). 
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women in developing countries to emulate "Western" or "modern" 
practices;243 and using women dressed as nurses to hand out free sam- 
ples in villages.244 Nestle and other manufacturers explicitly targeted 
mothers' fears about the health of their infants. Advertisement slo- 
gans included, "Mother's milk is sometimes deficient in providing the 
complete nutritional need," "Give your baby the benefit of modern re- 
search," and "Easy to digest Angel baby milk food is as gentle as your 
love."245 Thus, at the very least, the marketing "campaign ... gave 
the impression that the infant formula was a safe and easy-to-use sub- 
stitute for breastmilk."246 
Unfortunately, this marketing strategy failed to account for a host 
of developing country problems - illiteracy, poverty, and unsanitary 
conditions - which resulted in tragic product misuse. Often, formula 
was mixed with contaminated water, bottles were not cleaned properly, 
and prepared formula was not refrigerated, all resulting in the growth 
of deadly bacteria.247 Poverty-stricken mothers, unable to read pack- 
age instructions, mixed the formula with excessive amounts of water in 
order to stretch baby food dollars, grossly under-nourishing their in- 
fants in the process.248 Ultimately, an advisory group of the United 
Nations identified a strong "link between misleading formula promo- 
tion and infant mortality."249 Just as the gun industry targeted female 
consumers, manufacturers of baby formula employed a variety of 
marketing techniques to increase demand for a product that posed sig- 
nificant inherent health and safety risks. We believe this case is espe- 
cially instructive as an example of the way marketing practices might 
develop in unregulated markets. Indeed, it took an international boy- 
cott and a World Health Organization regulatory code for Nestle to 
begin reforming its practices.250 
While the gun and baby formula advertisements seized upon exter- 
nal fears, such as the threat of violence to women or medical risks to a 
child, other marketing strategies attempt to manipulate perceptions of 
243 See id. at 7I. 
244 See Finkle, supra note 24I, at 603. 
245 CLARK, supra note 45, at 143 (quoting an ad that was published in Pakistan) (internal quo- 
tation marks omitted). 
246 Finkle, supra note 24I, at 603. 
247 See id. at 603-04. 
248 See id. at 604. 
249 Id. 
250 See Zelman, supra note 242, at 733-4I. Nestl6's infant formula troubles have not been lim- 
ited to unregulated markets, however. After Nestle introduced a new line of formula in the 
United States, Good Start H.A. (H.A. was intended to stand for hypoallergenic), many mothers 
mistakenly interpreted the product as being designed specifically for babies with severe milk al- 
lergies. See Laura Epstein, Women and Children Last: Anti-Competitive Practices in the Infant 
Formula Industry, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 2I, 43 (i996). Because this misinterpretation had 
"dangerous consequences," the FDA as well as several state attorneys general investigated 
Nestle's marketing practices. Id. In a settlement, Nestl6 agreed to pay the costs of the investiga- 
tion and to refrain from marketing Good Start as hypoallergenic. See id. at 43-44. 
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risks posed by the use of the advertised product itself. In those cases, 
manufacturers simply try to make their products appear safer than 
they actually are. An advertisement for Volvo automobiles vividly il- 
lustrates this approach. Volvo, a manufacturer of automobiles widely 
perceived by consumers as safe, endeavored to reinforce this image 
through an advertisement showing a pickup truck crushing a series of 
cars but not harming a Volvo. An investigation by the Texas Attorney 
General's office revealed that the Volvo car used in the ad had been 
mechanically reinforced for the commercial.5' Thus, the manufac- 
turer deliberately attempted to manipulate consumer risk perceptions 
by depicting its product with safety capabilities that the actual product 
simply did not possess. 
D. Summary 
Although the preceding evidence is far from systematic, we believe 
that it supports our basic claim that manufacturers manipulate con- 
sumer perceptions. The markets that we have described as evincing 
manufacturer manipulation - food products, pharmaceutical drugs, 
environmental pollutants, weapons, and automobiles - are all mar- 
kets in which one would surmise intuitively that consumers are at least 
somewhat aware of the fact that health and safety issues are impli- 
cated by the product. When consumers are at least partially aware of 
health and safety risks, manufacturers have incentives to manipulate 
risk perceptions in the manner that benefits them most, whether that 
means creating alarmist fears about breast milk, understating a prod- 
uct's environmental costs, or falsely depicting an automobile's crash- 
worthiness.252 
The preceding evidence should also show that actual product mar- 
kets will be far more complicated than the predictions from our com- 
251 See SOLOMON, supra note 24, at 249; see also Volvo N. Am. Corp., II5 F.T.C. 87, 88 (1992) 
(alleging that the product demonstration was deceptive because the Volvo had been reinforced 
and the roof supports of the other cars had been severed). 
252 These incentives lead to what might be denoted the "Volvo Effect." Once the risks of a 
product are salient in consumers' minds, manufacturers begin advertising safety information - 
but not before. Prior to consumer recognition of the safety hazard, it is in the manufacturer's in- 
terest to remain silent on the issue. See AMERICAN LAW INST., I ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR PERSONAL INJURY 23I (i99i) ("In addition, firms are often reluctant to call consumers' at- 
tention to safety hazards by instructing them as to how to avoid those problems."); STEPHEN 
BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 28 (i982) (noting that in insufficiently competitive 
markets, firms may tacitly agree not to advertise safety); Bailey H. Kuklin, The Asymmetrical 
Conditions of Legal Responsibility in the Marketplace, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 893, 946 (i990) 
("[Manufacturers] may be reluctant to advertise safety data for fear of alarming potential consum- 
ers."); Howard A. Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CAL. L. 
REV. 677, 73i n.227 (I985) ("There are numerous reasons why producers may be reluctant to dis- 
close product-related safety hazards even when their goods are relatively safer than competing 
products."); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 562 n.i5 
(i985) ("Perhaps one reason for inadequate consumer information is that producers face disincen- 
tives to advertise safety."). 
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panion article suggest. Those ambiguities, however, do not render our 
central claim any less robust. It is our position that markets evolve to 
a point at which manufacturers behave as if they know and under- 
stand consumer's biases and cognitive shortcomings and can manipu- 
late them accordingly. That market evolution occurs whether or not 
we as theoreticians can precisely describe manufacturers' methods. 
Indeed, it occurs whether or not the manufacturers themselves can de- 
scribe the processes they are using. As the authors of a study in the 
Journal of Consumer Research note, "[the] shaping of managerial be- 
havior by market forces is likely to occur whether or not retail price 
setters are explicitly aware of ... consumer effects."253 The evidence of 
market manipulation that we offer may therefore represent only the 
practices that have been around long enough and are pervasive 
enough to be identifiable. Market manipulation may be far more 
prevalent and problematic than we could ever demonstrate.254 
II. A CASE STUDY IN MANUFACTURER MANIPULATION: 
THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY 
In this Part, we devote careful study to the conduct of the tobacco 
industry. We have chosen to focus on cigarettes largely because, of all 
contemporary product markets, we believe that this one is, for several 
reasons, most likely to reveal manipulative manufacturer conduct. 
First, the industry's enormous cash flow from repeat purchases of to- 
bacco products allows the industry to spend unparalleled amounts of 
money on the tools of manipulation - including marketing research, 
promotion, public relations, and advertising.255 Second, the public has 
for some time been aware that tobacco products may pose serious 
health risks.256 That awareness, coupled with the fact that cigarettes 
are far and away the most dangerous consumer product marketed to- 
day, means that the incentive for manufacturer manipulation of risk 
perceptions is perhaps nowhere more strongly felt than in the cigarette 
253 Schindler & Kirby, supra note 86, at I92 (emphasis added). 
254 Indeed, a possibly fruitful research project may be to reverse the methodology we have 
taken in this Article and its companion. We have begun with the cognitive anomalies identified 
by behavioral researchers in hopes of predicting the manipulative tactics of manufacturers. This 
approach, however, is limited by certain difficulties of application. See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, 
supra note i i, at notes 443-44 and accompanying text. A different approach might be to examine 
the actual market behavior of manufacturers in order to learn more about cognitive anomalies. 
Given the powerful market forces driving the manipulative practices of manufacturers, consumer 
product markets may represent the ultimate laboratory for behavioral researchers. 
255 See W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKING: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION 35 (1992) [hereinafter 
VISCUSI, SMOKING] (noting that "[uln some years there have been more ads for cigarettes than for 
any other consumer product"). 
256 See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex 
Post Incentive-Based Regulation, I07 YALE L.J. I i63, I i8i-83 (i998). 
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industry. Third, the concentrated nature of the industry might have a 
catalytic effect on the industry's ability to manipulate.257 
We have chosen to focus on the tobacco industry also because the 
unprecedented litigation of recent years has had two major and related 
effects. First, it has transformed tobacco into perhaps the most signifi- 
cant products liability issue of the century, and it has placed tobacco 
near the top of national and state domestic policymaking agendas. In 
the litigation and in the policy debates, the question whether smokers 
are adequately informed is paramount.258 In short, we simply cannot 
imagine a more salient consumer product market to examine. Second, 
the litigation and resultant policymaking initiatives have uncovered 
enormous amounts of documentation and data regarding the once- 
secret details of industry conduct. Indeed, there is no other consumer 
product industry for which this amount of evidence is available. Thus, 
we as theorists are the beneficiaries of countless hours of research by 
public and private tobacco plaintiffs - research that is only just be- 
ginning to find its way into the law review literature or otherwise to be 
amassed for publication.259 
Although this effort presents an extraordinary opportunity, it also 
creates a need for caution. Many of the documents that we cite below 
have been provided to us, upon our request, by lawyers representing 
various tobacco plaintiffs, particularly the State of Washington and the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.260 These documents may reflect a 
sampling bias. Additionally, some of the inferences that we draw from 
the documents regarding actual industry conduct mirror allegations 
made by those tobacco plaintiffs in their complaints and in other liti- 
gation documents. Thus, it is imperative that readers understand that 
some of our descriptions of industry conduct may turn out to be in- 
complete or even inaccurate, particularly in the details. Moreover, 
there is reason to suspect that any inaccuracies in our descriptions will 
tend to be biased against the tobacco manufacturers. 
On the other hand, there are good reasons for assuming that the in- 
ferences we draw are, on the whole, reasonably accurate. After all, the 
257 See infra pp. I552-53. 
258 See Hanson & Logue, supra note 256, at ii81-83. 
259 There has, however, been some important work based on previously released documents, 
such as the Brown & Williamson documents that were leaked several years ago, and that work 
contains descriptions of the same type of conduct that we describe below. See, e.g., STANTON A. 
GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS (i996); PHILIP J. HILTS, SMOKE SCREEN: THE TRUTH 
BEHIND THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY COVER-UP (i996); RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES: 
AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED 
TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS (I 996). 
260 One of us has been involved as a consumer-information expert and consultant on several of 
the tobacco suits. However, that involvement began several years after we started this project 
and well after we had drafted the majority of this article and its companion. In any event, we are 
extremely grateful to the lawyers involved in those cases and several others for assisting us in lo- 
cating potentially relevant documents and briefs from both sides of the cases. 
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industry's litigation strategy has been less to deny the accuracy of the 
plaintiffs' factual allegations regarding the sort of conduct we describe 
below and more to deny that the allegations, if true, have any legal 
significance. Furthermore, the fact that the industry went to great 
lengths to avoid disclosing the evidence, and appears to have at- 
tempted to destroy or otherwise render inaccessible this evidence (a 
topic that we address below), suggests to us that our descriptions, al- 
beit unflattering, are neither unexpected nor generally unfair to the in- 
dustry. 
In section A of this Part, we provide a brief history of tobacco 
marketing, public relations, and other conduct that may have influ- 
enced consumers' risk perceptions and preferences. This history fur- 
nishes a fascinating case study in the relationship among consumer 
risk awareness, manufacturer market incentives, and regulatory meas- 
ures designed to constrain those incentives. The ambition of this sec- 
tion is to analyze the tobacco industry's practices from the perspective 
of the flourishing behavioralist literature - to examine whether the 
industry's conduct appears likely to influence the risk perceptions and 
preferences of consumers. The relevant history and current evidence 
strongly suggest that industry practices have indeed created and rein- 
forced consumer biases about the risks of cigarettes, and continue to 
do so - substantially lowering consumers' estimates of the risks of 
cigarettes and increasing their willingness to expose themselves to 
those risks. More importantly, the history makes it fairly clear that 
many consumers would not have begun smoking (or, having begun, 
would not have continued to smoke) cigarettes were it not for the 
manufacturers' successful and ubiquitous efforts to mislead via effec- 
tive cognitive manipulation. 
In section B, we reassess the scholarly debate over the accuracy of 
smoker risk perceptions. We review the evidence indicating the suc- 
cess of manufacturers' manipulations, including numerous recent so- 
cial science surveys that measure smokers' perceptions of the risks of 
smoking. We conclude that the case is quite strong that consumers do 
tend to underestimate the risks of smoking and that they do so in ways 
that are unsurprising in light of consumer biases and manufacturers' 
efforts to tap into them. Finally, we summarize and criticize the evi- 
dence offered by the industry and its primary consumer-information 
expert indicating that consumers are adequately informed of the risks 
of smoking. In addition to its more explicit goals, section B provides 
further evidence of the fact that risk assessments are dependent upon 
variables that an industry can easily take advantage of and manipu- 
late. 
We wish to emphasize, at the outset of this Part, that our history of 
tobacco marketing and our review of the smoker risk perception litera- 
ture are especially significant, as they provide the strongest evidence 
that manufacturer manipulation not only occurs, but also succeeds; 
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that is, in addition to offering, as we do in Part I, descriptive accounts 
of the types of manipulative practices that manufacturers use, here we 
are also able to advance actual empirical evidence that the manipu- 
lative efforts have resulted in lowered consumer risk perceptions. 
Thus, we believe that this case study in tobacco industry manipulation 
provides a degree of proof about consumer product markets greater 
than anything previously available in the academic literature. 
A. A Sample of Industry Conduct 
This section describes cigarette manufacturers' conduct by re- 
viewing three strategies central to retaining and expanding the size of 
the cigarette market. These strategies include the following: first, a 
vast range of marketing efforts designed to enhance the desirability of 
cigarettes; second, a concerted public relations effort to create and per- 
petuate "controversy" over the question whether cigarettes are harmful 
to health; and third, a careful orchestration and eventual suppression 
of internal research into the health issues raised by cigarettes. What is 
most revealing about these practices is that they occurred despite the 
industry's extensive knowledge of the actual health risks of smoking. 
Tobacco manufacturers have long known that cigarettes cause cancer, 
emphysema, and lung disease. They have also long known that nico- 
tine is addictive.261 Nevertheless, tobacco manufacturers have adopted 
a public posture that shuns any mention of health risks (except per- 
haps to downplay them) and have gone to great lengths to counteract 
the effect of eventual recognition by public health officials that those 
risks do exist. Consider the following evidence, then, in light of the 
fact that the industry's private awareness was remarkably at odds 
with its public facade. 
I. Creating Demand: The Industry's Marketing Triumphs. - No 
consumer product is as inexorably linked with modern advertising as 
is the cigarette. This section reviews a few of the tobacco industry's 
most striking marketing accomplishments, beginning with a selection 
of health-focused advertising campaigns from the first half of the cen- 
tury that, from a contemporary perspective, appear remarkable in 
their brazen attempts to deceive. Equally remarkable are the "health 
reassurance cigarettes" - filter-tipped and low-tar, low-nicotine ciga- 
rettes - that the industry developed to provide an appearance of be- 
ing safer or healthier than "regular" cigarettes while simultaneously 
manipulating the new products to ensure that they were not safer or 
healthier than "regular" cigarettes. Finally, this section also discusses a 
few of the ways in which tobacco manufacturers have focused their 
marketing talents on attracting young smokers in an effort to safe- 
guard the long-term vitality of their brands. 
261 This knowledge is discussed below on pages I500-0I. 
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(a) The Ascendancy of Cigarettes. - A major and constant chal- 
lenge for cigarette manufacturers has been to create demand for their 
products among non-smokers - no easy task at the beginning of this 
century, when the tobacco industry was insignificant, cigarettes were 
sparse, and ours was not yet a smoking culture. Yet demand for the 
cigarette was successfully established by an aggressive industry strat- 
egy: not only improving the product and its underlying technology, but 
also actively cultivating a receptive market for the product. The ciga- 
rette, according to Allan Brandt, is a "twentieth century phenomenon" 
that would have remained obscure were it not for developmentsns in 
agricultural technique, production technology, and industrial organiza- 
tion, as well as such factors as the introduction of the portable 
match...."262 More importantly, however, the cigarette culture was 
itself an industry-nurtured phenomenon, a combined product "of cor- 
porate capitalism, technology, mass marketing, and, in particular, the 
impact of advertising."263 
"Advertising promised consumers well-being and power" and 
thereby took the focus off the product, redirecting it toward "the moral 
and psychological value of the patron."264 Brandt writes, "Creating 
demand for relatively undifferentiated, nonessential items . . . was the 
core of the new consumer culture, which the cigarette epitomizes."265 
Cleverly targeted ad campaigns, such as the now-famous Marlboro 
Man,266 succeeded in creating demand for Marlboros and other ciga- 
rettes by conveying to smokers a sense of independence, autonomy, 
and sexuality.267 Not surprisingly, consumers soon associated ciga- 
rettes with desirable, abstract traits of the sort that they almost cer- 
tainly would not have perceived absent effective advertising. 
(b) Promotional Efforts to Solidify the "Smoking Lifestyle." - De- 
spite the favorable conditions for the mass production and marketing 
of cigarettes, manufacturers still had to surmount the widespread view 
that their products were potentially harmful: "As long as there have 
been cigarettes there has been concern about their impact on 
health."268 The nature and degree of that concern, however, have 
changed dramatically over time. During the early part of this century, 
the health risks of smoking were never clearly defined or understood, 
and the health concerns that were articulated tended to involve rela- 
tively trivial issues, such as whether cigarettes decreased smokers' 
262 Allan M. Brandt, The Cigarette, Risk and American Culture, in RISK I55, I57 (Edward J. 




266 Cf. infra note 344 (describing industry attempts to fashion such marketing icons to appeal to 
children). 
267 See Brandt, supra note 262, at I57. 
268 Id. at I56. 
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"mental efficiency" or stunted smokers' growth. Nevertheless, the is- 
sue was significant enough for manufacturers to turn to the emerging 
advertising and public relations industries for assistance.269 The re- 
sulting marketing campaigns not only reassured any consumers who 
were mindful of the ill-defined risks of smoking, but they also trans- 
formed the potential threat into an enormous boon for the industry - 
the totem of "good health" had both a unifying and a competitive ef- 
fect within the industry. Ironically, the threat raised by early health 
concerns and the industry's aggressive response to that threat may 
have only helped to entrench the cigarette in the American psyche as a 
major cultural and lifestyle icon. 
For instance, the health-oriented campaign by R.J. Reynolds To- 
bacco Company (RJR) for Camel cigarettes in the I930s revealed the 
enormous potential of an aggressive, multi-faceted advertising strategy. 
Some campaign advertisements directly refuted potential health risks 
"[Camels] don't get your wind" and "So mild . . . you can smoke all 
you want."270 Others ads portrayed Camels as a soothing health aid: 
"Get enough sleep and fresh air - find time for recreations. Make 
Camels your cigarette. You can smoke as many Camels as you 
please."271 RJR sometimes reinforced bold assertions like these with 
meaningless appeals to science: "A [fact]: Science Advances New Data 
That May Completely Change Your Ideas of Cigarettes."272 Still an- 
other method of reinforcing Camel's health claims and defenses was 
through endorsements by the medical establishment itself. RJR reas- 
sured the public that "[d]octors recommend Camel."273 Regardless of 
their veracity, these sorts of advertisements appear to have been ex- 
tremely successful. By the end of I937, Camels were outselling the 
main competition, Luckies and Chesterfields, by approximately forty 
percent.274 
269 See HILTS, supra note 259, at 2-7. In fact, in doing so, cigarette manufacturers were to be- 
come one of the chief beneficiaries and stimulants of the advertising and public relations indus- 
tries. See id. at 2. 
270 KLUGER, supra note 259, at 87. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. 
273 HILTS, supra note 259, at 2. Similarly, celebrity endorsements by actors such as Henry 
Fonda - who purportedly said, "My voice is important in my career. I smoke Camels because 
they're mild and have such rich flavor" - were intended to reinforce public trust in the product. 
STAT, SIXTY YEARS OF DECEPTION: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS & COMPILATION OF CIGA- 
RETTE ADS I925-I985, at 3I9 (quoting a I95 I RJR ad for Camels). After all, if tennis great Bill 
Tilden, the epitome of health and athleticism, believed that "[Camels] don't get my wind or upset 
my nerves," then any concerns by the average consumer were overstated. KLUGER, supra note 
259, at 88. 
274 See KLUGER, supra note 259, at 88. Camels' competition, perhaps recognizing the power 
behind such advertising, adopted similar, if less intense, strategies. An advertisement for L & M 
Filter cigarettes featured the tag-line "Just What the Doctor Ordered." Id. at 185. A typical ad 
for B & W's mentholated cigarette in the I930s read, "Like a week by the sea, this mild menthol 
smoke is a tonic to hot, tired throats." Id. at 93. 
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But to date, the most effective and aggressive campaign came from 
Philip Morris, which boldly called their product "[tihe cigarette that 
takes the fear out of smoking."275 In the early I930S, Philip Morris fi- 
nanced a pair of studies that purported to demonstrate that its Marl- 
boro brand had health advantages over its rival products because only 
Marlboro used diethylene glycol (instead of glycerine) as a humidifying 
agent.276 Soon thereafter, Philip Morris began claiming in advertise- 
ments that diethylene glycol was "the greatest achievement in cigarette 
manufactur[ing] since the introduction of cigarettes themselves."277 By 
I938, advertisements boasted that Philip Morris's "research files" con- 
tained "exhaustive data from authoritative sources"278 supporting their 
health claims: "Recognized laboratory tests have conclusively prove[d] 
the advantage of Philip Morris over other cigarettes,"279 and studies 
have "proved conclusively that on changing to Philip Morris, every 
case of irritation due to smoking cleared completely or definitively im- 
proved."280 
The accuracy of those advertising claims, in hindsight, is laughable. 
Even at the time, however, there were critics. In I938, Consumer Re- 
ports published the results from their taste and chemical tests of thirty- 
six brands of cigarettes. Despite Philip Morris's claims to having pro- 
duced a less irritating smoke, and notwithstanding "[t]he aura of sci- 
ence surrounding their 'proofs,"' the magazine found that the substitu- 
tion of glycol for glycerine "ha[d] probably little more than a 
psychological effect in reducing irritation felt by the smoker."'281 Ac- 
cording to Richard Kluger, "All that Philip Morris had really prove[d] 
was that in the creation of deceptive advertising, it could compete toe 
to toe with the big boys."282 
(c) Health Reassurance Cigarettes. - Following increased public 
awareness of the dangers of smoking in the I950s, manipulation of 
consumer risk perceptions became a much more complicated process 
for cigarette manufacturers. A favorite tactic was the development of 
"revolutionary" new types of cigarettes that could be positioned as 
"safer" cigarettes. Like Phillip Morris's "diethylene glycol" cigarette, 
these products were the result of industry advances in marketing, 
rather than technological expertise: 
Recently released documents regarding a conference of tobacco company 
scientists in I968 demonstrates that several of the scientists at the confer- 
ence emphasized the distinction between a "[h]ealth image" or "health re- 
275 HILTS, supra note 259, at 66. 
276 See KLUGER, supra note 259, at ioo-oi, I31. 
277 Id. at I02. 
278 Id. 
279 Id. at I3I. 
280 Id. at IO2. 
281 Id. 
282 Id. 
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assurance cigarette," such as a "low tar-low nicotine cigarette which the 
public accepts as a healthier cigarette," and a "[h]ealth-oriented" cigarette, 
which is intended to be truly safer.283 
By emphasizing the role of "health reassurance cigarettes," manufac- 
turers could create the perception of a safer product, irrespective of 
whether the product actually was safer, thereby slowing or even halt- 
ing the decline in consumer demand for cigarettes. 
(i) Filter-Tipped Cigarettes. - The first such attempt was the in- 
dustry's introduction of filter-tipped cigarettes. In the early I95 Os, the 
cigarette companies marketed filters as "trapping the dangerous com- 
ponents of cigarette smoke but letting the 'flavor' through."284 Ironi- 
cally, the most successful early filter, touted quite explicitly for its 
health protection properties, used asbestos as the filtering agent. Lor- 
illard Tobacco Company (Lorillard) advertised the filter as removing 
"[seven] times more nicotine and tars" and offered demonstrations so 
"you can see the proof of Kent's health protection."285 Other tobacco 
companies followed suit. Brown & Williamson (B & W) advertised 
Viceroy by exclaiming, ".... and thanks, doctor, for recommending 
Viceroy!"286 Liggett marketed its L & M brand as "Just What the Doc- 
tor Ordered," with no quotation marks, implying that the filters were 
actually of medically prescriptive value.287 However, in reality, to 
compensate for the taste that was lost to the filter, the new brands 
used stronger tobaccos that contained about as much tar and nicotine 
as the unfiltered brands, rendering the filters essentially "cosmetic 
mouthpieces."X288 
Affording smokers an apparent alternative to quitting, filters rap- 
idly became the dominant product on the market. Indeed, their intro- 
duction and marketing quickly reversed the two-year decline in per 
capita cigarette consumption in I953 and I954, which had resulted 
from new evidence linking lung cancer to smoking.289 Because the 
manufacturers provided a new type of cigarette, consumers could rea- 
sonably assume that the risks of the old type of cigarette and the stud- 
ies indicating the dangers of that cigarette were irrelevant. The indus- 
try was able to offer, in other words, the mechanism through which 
283 Hanson & Logue, supra note 256, at I i90 n.io6 (quoting GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at 
129 (emphasis omitted)). 
284 Kenneth E. Warner et al., The Emerging Market for Long-Term Nicotine Maintenance, 278 
JAMA I087, io88 (I'997). 
285 Robert J. Dolan, Expert Report on Tobacco Litigation to Massachusetts Attorney General 
33 (July 15, i998) [hereinafter Dolan Report] (on file with the authors). 
286 Id. 
287 KLUGER, supra note 259, at I55. 
288 Id. at i88. 
289 See infra p. 1484. 
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the smoker could find "self-justification" for his or her behavior.290 
Such tactics continued, although legal restrictions and the adoption of 
the voluntary Cigarette Advertising Code in i964 encouraged cam- 
paigns to become more implicit: to "alleviate" anxiety about health 
rather than to "provoke" it.291 While Lorillard's campaign in the 
I950S, for example, was "proof of Kent's health protection," Liggett 
later employed the less explicit slogan for Lark, "the pack-a-day 
smoker's best friend.")292 
(ii) Low-Tar and Low-Nicotine Cigarettes. - The industry's next 
technological "fix" was the low-tar and low-nicotine cigarette, which 
was marketed, often explicitly, as a viable alternative to quitting for 
health-conscious smokers. The move to ultra low-tar began in i964 
with the introduction of the Carlton brand, touted as an "unusual new 
cigarette" with a "unique Air-Stream Filter" that U.S. Government 
testing had found to be lowest in tar.293 Major brands responded by 
extending their lines, and by i980, over fifty percent of cigarettes sold 
were "low-tar."294 Those health reassurance cigarettes quickly accom- 
plished their aim: the public grew to view them as important, safer al- 
ternatives to "regular" cigarettes. "Consumer research showed those 
who smoked low-tar and -nicotine cigarettes largely did so because 
they saw them as 'safer. "'295 Cigarette companies even attempted to 
persuade physicians to prescribe their use for patients unable or un- 
willing to quit.296 
Little evidence exists to support the industry's claim that these 
cigarettes were safer. Scientists have learned that smokers who switch 
from regular cigarettes to low-tar and low-nicotine brands frequently 
engage in "nicotine regulation" - compensatory behavioral changes 
that virtually eliminate any gap between high-yielding and low- 
yielding cigarettes. Significantly, this behavior was well-known to the 
industry when it developed and manufactured low-tar and low- 
nicotine products. 
The industry has made other efforts to ensure that smokers, al- 
though believing that they are smoking "safer" cigarettes are, in fact, 
maintaining their addiction to nicotine. Specifically, the industry has 
manipulated the nicotine content of health reassurance cigarettes to 
290 Dolan Report, supra note 285, at 33. Indeed, B & W noted in I976 that "good cigarette ad- 
vertising in the past has given the average smoker a means of justification." Id. (quoting B & W 
statement) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
291 See id. at 34. 
292 Id. at 34-35. 
293 Id. at 35. 
294 See id. The industry definition for a low-tar cigarette was one containing less than fifteen 
milligrams of tar. See id. 
295 Id. at 36. 
296 See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at 339. 
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provide the enhanced pharmacological effect that ensures even health- 
conscious smokers will remain addicted to the product. 
For example, the industry studied smoker behavior to design ciga- 
rettes that allow smokers to block ventilation holes.297 Indeed, the in- 
dustry has studied smoker behavior to design cigarettes that allow for 
this very feature.298 Manufacturers use a technique called "filter ven- 
tilation" in which nearly invisible holes are drilled in the filter paper, 
or the filter paper is made more porous.299 Many smokers of cigarettes 
advertised as low-tar and low-nicotine block the tiny, laser-generated 
perforations in ventilated filters with their fingers or lips; this results in 
greater tar and nicotine yields than those measured by the FTC 
smoking machine, which gauges the content of the smoke at the end of 
the cigarette shaft.300 The industry refers to this phenomenon as "elas- 
ticity" - the ability of a cigarette, whatever its FTC-measured nico- 
tine yield, to deliver enough smoke to permit a smoker to obtain the 
nicotine she needs.301 
Cigarette manufacturers have also accomplished this enhanced 
nicotine content by developing raw tobacco with higher nicotine deliv- 
ery. Testifying before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environ- 
ment in the Summer of I994, then FDA Director Dr. David A. Kessler 
described a program undertaken by B & W, which developed a to- 
bacco plant known as "Y-i" with more nicotine content.302 Over ten 
years, B & W secretly produced a genetically engineered plant with 
more than twice the level of nicotine found in regular tobacco.303 To 
conceal its work, B & W patented the plant in Brazil and shipped mil- 
lions of pounds to the United States for use in five B & W brands, in- 
cluding three identified as "light" cigarettes.304 B & W also instructed 
297 See Dolan Report, supra note 2 85, at 36. 
298 See Group Research & Development Centre, British-American Tobacco Co. Ltd., Measure- 
ment of the Degree of Ventilation of Cigarettes at Various Flow Rates, Report No. RD.I576 Re- 
stricted (Apr. 4, I978) (unpublished report, on file with the authors); cf. Memorandum from G. 
Berman to W. Dunn (May 7, i998) (on file with the authors). 
299 GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at 87; Richard D. Hurt & Channing R. Robertson, Prying 
Open the Door to the Tobacco Industry's Secrets About Nicotine: The Minnesota Tobacco Trial, 
28oJAMA, II73, II78 (i998). 
300 See Hanson & Logue, supra note 256, at ii9 n.I04; Milo Geyelin, Reynold's Paper Adds 
New Twist to Tar Debate, WALL ST. J., Mar. i6, i998, at Bi. 
301 See Complaint at 1'SS Massachusetts v. Philip Morris, Inc., (Mass. Sup. Ct. i995) (No.95- 
7378) (on file with the authors). 
302 See Regulation of Tobacco Products (Part 3): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and 
the Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, io3d Cong. 4 (I994) (statement of David 
A. Kessler, Commissioner, FDA) [hereinafter Kessler Testimony, Part 3]. 
303 See id. 
304 See id. at 4-5. But see Regulation of Tobacco Products (Part 3): Hearings Before the Sub- 
comm. on Health and the Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, io3d Cong. I42 
(I994) (statement of Thomas E. Sandefur, Jr., Chairman and CEO, B & W) [hereinafter Sandefur 
Testimony] ("[I]t was suggested that there was something sinister or secretive about Y-i because it 
was patented in Brazil .... In fact, it was grown in Brazil to prevent our competition from using 
it and because the growing conditions in Brazil were very good."); Memorandum from Mary Ar- 
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the DNA Plant Technology Corporation, which had worked on Y-i, to 
mislead FDA investigators who were seeking information on industry 
efforts to manipulate nicotine levels.305 Customs service invoices even- 
tually exposed B & W by revealing that more than a half-million 
pounds of high-nicotine tobacco was shipped to B & W from 
abroad.306 
Despite this high-profile industry exposure, and the resulting criti- 
cism, various other forms of nicotine manipulation persist. For in- 
stance, all American cigarette manufacturers except Liggett add am- 
monia compounds to their tobacco.307 The FTC smoking machine test 
does not detect this alteration because it does not distinguish between 
the slower-acting salt-bound nicotine and the potent "free" nicotine 
that ammonia helps to release. Thus, smokers consuming cigarettes 
containing an ammonia blend effectively inhale a higher level of nico- 
tine per unit delivered.308 According to John Kreisher, a former asso- 
ciate scientific director of the Council for Tobacco Research, 
"[a]mmonia helped the industry lower the tar and allowed smokers to 
get more bang with less nicotine. It solved a couple of problems at the 
same time."309 
Another method of enhancing nicotine delivery is known as "to- 
bacco reconstitution." The process recycles tobacco stalks, stems, and 
other waste to form a sheet of tobacco material to which nicotine ex- 
tractions are added at the discretion of the manufacturer. The tobacco 
industry's trade literature suggests that reconstitution enables manu- 
facturers to triple or even quadruple the nicotine content of tobacco 
onson 5 (Oct. 22, i998) (on file with the authors) [hereinafter Aronson Memorandum] (reporting 
that the tobacco industry defends itself by claiming that "[o]ne method used to improve the safety 
of smoking was the development and use of a nicotine rich leaf (Y-i) which would keep the nico- 
tine levels high while reducing the tars associated with smoking"). 
305 See Kessler Testimony, Part 3, supra note 302, at 5. But see Sandefur Testimony, supra note 
304, at I42 ("Dr. Kessler stated that B & W authorized DNAP to state that Y-i had not been 
commercialized. This is false. When DNAP called Brown & Williamson earlier this month and 
asked if it could discuss Y-i with [the] FDA despite his confidentiality agreements with my com- 
pany, Brown & Williamson gave permission to do so. We never told DNAP what to say."). 
306 See Kessler Testimony, Part 3, supra note 302, at io. 
307 See P.L. AULBACH ET AL., ROOT TECHNOLOGY: A HANDBOOK FOR LEAF BLENDERS AND 
PRODUCT DEVELOPERS 9-IO [hereinafter ROOT TECHNOLOGY]; see also, e.g., Memorandum 
from Scott Appleton to Graham Smith I-2 (Jan. 29, I992) (on file with the authors) (referring to 
use of ammonia by B & W); Memorandum to W.B. Line I (July 30, i98i) (on file with the 
authors) (referring to the use of ammonia by Phillip Morris and RJR). 
A i99i B & W blending manual explained, "Ammonia . . . reacts with the indigenous nicotine 
salts and liberates free nicotine.. .. As the result of such change, the ratio of extractable nicotine 
to bound nicotine in the smoke may be altered in favor of extractable nicotine." ROOT 
TECHNOLOGY, supra, at i8-i9. 
308 See Alix M. Freedman, "Impact Booster": Tobacco Firm Shows How Ammonia Spurs Deliv- 
ery of Nicotine, WALL ST. J., Oct. i8, 1995, at Ai; see also Kessler Testimony, Part 3, supra note 
302, at 20-22 (noting that adding ammonia compounds during the manufacturing process almost 
doubles the nicotine transfer efficiency of cigarettes). 
309 Freedman, supra note 308, at Ai. 
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and includes advertisements such as the following: "Nicotine levels are 
becoming a growing concern to the designers of modern cigarettes. 
[The] Kimberly-Clark tobacco reconstitution process ... permits ad- 
justments of nicotine to your exact requirements.... We can help you 
control your tobacco."'310 
Of course, having studied the production and manipulation of nico- 
tine this extensively, tobacco companies also gained significant insight 
into making cigarettes that contained less nicotine or were otherwise 
less addictive. But because manufacturers believed that nicotine was 
the product they actually were promoting, they declined to develop 
such cigarettes. The rationale was explained in a I978 report to execu- 
tives of Philip Morris: "If the industry's introduction of acceptable 
low-nicotine products does make it easier for dedicated smokers to 
quit, then the wisdom of the introduction is open to debate."'311 In- 
deed, in a pattern repeated across the industry, both B & W and Philip 
Morris hired scientists to research and develop a nicotine analogue- 
artificial nicotine believed by some members of the industry to have 
the addictive properties of nicotine without the harmful effects on the 
heart - only to abandon the effort once the scientists discovered such 
an alternative.312 
The various industry elasticity projects described in this section 
appear to have been successful. Studies indicate that smokers tend to 
obtain nearly the same amount of nicotine from each cigarette despite 
differences in yield as measured by the FTC smoking machine.313 In a 
I974 British American Tobacco Company conference, researchers de- 
scribed the results of one such study: "The Kippa study ... in Ger- 
many suggests that whatever the characteristics of cigarettes as deter- 
mined by smoking machines, the smoker adjusts his pattern to deliver 
his own nicotine requirements (about o.8 mg. per cigarette)."314 Re- 
search recently commissioned by the FDA indicates that there is no 
necessary correlation between nicotine and tar levels and that low-tar 
310 Regulation of Tobacco Products (Part 2): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the 
Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Io3d Cong. I7 (1994) (statement of David 
A. Kessler, Commissioner, FDA) (statement available in 9.2 TOBACCO PRODUCTS LITIG. REP. 
7.27) (quoting a Kimberly-Clark Corporation ad). Tobacco industry patents also show that many 
technological advances have been made to control the nicotine content of cigarettes. See Regula- 
tion of Tobacco Products (Part I): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Env't of the 
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 1o3d Cong. 28, 80-8I (I994) (statement of David A. 
Kessler, Commissioner, FDA) [hereinafter Kessler Testimony, Part i]. Several tobacco industry 
patent applications described an invention designed to release nicotine in controlled amounts and 
stated that tobacco could be made to provide a variety of nicotine levels. See id. at 82-83. 
311 Memorandum from F.J. Ryan, Philip Morris U.S.A. Research Center 2 (Mar. 1978) (on file 
with the authors). 
312 See Myron Levin, Tobacco Lab: Science and Silence, L.A. TIMES, July I9, 1994, at Ai. 
313 See Lynn T. Kozlowski et al., The Misuse of 'Less-Hazardous' Cigarettes and Its Detection: 
Hole-Blocking of Ventilated Filters, 70 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH I202, 1202-03 (i980). 
314 GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at 87 (emphasis omitted). 
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brands have more nicotine by weight than "regular" brands.315 But 
even those statistics may be misleading inasmuch as nominally low-tar 
cigarettes may, for familiar reasons, deliver more tar to the smoker 
than smoking machines register. The Players Ultra Mild, a cigarette 
that normally delivers o.8 milligrams of tar, delivers 28.5 milligrams of 
tar when the perforations are blocked.316 Results such as these have 
led some public health experts to conclude that "[o]n balance ... [low- 
tar and -nicotine] cigarettes may well have increased the aggregate so- 
cietal burden of smoking, primarily by reducing the number of people 
who would have quit in the absence of their availability, and secon- 
darily by switchers smoking more cigarettes."1317 
(d) Recruiting New Smokers. - After cigarette manufacturers 
survived the health revelations of the I95os and i96os, the I970S be- 
came a period of marketing innovation for the more aggressive among 
them. The paramount goal of the industry changed from maintaining 
the existing smoking population to recruiting new smokers, especially 
young new smokers, a goal that remains paramount.318 Although "the 
tobacco industry denies that it targets minors in its promotional cam- 
paigns, . . . evidence garnered from internal industry documents points 
to the contrary."'319 Indeed, examination of industry documents reveals 
a near obsession with marketing to the "pre-smoker."320 
The industry's chief strategy for capturing this "pre-smoker" mar- 
ket is pervasive, relentless advertising. Cigarettes are among the most 
promoted consumer products in the United States.32' The FTC re- 
315 See Kessler Testimony, Part I, supra note 31o, at 28, 96-97, I21 (showing that whereas one 
brand's Regular ioo's contained I146% nicotine, its Low Tar ioo's contained i.67% nicotine and 
its Ultra Low Tar ioo's contained i.99% nicotine). 
316 See HILTS, supra note 259, at 6i. 
317 Warner et al., supra note 284, at io8. 
318 Unfortunately, other things being equal, the younger a person begins to smoke, the greater 
the risk of lung cancer and other smoking-related diseases. Studies have shown that lung cancer 
mortality is highest among adults who begin smoking before the age of I5. See Hanson & Logue, 
supra note 256, at I327-29 & n.676. 
319 Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the Effective Con- 
trol of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL Y REv. 63, 66 (I99 7). 
320 The importance of young people to the industry stems from the nature of the smoking ad- 
diction. Most cigarette use and addiction begins when users are children or teenagers. Eighty- 
two percent of daily smokers had their first cigarette before age iS, 62% before the age of 16, and 
38% before the age of I4. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., YOUTH AND 
TOBACCO: PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON 
GENERAL 49 tbl.7 (1995). The younger a person begins to smoke, the more likely she is to become 
a heavy smoker. Seventy percent of teenage smokers become regular adult smokers. See id. at 
84. Because cigarettes are also a product characterized by intense brand loyalty, cigarette manu- 
facturers have obvious and strong incentives to attract young smokers. But cf. Aronson Memo- 
randum, supra note 304, at 5 (reporting on a recent class action tobacco trial and noting that the 
industry's defense is that "[t]he factors that most influence[] whether a kid will smoke is whether 
someone in his home smokes'). 
321 See John P. Pierce et al., Does Tobacco Advertising Target Young People to Start Smoking, 
Evidencefrom California, 266 JAMA 3154, 3154 (I99I). 
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ported to Congress that domestic cigarette advertising and promo- 
tional expenditures rose from close to $4 billion in i990 to more than 
$6 billion in 1993.322 Tobacco imagery product brand names, logos, 
and advertising messages - is ubiquitous.323 It can be found on or in 
everything from billboards to magazines, and from city buses to race 
cars.324 The effect is to convey the message "to young people that to- 
bacco use is desirable, socially acceptable, safe, healthy, and preva- 
lent."325 In fact, young people tend to buy the most heavily advertised 
cigarette brands, whereas many adults buy more generic or value- 
based cigarette brands, which have little or no image-based advertis- 
ing.326 Similarly, merchandising, a favorite promotional tool of the in- 
dustry,327 has also been linked to an increase in teen smoking rates, 
which occurred even as adult smoking rates were decreasing.328 
These marketing practices have remained remarkably consistent, 
and successful, over the years. In i967, for instance, new advertise- 
ment campaigns specifically targeting young girls coincided with a 
iio% jump in twelve-year-old starters.329 Perhaps more tellingly, Im- 
perial Tobacco of Canada, sister company to B & W in the United 
States, used the focus group methodology described in Part I in a dec- 
ade-long study beginning in I976. The study was code-named "Project 
Sixteen," for the age of the intended subjects.330 Project Sixteen was 
designed to determine how smoking starts, how high-schoolers felt 
about being smokers, and how they saw their use of tobacco in the fu- 
ture.33' The subjects had to "be [sixteen] or [seventeen] years old, in 
high school, and professed smokers of [five] or more cigarettes per 
day."332 The youths were shown advertisements and questioned about 
them.333 The project revealed that the companies would profit from 
encouraging children to begin smoking between the ages of twelve and 
eighteen to ensure that the habit would become part of their self-image 
322 See FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR I995 PURSUANT TO THE 
FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT I7 tbl.3D (I995). 
323 See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco 
Products to Children and Adolescents, 6o Fed. Reg. 4I,314, 4I,3I4 (I995). 
324 See id. 
325 Id. 
326 See id.; KLUGER, supra note 259, at 702. 
327 See Eben Shapiro, Cigarette Makers Outfit Smokers in Icons, Eluding Warning and Enrag- 
ing Activists, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, I993, at Bi. 
328 See I39 CONG. REc. S3052 (daily ed. Mar. 17, I993) (statement of Sen. Harkin). Sampling 
was a popular practice through the early i99os. To give just one example of the massive mer- 
chandise giveaways conducted by the industry, RJR developed a beach shoe, alleged to appeal to 
young people, that leaves behind the word "Camel" in the sand as children stroll along the beach. 
See SOLOMON, supra note 39, at 4I I. 
329 See HILTS, supra note 259, at 69. 
330 Id at 8o. 
331 See id. 
332 Id. 
333 See id. at 8i. 
I999] TAKING BEHAVIORALISM SERIOUSLY I48i 
as adults.334 The industry also learned that it should use ads that por- 
trayed smoking as "cool" and "sophisticated."335 The study empha- 
sized that to appeal to youths the company must "re-establish clear, 
distinct images for Imperial Tobacco Limited brands with particular 
emphasis on relevance to younger smokers."336 
In the spring of I972, Dr. Claude Teague, then assistant chief of re- 
search and development at RJR, wrote a memo discussing what moti- 
vates different groups of smokers to smoke, including the marketing of 
cigarettes to youths.337 The memo describes the profile of an ideal 
cigarette for a beginning smoker (between ages thirteen and seventeen) 
as mild tasting so as not to put them off in the beginning, containing 
lower-than-normal nicotine because children's bodies have not yet ac- 
climated to nicotine, and being promoted with a simultaneous empha- 
sis on togetherness and individuality.338 The new campaign that RJR 
established as a result was Joe Camel, described by the ad copy as a 
"smooth character" and the "quintessential party animal," who was 
"done up in a tuxedo and sunglasses, with a cigarette adangle from his 
pendulous lips and a bevy of adoring (human) beauties nearby."339 
The smooth character appears to have appealed to underage consum- 
ers. Studies published in a i99i issue of the Journal of the American 
Medical Association found that Joe Camel is almost as familiar to six- 
year-old children as Mickey Mouse,340 that the campaign has enticed 
thousands of teens to smoke the brand, and that Camel's popularity 
with twelve- to seventeen-year-olds has surged.34' Those studies 
showed that roughly ninety percent of six-year-olds knew there was a 
connection between Joe Camel and cigarettes and ninety-eight percent 
of high school students understood, more specifically, the link between 
Joe and the Camel brand.342 In three years, the brand jumped from 
334 See id. at 82. 
335 See id. at 82-87. 
336 Id. at 84 (quoting Project Sixteen Report) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other re- 
search, an RJR affiliate studied in detail the motivations of young smokers. "Youth Target" was 
the first of a planned series of studies into the lifestyles and value systems of young men and 
women ages I5 to 24. The stated purpose of the study was to "provide marketers and policymak- 
ers with an enriched understanding of the mores and motives of this important emerging adult 
segment which can be applied to better decision making in regard to products and programs di- 
rected at youth." Creative Research Group, Foreword, Youth Target i987, at I (unpublished re- 
port, on file with the authors). The study focused on the "primary elements of lifestyles and val- 
ues among the youth of today" to learn how to market products to children and teens. Id. at 4. 
337 See HILTS, supra note 259, at 7I-75. 
338 See id. at 75. 
339 KLUGER, supra note 259, at 701. 
340 See Paul M. Fischer et al., Brand Logo Recognition by Children Ages 3 to 6 Years: Mickey 
Mouse and Old Joe the Camel, 266 JAMA 3I45, 3I47 (I99I). 
341 See Joseph R. DiFranza et al., RJR Nabisco's Cartoon Camel Promotes Camel Cigarettes to 
Children, 266 JAMA 3I49, 3I49 (I99I). 
342 See KLUGER, supra note 259, at 702. 
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three percent to over thirteen percent of the market,343 and its con- 
sumer niche shifted from the over-fifty smoker to the under-twenty one 
smoker.344 
None of those practices was permissible under the industry's self- 
imposed regulatory scheme - the Cigarette Advertising Code (the 
Code) - which was adopted in i965 and was purportedly intended to 
restrict advertising to target only persons over twenty-one. The Code 
prohibited advertising in comic books, school papers, and children's 
television and radio programs, forbade distribution of samples to the 
underaged, and disallowed the use of models under the age of twenty- 
five in commercials or advertisements. But the Code had no real ef- 
fect. Because of loopholes in its language, millions of children and 
teenagers watched programs sponsored by cigarette companies and 
read magazines filled with cigarette ads.345 A July I995 report by the 
California Department of Health Services that surveyed tobacco ad- 
vertisements in or around almost six thousand stores found that on av- 
erage there were slightly more than twenty-five tobacco advertise- 
ments per store.346 The report also found that stores within one 
thousand feet of a school had significantly more tobacco advertising 
and promotions than stores that were not near schools.347 Marlboro 
was the most frequently advertised and promoted cigarette brand, 
with an average of ten advertisements per store.348 Camel was the 
second most frequently advertised and promoted cigarette brand and 
had an average of 4.84 advertisements and promotions per store.349 
343 See HILTS, supra note 259, at 70. 
344 See id. at 79-80. Joe Camel was not the only marketing icon invented to appeal to young 
people. The model who portrayed the "Winston Man" for RJR's Winston brand cigarettes testi- 
fied before Congress: 
I was clearly told that young people were the market that we were going after.... It was 
made clear to us that this image was important because kids like to role play, and we were 
to provide the attractive role models for them to follow. I was told I was a live version of 
the GI Joe. 
Hollywood Unions Take on Tobacco Firms: Talent Guilds' Lawsuit Seeking Smoking-Related 
Medical Costs, BOSTON GLOBE, NOV. 28, I997, at AI7. 
345 See KLUGER, supra note 259, at 279. 
346 See Convenience Store Ads Geared Toward Youth, Study Finds, in MEALY'S LITIGATION 
REPORTS: TOBACCO (Aug. I7, I995) (summarizing California report). 
347 See HILTS, supra note 259, at 93 (discussing California Dep't of Health Servs., Operation 
Storefront: Youth Against Tobacco Advertising and Promotion). Stores near schools were also 
more likely to have at least one tobacco advertisement placed next to candy or displayed at a 
height of three feet or below, and a significantly higher average number of tobacco advertisements 
were found on the exterior of stores located in young neighborhoods (communities in which at 
least one-third of the population was I 7 years or under). See id. 
348 See Convenience Store Ads Geared Toward Youth,, supra note 346. 
349 See id. 
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Not surprisingly, Marlboro and Camel are the leading brands smoked 
by children.350 
Despite these disturbing statistics, each of the cigarette manufac- 
turers involved maintains that the effect of its pervasive advertising 
and promotion of cigarettes is limited to maintaining brand loyalty and 
that it has no role in encouraging adolescents to experiment with 
smoking.35' That public position, however, is belied by the industry's 
private practices. Consider the fact that, unlike the health reassurance 
cigarette described above, tobacco products aimed at minors are not 
positioned as safer or less risky than other cigarettes. Cigarette manu- 
facturers appear to have adopted this practice for deliberate (and du- 
bious) reasons. There is growing evidence that cigarette warnings may 
actually give the product an enhanced gloss in the eyes of young con- 
sumers. Several studies have demonstrated a forbidden fruit appeal 
from television parental advisory warnings for violent shows.352 
Similar studies on the labeling effects of alcoholic versus nonalcoholic 
drinks also suggest that the warning itself may enhance the attractive- 
ness of the product.353 Tobacco industry executives seem to have been 
well aware of that possibility. As early as I973, Dr. Claude Teague of 
RJR noted that a new brand aimed at the young group "should not in 
any way be promoted as a 'health' brand" and perhaps should carry 
some implied risk. To the contrary, "the warning label on the package 
may be a plus."354 Thus, just as tobacco manufacturers were able to 
devise seemingly safer cigarettes to appease risk-conscious adult smok- 
ers, they also seem able to take advantage of government-mandated 
product warnings as an appeal to children in their constant efforts to 
recruit new smokers. 
2. Creating Controversy: The Industry's Public Voice on Health Is- 
sues. - Having focused in the previous section on the tobacco indus- 
try's advertising, promotion, and design efforts to create demand for a 
product long suspected to be harmful, we now shift to the industry's 
less traditional marketing maneuvers to counter this suspicion. Spe- 
cifically, this section concentrates on the extraordinary decades-long 
350 See Michael Schudson, Symbols and Smokers: Advertising, Health Messages, and Public 
Policy, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 208, 217 (Robert L. Rabin & Ste- 
phen D. Sugarman eds., I993); Convenience Store Ads Geared Toward Youth,, supra note 346. 
351 See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco 
to Protect Children and Adolescents, 6i Fed. Reg. 44,396 (i996) (summarizing industry argu- 
ments). 
352 See, e.g., Brad J. Bushman & Angela D. Stack, Forbidden Fruit Versus Tainted Fruit: Ef- 
fects of Warnings Labels on Attraction to Television Violence, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: 
APPLIED 207, 208 (I996). 
353 See, e.g., John M. Springer & Craig T. Nagoshi, Magical Thinking and Alcohol Labels, 69 
PSYCHOL. REP. 767, 767 (I991). 
354 John Schwartz, 1973 Cigarette Company Memo Proposed New Brands for Teens, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 4, I995, at A2 (emphasis added) (quoting Dr. Claude Teague) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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campaign of the industry, acting in concert, to foster and perpetuate 
"controversy" over whether cigarettes cause disease and, more recently, 
whether they are addictive. This campaign followed a deliberate 
strategy of gaining public trust by appearing cooperative and con- 
cerned, providing the smoker with any and all "justifications" the in- 
dustry could muster for disbelieving public health reports about 
smoking, and carefully monitoring and suppressing the industry's own 
knowledge about the risks of smoking. 
(a) The Big Scare and the Industry's Coordinated Response. - It 
appears that before 1950, although smokers preferred brands marketed 
as healthful, they did not regard the health risks of even the most dan- 
gerous brands as particularly significant. The widely held sense seems 
to have been that the risks of smoking, though real, were insubstan- 
tial.355 The midpoint of this century, however, marked a sea change in 
scientific and public perceptions of smoking risks - what one com- 
mentator calls "the end of the age of innocence about the blithe charms 
of the cigarette."356 Several studies appeared at about this time 
strongly indicating that the dangers of smoking were substantial, espe- 
cially with respect to lung cancer.357 Perhaps more damaging to the 
industry was the fact that the results of those studies were widely re- 
ported,358 leading to what cigarette company officials later called the 
"Big Scare"359 and a sudden, large drop in cigarette sales.360 
The response to this mounting adverse publicity was swift. At the 
invitation of the president of the American Tobacco Company (ATC), 
Paul M. Hahn, the chief executive officers of the leading cigarette 
manufacturers met on December 15, 1953 at the Plaza Hotel in New 
355 For instance, in a I936 issue of the highly respected magazine Scientific American, one of 
the editors wrote that although smokers "are doubtless harmed to some extent, [the harm] is usu- 
ally not great." KLUGER, supra note 259, at I05 (quoting a June I936 article in Scientific Ameri- 
can) (internal quotation marks omitted). The editor continued, smoking can be dangerous, but it 
is also dangerous "to climb mountains and stepladders, play football, cross the street, or merely to 
exist, but the risk is so small that we willingly accept it." Id. An editorial in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association stated the position even more clearly: "[M]ore can be said in behalf 
of smoking as a form of escape from tension than against it.... [T]here does not seem to be any 
preponderance of evidence that would indicate the abolition of the use of tobacco as a substance 
contrary to the public health." Id. at I32 (quoting a I948 JAMA editorial) (internal quotations 
marks omitted); see also Lydia Saad & Steve O'Brien, The Tobacco Industry Summons Polls to 
the Witness Stand: A Review of Public Opinion on the Risks of Smoking I2 (May I5, i998) (un- 
published manuscript, prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the American Associa- 
tion for Public Opinion Research, on file with the authors) (describing the results of a I954 Gallup 
Poll, in which only 6.6% of respondents mentioned cancer-related maladies as a harm of smoking, 
only 30.I% mentioned lung-related illnesses, and only 4.2% mentioned heart ailments). 
356 KLUGER, supra note 259, at I33. 
357 See HILTS, supra note 259, at 3. 
358 There had been previous studies that linked cigarettes to lung cancer, but the fact that they 
were not well publicized tempered the resulting damage to the industry. 
359 Hill & Knowlton, Public Relations Report to the Tobacco Industry Research Committee I 
(Apr. 28, I955) (unpublished memo, on file with the authors). 
360 See id. (reporting an eight percent drop in cigarette consumption over just two years). 
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York City. Also in attendance was the public relations firm Hill & 
Knowlton, which was to play a central role in formulating and exe- 
cuting the industry's response. Hill & Knowlton's minutes of the 
meeting at the Plaza indicate that cigarette industry executives viewed 
the problem as "extremely serious" and "worthy of drastic action."'36' 
Despite the executives' initial fears that the "industry might have to 
acknowledge the hazard and make themselves ready to regulate to- 
bacco," Hill & Knowlton's bold proposal for a counter-attack against 
the scientists convinced them that a strong public relations response 
from the industry was both feasible and necessary.362 
From the beginning, the research linking smoking and cancer 
seems to have been viewed by the manufacturers as a public relations 
threat rather than a public health issue. In a memorandum circulated 
to the CEOs of other tobacco companies the day before the meeting at 
the Plaza, B & W's president, Timothy V. Hartnett, expressed the need 
to hire "the best obtainable public-relations counsel since none has 
ever been handed so real and yet so delicate a multimillion dollar 
problem."363 As the Hill & Knowlton memorandum details, the CEOs 
of all the leading companies, except Liggett, eventually decided that 
"[t]he industry should not engage in a merely defensive campaign."364 
The memo continued, "They should sponsor a public relations cam- 
paign which is positive in nature and entirely 'pro-cigarettes. "'1365 The 
CEOs were "also emphatic in saying that the entire activity" must be 
"a long-term, continuing program, since ... the problem is one of 
promoting cigarettes and protecting them from these and other attacks 
that may be expected in the future."366 
Just one week after the meeting, Hill & Knowlton presented a pub- 
lic relations proposal to the cigarette manufacturers recommending, 
among several actions, the formation and widespread announcement 
of a joint research committee for promoting "independent scientific re- 
search on the health effects of smoking."367 The proposal emphasized 
that if their strategy was to be successful, the industry would have to 
gain the public trust and avoid the appearance of bias.368 Two key 
361 Id. at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
362 Id. 
363 KLUGER, supra note 259, at I63-64. 
364 HILTS, supra note 259, at 6 (quoting minutes of December 1953 meeting between tobacco 
industry executives and Hill & Knowlton officials) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
365 Id. 
366 Background Material on the Cigarette Industry Client 2 (Dec. i8, I953) (unpublished memo, 
on file with the authors). 
367 GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at 33. 
368 Hill & Knowlton recommended the following: 
[Tihe grave nature of a number of recently highly publicized research reports on the effects 
of cigarette smoking ... have confronted the industry with a serious problem of public re- 
lations.... It is important that the industry do nothing to appear in the light of being cal- 
lous to considerations of health or of belittling medical research which goes against ciga- 
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public relations goals for the industry, therefore, were to maintain the 
appearance of a "controversy" regarding the health effects of smoking 
and to pledge to consumers (and lawmakers) their own fidelity to con- 
sumer health in their own research into this "controversy."369 
The first effort of this sort was made shortly after the formation of 
a public relations vehicle, the Tobacco Industry Research Council 
(TIRC). On January 4, I954, member manufacturers announced the 
formation of TIRC with a full-page newspaper advertisement entitled 
"A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers."370 The statement ap- 
peared in 448 newspapers across the nation, reaching a circulation of 
43,245,000 in 258 cities.371 The Frank Statement included the follow- 
ing reassurances: 
Recent reports on experiments with mice have given wide publicity to a 
theory that cigarette smoking is in some way linked with lung cancer in 
human beings. 
We accept an interest in people's health as a basic responsibility, para- 
mount to every other consideration in our business. 
We always have and always will cooperate closely with those whose task it 
is to safeguard the public health. 
i. We are pledging aid and assistance to the research effort into all phases 
of tobacco use and health. 
2. For this purpose we are establishing a joint industry group consisting 
initially of the undersigned. This group will be known as TOBACCO 
INDUSTRY RESEARCH COMMITTEE. 
3. In charge of the research activities of the Committee will be a scientist 
of unimpeachable integrity and national repute. In addition there will be 
an Advisory Board of scientists disinterested in the cigarette industry. A 
group of distinguished men from medicine, science, and education will be 
invited to serve on this Board. These scientists will advise the Committee 
on its research activities. 
rettes.... The situation is one of extreme delicacy. There is much at stake and the indus- 
try group, in moving into the field of public relations, needs to exercise great care not to 
add fuel to the flames. 
Hill & Knowlton, Preliminary Recommendation for Cigarette Manufacturers I-2 (Dec. 24, I953) 
(unpublished memo, on file with the authors). 
369 See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at 40. 
370 Tobacco Industry Research Committee, A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Jan. 4, I954, at I3. 
371 See HILTS, supra note 259, at I2. 
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This statement is being issued because we believe the people are entitled 
to know where we stand on this matter and what we intend to do about 
it.372 
By the Spring of I955, it was fairly apparent that Hill & Knowl- 
ton's self-defense strategy had been successful. According to one I955 
memorandum, "Suspicion is still widespread but the lynching party 
seems to have been called off .... Even adverse stories now tend to 
carry modified statements."373 On an even more positive note, Hill & 
Knowlton reported to TIRC that "progress has been made" and "[t]he 
first 'big scare' continues on the wane."374 More specifically, "[t]he re- 
search program of [TIRC] has won wide acceptance in the scientific 
world as a sincere, valuable and scientific effort," and "[p]ositive sto- 
ries are on the ascendancy."375 Since then, many of the claims and 
promises of the I954 Frank Statement have been renewed and re- 
peated in industry advertisements.376 Each of these advertisements 
served the obvious purpose of building public trust through an ap- 
pearance of responsibility and concern on the part of the cigarette 
manufacturers. As we show in the following sections, however, creat- 
ing this appearance was actually just the first step in the industry's 
long campaign to perpetuate misinformation and confusion over the 
health questions of most vital concern to smokers.377 
372 Tobacco Industry Research Committee, supra note 370, at I3; see also HILTS, supra note 
259, at I2-I3. On April I4, I954, shortly after publishing the Frank Statement, TIRC sent a 
booklet to every doctor in the United States entitled A Scientific Perspective on the Cigarette Con- 
troversy. Despite some concern by TIRC lawyers that the booklet was using quotations of scien- 
tists improperly and without their permission, it was nevertheless sent to I76,800 doctors, mem- 
bers of Congress, and I5,ooo members of the press. See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at 358. 
373 HILTS, supra note 259, at I 7. 
374 Hill & Knowlton, Public Relations Report to the Tobacco Industry Research Committee i 
(Apr. 28, I955) (on file with the authors). 
375 Id. 
376 For instance, one advertisement contained the following reassurances: 
After millions of dollars and over 20 years of research: The question about smoking and 
health is still a question. 
In the interest of absolute objectivity, the tobacco industry has supported totally inde- 
pendent research efforts with completely non-restrictive funding. 
In I954, the industry established what is now known as CTR, the Council for Tobacco 
Research - USA, to provide financial support for research by independent scientists into 
all phases of tobacco use and health. Completely autonomous, CTR's research activity is 
directed by a board of ten scientists and physicians who retain their affiliations with their 
respective universities and institutions. This board has full authority and responsibility for 
policy, development and direction of the research effort. 
The Tobacco Institute, After Millions of Dollars and Over Twenty Years of Research: The Question 
About Smoking and Health Is Still a Question, WASH. POST, Dec. I, I970, at Aio. 
377 The industry shows little sign of abandoning these tactics. In the early i990s, the industry 
replicated the Frank Statement strategy of preempting emerging scientific research, this time 
fighting to keep alive the controversy concerning the link between second-hand smoke and lung 
cancer. The industry once again took out full-page advertisements and established a committee, 
this time called the "Center for Indoor Air Research," in an effort to duplicate its earlier success. 
The advertisements attempted to associate specific brands with the message that smoking was not 
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(b) A Deliberate Effort to Confuse: "Doubt Is Our Product." - In- 
ternal documents seem to demonstrate that the joint industry research 
efforts undertaken through TIRC and the Council for Tobacco Re- 
search (CTR) were self-consciously designed to promote favorable re- 
search, suppress negative research where possible, and attack negative 
research when it could not be suppressed, all in order to assuage 
smokers' fears. Perhaps the most succinct statement of these objec- 
tives comes from a memorandum, believed to have been written by 
J.V. Blalock, B & W's director of public relations: "Doubt is our prod- 
uct since it is the best means of competing with the 'body of fact' that 
exists in the mind of the general public. It is also the means of estab- 
lishing a controversy."378 
Creating and sustaining controversy over the risks of smoking be- 
came standard practice in the industry, as evidenced by a 1972 internal 
document from a TIRC official. The document described the impor- 
tance of using joint industry research to maintain public doubt about 
the link between smoking and disease. This document represents a 
remarkably candid and revealing statement of industry policy: 
For nearly twenty years, this industry has employed a single strategy 
to defend itself on three major fronts - litigation, politics, and public 
opinion. 
While the strategy was brilliantly conceived and executed over the 
years, helping us win important battles, it is only fair to say that it is not 
- nor was it ever intended to be - a vehicle for victory. On the contrary, 
it has always been a holding strategy, consisting of 
- creating doubt about the health charge without actually denying it 
- advocating the public's right to smoke, without actually urging them 
to take up the practice 
- encouraging objective scientific research as the only way to resolve 
the question of the health hazard 
As an industry, therefore, we are committed to an ill-defined middle 
ground which is articulated by variations on the theme that, the case is 
not proved. 
In the cigarette controversy, the public - especially those who are 
present and potential supporters (e.g., tobacco state congressmen and 
dangerous. The first such advertisement was for Kool cigarettes and emphasized "the other side 
of the smoking and health controversy." GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at i88 (quoting memo- 
randum from J. Burgard to R. Pittman 5 (Aug. 2 I, i969)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
378 Id. at i9o-9i (noting that B & W sought not to refute, but to sustain a controversy). 
1999] TAKING BEHAVIORALISM SERIOUSLY I489 
heavy smokers) - must perceive, understand, and believe in evidence to 
sustain their opinions that smoking may not be the causal factor.379 
This and other evidence380 indicates that the purpose of TIRC and 
CTR was to create public trust and then to manipulate the public's 
perception of the risks of smoking. There is every reason to believe 
that the strategy has been effective. As one industry executive has 
been quoted as saying, "CTR is [the] best [and] cheapest insurance the 
tobacco industry can buy and without it the Industry would have to 
invent CTR or would be dead."138' 
(i) Projecting Independence. - Throughout their history, TIRC 
and CTR have been heavily influenced by tobacco industry lawyers. 
Indeed, some observers have claimed that these lawyers set the re- 
search agenda for the supposedly independent organizations. More 
specifically, they "encouraged scientific research to refute the scientific 
evidence about tobacco, to perpetuate controversy about the health ef- 
fects of tobacco, and to provide results that could be used to respond 
to adverse publicity."382 CTR "Special Projects" were not evaluated by 
independent scientists on their research merits but instead were di- 
rected by tobacco companies on advice from their legal depart- 
ments.383 "Between I972 and i99i, CTR awarded at least $I4,636,9i8 
in special project funding," the recipients of which were selected by 
tobacco company executives and lawyers.384 
In order for CTR effectively to serve its role as industry "insur- 
ance," however, the industry had to present it to the outside world as 
an independent and objective source of scientific information. Thus, 
in its annual reports, CTR stated that its Scientific Advisory Board 
funded peer-reviewed research projects, "judging them solely on the 
basis of scientific merit and relevance."385 In I994, Dr. James F. 
Glenn, CEO and president of CTR, testified before the House Com- 
mittee on Energy and Commerce: "The Council . . . sponsors research 
379 Memorandum from Fred Panzer to Horace R. Kornegay I-2 (May I, I972) (on file with the 
authors) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
380 For instance, a I978 memorandum addressed to the CTR file from a Philip Morris official 
characterized CTR as "an industry 'shield."' Haines v. Liggett Group, 140 F.R.D. 68i, 696 
(D.N.J. 1992). The memorandum goes on to explain that "the 'public relations' value of CTR 
must be considered and continued.... It is extremely important that the industry continue to 
spend their dollars on research to show that we don't agree that the case against smoking is 
closed... ." Id. Furthermore, Ernest Pepples, vice president and general counsel of B & W, said 
in a private statement in I978 that although CTR was originally "organized as a public relations 
effort," it "also discharged a legal responsibility." Letter from Ernest Pepples to J.K. Edens et al. 2 
(Apr. 4, I978) (on file with the authors). Pepples added, "[T]he industry research effort has in- 
cluded special projects designed to find scientists and medical doctors who might serve as indus- 
try witnesses in lawsuits or in a legislative forum." Id. 
381 HILTS, supra note 259, at i6 (quoting Addison Yeaman). 
382 GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at 288. 
383 See id. at 289. 
384 Id. 
385 E.g., THE COUNCIL FOR TOBACCO RESEARCH-U.S.A., INC., i984 REPORT. 
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into questions of tobacco use and health .... [Council] grantees ... 
are assured complete scientific freedom in conducting their studies.... 
[Plublication [of research results] is encouraged in all instances."386 In 
fact, the studies were often the product of industry scripts and irrecon- 
cilable financial conflicts of interest, and those studies that were not 
ran the risk of being suppressed by the industry. For example, the 
Kentucky Tobacco and Health Research Institute publicized itself as a 
taxpayer-funded, independent tobacco research program, but actually 
conducted research on the supposed benefits of smoking and on nico- 
tine analogues, while it also helped to prepare congressional testimony 
in an attempt to influence public policy.387 
Carl Seltzer, professor of public health at Harvard University, con- 
ducted research related to the hypothesis that genetic factors rather 
than smoking cause heart disease. During his retirement, he received 
more than $750,000 in CTR Special Projects grants between I976 and 
1990.388 Seltzer traveled extensively to speak about his work, and the 
industry increased his grant to cover travel expenses.389 Asked to re- 
spond to unfavorable press about a particular study during the Mac- 
Neil/Lehrer NewsHour, he criticized the study, claiming that the scien- 
tist at issue, Dr. Castelli, made statements that were "biased, flawed 
and inaccurate."390 Professor Seltzer stated that, "I merely wanted you 
to get some idea of deliberate inaccuracies in the Castelli statements to 
you and the public. . . ."391 He did not mention that B & W's law- 
yers requested him to write the letter or that the industry was funding 
him.392 
386 Regulation of Tobacco Products (Part 2): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the 
Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 340-43 (I994) (statement of 
James F. Glenn, CEO and president, CTR). 
387 See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at 3I4-i6. The industry also used a more subtle strat- 
egy to sway important organizations, such as the American Medical Association (AMA). In 
keeping with the realistic and strategic nature of the tobacco executives' campaigns, the aim was 
to maintain the neutrality of the AMA, and to encourage them to issue statements that would 
prove useful to the tobacco companies in their public relations campaign. See id. at 184. In fact, 
the AMA in the i960s did not actively oppose the tobacco industry. Instead, the organization 
worked with the industry, "both to perpetuate the scientific 'controversy' about smoking and 
health and to keep federal regulation to a minimum." Id. at i8i. 
388 See id. at 293. 
389 See id. at 294. 
390 Id. at 295. 
391 Id. 
392 See id. at 295-96. Dr. Theodor Sterling likewise advanced the "constitutional hypothesis" of 
disease, and publication of his criticisms was part of an industry strategy to stimulate controversy 
about the dangers of second-hand smoke. In addition, he gave the industry material that it could 
cite to maintain the controversy regarding the causal link between cigarette smoke (be it active or 
passive) and disease. See id. at 30I. Similarly, Dr. Henry Rothschild, professor of medicine at 
Louisiana State University, was awarded $250,000 to conduct research on the role of genetics in 
the causation of cancer. Tobacco companies funded him through CTR Special Projects and used 
his work for congressional testimony. Rothschild kept tobacco company lawyers informed of his 
progress, and they were even able to review his manuscripts before Rothschild submitted those 
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Other researchers were not as cooperative and thus required a dif- 
ferent brand of industry oversight. Dr. Frederick Homberger, for in- 
stance, received money to study smoke exposure on hamsters. As his 
research progressed, the initial grant was reformulated as a contract, 
"so [the industry] could control publication - they were quite open 
about that."393 The industry was particularly sensitive to the use of 
the word "cancer," which they did not allow Dr. Homberger to pub- 
lish.394 In order to enforce such edits, the tobacco companies stopped 
funding his research.395 Frustrated with such tight control over his 
work, Dr. Homberger attempted to call a press conference to expose 
the suppression of scientific information. Officials working for the to- 
bacco industry, however, were one step ahead of him. As detailed in 
an internal memo, rather than allowing such damaging allegations to 
reach the public, the tobacco officials "arranged later that evening for 
[the press conference] to be cancelled."396 Instead of revealing industry 
practices, "Homberger was given a cordial welcome and nicely has- 
tened out the door."397 The bottom of the internal memo included a 
postscript: "P.S. I doubt if you or Tom will want to retain this note."398 
Finally, the industry often resorted to publishing pro-cigarette 
propaganda pieces through "independent" writers to give the appear- 
ance of objectivity in the popular press. The tobacco industry paid 
people to write articles favorable toward cigarettes and unfavorable 
toward public health research,399 and paid them even more when na- 
tional magazines published their articles. For instance, in i969, two 
national periodicals published articles by the same author under dif- 
ferent pseudonyms. The author, a sports writer named Stanley Frank, 
did not disclose that he had been hired by Hill & Knowlton.400 A 
month after one of the articles was published, six hundred thousand 
reprints were distributed with an attached note reading, "As a leader 
in your profession and community, you will be interested in reading 
manuscripts for publication. Rothschild's The Bandwagons of Medicine, which was published in 
the scientific journal Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, contained the basic premise that 
physicians "jump on the bandwagon" of popular therapies, including the "complete elimination of 
cigarettes," when "there is no definitive evidence to support their value." Id. at 292. Rothschild 
sent the manuscript to an attorney, Timothy Finnegan of Jacob, Medinger & Finnegan, who then 
circulated the manuscript to counsel for the tobacco companies. See id. at 293. 
393 Alix M. Freedman & Laurie P. Cohen, Smoke & Mirrors, WALL ST. J., Feb. II, I993, at A6. 
394 See id. 
395 See HILTS, supra note 259, at I I. 
396 Memorandum from L.S.Z. to Henry & Tom I-2 (Apr. 22, I974) (on file with the authors). 
397 Id. at 2. 
398 Id. 
399 See HILTS, supra note 259, at io6. 
400 See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at I79. 
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this story. "401 Nowhere on the note was it indicated that tobacco 
money had paid for the reprints.402 
(ii) Denying Causation. - In addition to this effort to control and 
suppress scientific research into the ills of smoking, while simultane- 
ously projecting an image of independence, the cigarette industry also 
steadfastly maintained a campaign to create controversy and doubt 
surrounding all outside research that indicated a causal link between 
cigarettes and disease. Many of the public health studies had shared 
the same basic methodology: they observed general trends and noted 
the strong correlation between smoking and disease, particularly can- 
cer. Because none of the studies could establish a specific causal rela- 
tionship between smoking and an individual smoker's cancer, the in- 
dustry repeatedly invoked the argument that correlation does not 
prove causation. Indeed, the tobacco companies exploited this general 
truism by issuing bold statements that there was no link at all. The 
Frank Statement of I954 stands as an exemplar of their approach: "Al- 
though conducted by doctors of professional standing," the widely dis- 
seminated text read, "these experiments are not regarded as conclusive 
in the field of cancer research."403 Further, the Frank Statement as- 
serted that "there is no proof that cigarette smoking is one of the 
causes [of lung cancer]," and "[w]e believe the products we make are 
not injurious to health."404 
This approach became the basic line of defense for the industry, 
and it repeatedly appeared over several decades. For instance, after 
the respected Dr. Clarence Cook Little assumed leadership of TIRC's 
Scientific Advisory Board in I954, he received a memorandum from 
Hill & Knowlton that emphasized the importance of stressing the ab- 
sence of a proven causal link. The memo instructed Dr. Little that 
"[n]o evidence within our knowledge has yet established cigarette 
smoking as a causal factor in lung cancer," and "[r]esearch reports have 
definitely NOT produced to date a fragment of conclusive evi- 
dence."405 Dr. Little dutifully followed these instructions a few days 
later during an interview on Edward R. Murrow's television show. In 
response to a query about whether "cancer-causing agents" had been 
401 KLUGER, supra note 259, at 324. 
402 See id. This practice of reprinting supposedly independent articles continued through the 
shift from concern about active smoking to deepening awareness about the dangers of passive 
smoking. See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at i8o-8i. After the Environmental Protection 
Agency's 1992 report detailed the dangers of passive smoking, the tobacco industry reprinted arti- 
cles criticizing the report. Philip Morris reprinted one of these articles as a full-page ad for four 
successive days. The ad's bold caption read, "If We Said It, You Might Not Believe It." Philip 
Morris did not disclose that the author's employer received a $ioooo donation from Philip Morris 
or that the author himself received $5000 from RJR for the rights to use his writings. The indus- 
try also made similar attempts to attack the FDA. See id. at i8i. 
403 GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at 34 (reproducing the actual advertisement). 
404 Id. 
405 HILTS, supra note 259, at io. 
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identified in cigarettes, Dr. Little replied, "No. None whatever, either 
in cigarettes or in any product of smoking ... .406 
In i983, Dr. Sheldon Sommers, then the scientific director of the 
CTR, testified before Congress: "Cigarette smoking has not been scien- 
tifically established to be a cause of chronic diseases, such as cancer, 
cardiovascular disease, or emphysema. Nor has it been shown to af- 
fect pregnancy outcome adversely."407 An advertisement placed by 
RJR in I984, styled like an editorial, averred that "[s]tudies which con- 
clude that smoking causes disease have regularly ignored significant 
evidence to the contrary" and that "reasonable people who analyze [the 
evidence] may come to see this issue not as a closed case, but as an 
open controversy."408 The advertisement continued: "Like any contro- 
versy, this one has more than one side. We hope the debate will be an 
open one."409 Continuing the theme, in i990 RJR sent a letter includ- 
ing the following paragraph to the principal of a school whose fifth 
graders had written to the company: "Despite all the research going 
on, the simple and unfortunate fact is that scientists do not know the 
cause or causes of the chronic diseases reported to be associated with 
smoking. The answers to the many unanswered controversies . . . we 
believe can only be determined through much more scientific re- 
search."X410 
Occasionally, in its zeal to convey the message that no one had 
shown causation, the industry even overtly misrepresented the conclu- 
sions of studies.41' The Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial was a 
government funded, $ioo million, twenty-year study that ended in 
i982.412 The study found that "those who quit smoking had signifi- 
406 Id. 
407 GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at 20. 
408 RJR, Editorial, Can We Have an Open Debate About Smoking?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, i984, 
at Aii. 
409 Id. 
410 Dolan Report, supra note 285, at I4 (quoting a letter from RJR public information manager 
Jo Spach) (omission in original). This practice of denying that the science indicated anything 
more than correlation continued as recently as I994, when the heads of the major tobacco compa- 
nies testified before Congress. At that hearing, Andrew Tisch, CEO of Lorillard, maintained that 
"[wie have looked at the data and [it] has all been statistical data that has not convinced me that 
smoking causes death." HILTS, supra note 259, at I23 (quoting testimony). At the same hearing, 
the chief executives of the seven major tobacco companies swore under oath that nicotine and 
cigarettes are not addictive. See id. at I22. 
411 In one recent instance, Philip Morris attempted to debunk the EPA's conclusions that sec- 
ond-hand smoke is a prime carcinogen by taking out a full-page advertisement stating that a 
study in the American Journal of Public Health found "no overall statistically significant link be- 
tween second-hand smoke and lung cancer," and asking the question, "Why did the EPA not in- 
clude this study?" HILTS, supra note 259, at io6. The ad thus implied an intentional manipula- 
tion of information by the EPA. In reality, the study concluded that passive smoking suggests a 
"small but consistent elevation in the risk of lung cancer in nonsmokers due to passive smoking" 
and the "proliferation of federal, state and local regulations that restrict smoking in public places 
and work sites is well founded." Id. 
412 See KLUGER, supra note 259, at 572. 
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cantly lower rates of [coronary heart disease] and, for the most part, 
total mortality."'413 RJR took out an advertisement that ignored this 
unequivocal finding, stating: "After io years, there was no statistically 
significant difference between the two groups in the number of heart 
disease deaths."'414 In addition, RJR drove home the causation theme 
by flatly stating that the link between cigarettes and disease was "an 
opinion" or "[a] judgment."415 The link was "not scientific fact."'416 
(iii) Attacking the Opposition. - In addition to these efforts to 
play on the public health advocates' lack of specific causation evi- 
dence, the industry also attempted to create the appearance of an anti- 
smoking conspiracy. Tobacco manufacturers tried to portray scientists 
who reached conclusions about the adverse effects of smoking as zeal- 
ots who would do anything, including conducting flawed science, to 
put the industry out of business.417 Pursuant to such goals, the indus- 
try devised a system to keep track of scientists and physicians who 
were considered dangerous because they were informing the public of 
anti-tobacco evidence.418 The practice involved establishing an "active 
intelligence crew" to listen to papers presented at medical meetings 
and responding if possible when the reports seemed damaging.419 This 
well-organized system also included the labeling of certain territories 
as "red territories," where the industry needed to be most watchful for 
the problem of spreading anti-tobacco messages.420 
To resist the increasing threat of government regulations in i969 
and I970 and to draw attention away from the mounting body of sci- 
entific evidence attesting to the dangers of smoking, the tobacco indus- 
try eventually shifted the focus of its advertising from science to politi- 
cal "rights."'42' Advertising campaigns were "designed to equate any 
attack on the tobacco industry with an attack on freedom itself."422 
Buzzwords included "scare-tactics," "freedom," "legal product," "truth," 
413 Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial, 248 JAMA I465 (i982). 
414 KLUGER, supra note 259, at 574 (quoting RJR ad) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
415 In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., iii F.T.C. 539, 554 (i988) (Oliver, Chairman, dissenting) 
(quoting the advertisement "Of Cigarettes and Science") (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
416 Id. 
417 See, e.g., infra p. I495. 
418 See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at I97-98. 
419 HILTS, supra note 259, at I4. 
420 GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at i98. The "red territory" system involved keeping the 
companies in these territories informed of imminent industry action and included a check-list of 
major scientific papers with industry comments, a list of particularly favorable or unfavorable 
scientists and doctors, and a warning system for when these professionals traveled to a particular 
territory. Id. (quoting Letter from A.D. McCormick, BAT research and development, to B.G. 
Pearson, BAT attorney (June 27, i968)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The tobacco industry 
implemented this practice worldwide and formalized it through a London-based organization 
called INFOTAB. See id. 
421 See id. at i84-85. 
422 Id. at i85. 
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"free speech," "fair play," and "free and responsible enterprise."423 The 
attempt to frame the issue in political terms was evident in the slogans 
themselves, which included the following pithy statements: 
It's more than cigarettes being challenged here. It's freedom. 
We will continue to bring to the American people the story of the cigarette 
and any other legal product based upon truth and taste. 
We believe that free speech and fair play are both the heritage and prom- 
ise in our society of free and responsible enterprise.424 
Finally, when the foregoing tactics proved unavailing, the industry 
often resorted to nuisance litigation, a tactic that has appealed to the 
industry at least since the Big Scare. Around that time, for example, 
John Hill, of Hill & Knowlton, recommended suing Dr. Alton Ochsner, 
a pioneering authority on the health effects of cigarettes, because Hill 
wanted to have a "peg on which to hang an attack upon Ochsner and 
his ilk in making irresponsible and panicky statements under the cloak 
of scientific authority."425 In recent years, the tactic has been em- 
ployed with renewed vigor. In I997, for example, Californians for Sci- 
entific Integrity, a new citizens group funded mostly by the tobacco in- 
dustry, filed a suit charging Dr. Stanton Glantz, a statistician and 
professor of medicine at the University of California at San Francisco, 
with scientific misconduct in an influential study concluding that 
smoking bans in fifteen communities produced no adverse economic 
impact on restaurants.426 RJR was similarly aggressive and litigious in 
its reaction to Dr. Paul Fischer's famous study427 demonstrating the 
recognizability of Joe Camel among young children.428 These sorts of 
423 Id. 
424 Id. at i86 (citation omitted). Similarly, in I986 Philip Morris placed an advertisement "in 
major magazines and newspapers throughout the country" soliciting essays and promising prizes, 
including a $I5,000 prize for the first-place national winner. AMERICAN VOICES: PRIZE- 
WINNING ESSAYS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, CENSORSHIP AND ADVERTISING BANS at ix (Philip 
Morris ed., i987) (containing the 54 prize-winning essays). The ad's headline read, "Is Liberty 
Worth Writing For? Our Founders Thought So. And We Think So Too." The ad also contained 
a reproduction of the First Amendment. Id. 
A I985 internal Philip Morris document may help to explain the company's fawning affection 
for the constitutional doctrine of commercial speech: the document notes that one of the com- 
pany's marketing goals was "to establish a mind set in the public at large that bankrupting huge 
industries such as tobacco is unthinkable." Dolan Report, supra note 285, at i9 (quoting Philip 
Morris document) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
425 HILTS, supra note 259, at I4. 
426 See Bill Richards, Pro-Tobacco Groups Step up Attacks on a Longtime Foe, WALL ST. J., 
July 23, 1997, at Bi. A court granted Dr. Glantz's motion to dismiss the complaint. See Tobacco 
Litigation at a Glantz: A Lawsuit to Silence an Industry Antagonist Is Thrown out of Court, S.F. 
EXAMINER, Dec. 8, 1997, at A2o. Dr. Glantz is also the author of a book summarizing the con- 
tents of the B & W documents that were leaked in the early 1990s, see GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 
259, and an outspoken foe of the cigarette industry. 
427 See Fischer et al., supra note 340, at 3 I46-47. 
428 See Suein L. Hwang, Fire Fight: Doctor Whose Study Tied Joe Camel to Kids Takes an Odd 
Journey, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2I, I997, atAi. 
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lawsuits serve not only to intimidate those people who would dare to 
criticize the industry, but also to comfort smokers looking for evidence 
that "anti-tobacco" studies are flawed or unscientific. 
3. Suppressing Evidence: The Industry's Private Knowledge of 
Health Issues. - The industry's public campaign of creating contro- 
versy was accompanied by an intense and fruitful internal investiga- 
tion into the nature and degree of cigarette risks. One thing that is 
startling about this internal research is the sheer extent of knowledge 
that cigarette manufacturers amassed, often well before public health 
researchers acquired the same information. Equally startling is the 
degree to which the internal knowledge contrasted with the industry's 
public statements on health issues. This section reviews the industry's 
early and comprehensive knowledge of the health risks of smoking, as 
well as its equally broad efforts to suppress and conceal such knowl- 
edge from the public. 
(a) The Link Between Cigarettes and Disease. - The tobacco in- 
dustry, despite its representations to the contrary, knew that cigarette 
smoking caused cancer. Beginning as early as I946, the tobacco com- 
panies internally acknowledged the mounting evidence of the causal 
link between smoking and cancer.429 By the late 1950s, the company's 
internal documents revealed increasing acceptance of a causal link. In 
I958, Dr. H.R. Felton of British American Tobacco's (BAT) Research 
Center and two other scientists visited a number of American and Ca- 
nadian researchers, including those from the tobacco company re- 
search groups, to review the current science on causation. Dr. Felton's 
report concluded that "the individuals whom we met believed that 
smoking causes lung cancer if by 'causation' we mean any chain of 
events which leads finally to lung cancer and which involves smoking 
as an indispensable link."430 Dr. Felton dismissed the reasoning of the 
only scientist who disputed a causal connection as "nowhere thought to 
be sound."'431 That same year, a memorandum sent to the vice- 
president of research at Philip Morris explained that "the evidence . . . 
is building up that heavy cigarette smoking contributes to lung cancer 
either alone or in association with physical and physiological fac- 
tors. "432 
429 Lorillard chemist H.B. Parmele, later vice-president of research and a member of Lorillard's 
board of directors, wrote that certain scientists "have claimed for many years that the use of to- 
bacco contributes to cancer development in susceptible people." KLUGER, supra note 259, at 149 
(quoting a I946 memorandum from Parmele to the secretary of Lorillard's committee on manu- 
facturing) (internal quotation marks omitted). Parmele also indicated that "U]ust enough evidence 
has been presented to justify the possibility of such a presumption." Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
430 H.R. Bentley et al., Report on Visit to U.S.A. and Canada 2 (June II, I958) (on file with the 
authors). 
431 Id. 
432 Memorandum from R.N. DuPuis to C.U. Mace I (July 24, I958) (on file with the authors). 
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A few years later, in i96i, a Philip Morris Research and Develop- 
ment Committee document included a section entitled "Reduction of 
Carcinogens in Smoke,"433 which made the following conclusion: 
To achieve this objective will require a major research effort, because 
carcinogenss are found in practically every class of compounds in smoke. 
This fact prohibits complete solution of the problem by eliminating one or 
two classes of compounds. The best we can hope for is to reduce a par- 
ticularly bad class, i.e., the polynuclear hydrocarbons, or phenols.434 
Liggett also received unambiguous notice from researchers that ciga- 
rettes contained "biologically active materials" that were "a) cancer 
causing[,] b) cancer promoting[,] c) poisonous[, and] d) stimulating, 
pleasurable, and flavorful."435 Thereafter, tobacco industry research 
repeatedly confirmed that cigarettes caused disease. In i965, BAT be- 
gan a long-term biological testing program, code named "Project 
JANUS," that consisted of experiments in which smoke condensate 
was painted on the backs of mice.436 BAT and its researchers ac- 
knowledged that mouse-skin painting was "the ultimate court of ap- 
peal on carcinogenic effects" and had "developed into a dependable 
technique to grade smoke condensates."437 The unambiguous results 
of Project JANUS "repeatedly found that tobacco caused tumors when 
painted on mice skin."438 
This knowledge, however, was never shared with the public as the 
industry repeatedly promised. Instead, cigarette manufacturers prac- 
ticed a multifold campaign of concealment and suppression, the over- 
arching strategy of which involved a steadfast refusal to release the re- 
sults of research indicating any negative effects of smoking. As one 
former employee of CTR put it, "[W]hen CTR researchers found out 
that cigarettes were bad and it was better not to smoke, we didn't 
433 Dr. H. Wakeham, Tobacco and Health - R&D Approach I7 (Nov. I5, I96i) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the authors). 
434 Id. 
435 Arthur D. Little, Inc., Report to Liggett, Inc. I59 (Mar. 15, i96i) (on file with the authors). 
436 See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at I43-46 (summarizing the results of Project JANUS); 
Chronology of Brown and Williamson Smoking and Health Research 6 (Oct. 25, i988) (unpub- 
lished report, on file with the authors). 
437 Minutes of Conference Held at Kronberg 3-4 (June 23, i969) (on file with the authors). 
438 HILTS, supra note 259, at I50; see also Memorandum from M.H. Bilimoria to R.S. Wade I 
(Jan. 24, i980) (on file with the authors) (reviewing results of JANUS experiments). Similar inter- 
nal reports show advance industry knowledge of the link between smoking and emphysema. For 
instance, a i963 memorandum to Philip Morris's president and CEO from the company's vice- 
president of research enumerates compounds in cigarette smoke that are "very carcinogenic." 
Memorandum from H. Wakeham to Hugh Cullman of Philip Morris 2 (Oct. 24, i963) (on file with 
the authors). In this document, the vice-president related the following: 
Irritation problems are now receiving greater attention because of the general medical be- 
lief that irritation leads to chronic bronchitis and emphysema. These are serious diseases 
involving millions of people. Emphysema is often fatal either directly or through other 
respiratory complications. A number of experts have predicted that the cigarette industry 
ultimately may be in greater trouble in this area than in the lung cancer field. 
Id. at3. 
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publicize that."439 Equally dramatic was the industry's practice of 
abruptly shutting down research programs that produced adverse in- 
formation. RJR, for instance, established a facility, known as the 
"mouse house," to investigate the health effects of smoking on mice but 
shut down the program on a single day in December, I970.440 RJR 
laid off all of the workers at the laboratory and confiscated their mate- 
rials. The Surgeon General was already "slitting our throats," one of 
the dismissed workers was told, and "we don't need to do it our- 
selves."'441 Another researcher reflected that theyhy decided to kill [the 
adverse studies on causation]."442 
Additionally, any internal researcher who suggested that a tobacco 
company alter its public stance on causation met with severe repercus- 
sions. Dr. Sidney J. Green, head of research and development at 
BAT,443 believed that the position of the industry was irresponsible. 
For Dr. Green, "company arguments about scientific proof and cause- 
and-effect ... were 'disastrous."'444 As early as October 1976, he 
wrote an internal memorandum arguing that the position of BAT was 
scientifically unsound: "[The] problem of causality has been inflated to 
enormous proportions. The industry has retreated behind impossible 
demands for 'scientific proof' whereas such proof has never been re- 
quired as a basis for action in the legal and political fields."'445 Dr. 
Green went on to note that "for social policy purposes it is sensible and 
totally relevant to use the experimental evidence pertaining to large 
groups and also to select the simplest hypothesis. It may therefore be 
concluded that for certain groups of people smoking causes the inci- 
dence of certain diseases to be higher than it would otherwise be."446 
BAT did not tolerate the open admission of such views. Following a 
i980 appearance on British television during which he admitted that 
causation had been proved, Dr. Green "retired," after twenty years of 
service to BAT.447 
439 Complaint of Massachusetts at 2, Massachusetts v. Philip Morris, Inc. (Mass. Super. Ct. 
I995) (No. 95-7378). 
440 HILTS, supra note 259, at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
441 Id. 
442 Complaint at 3, Philip Morris (No. 95-7378). Research in Great Britain ended under simi- 
larly abrupt circumstances in 1974. See HILTS, supra note 259, at 40. Philip Morris kept its labs 
open longer, until April 5, i984, but its eventual shutdown was just as quick. See id. 
443 Dr. Green was the head of BAT research and development. See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 
259, at 441. 
444 HILTS, supra note 259, at i9. 
445 S.J. Green, Cigarette Smoking and Causal Relationships I (Oct. 27, I976) (on file with the 
authors). 
446 Id. at 4. 
447 See HILTS, supra note 259, at 4I. Dr. Green had claimed that smoking causes disease: "I'm 
quite sure it can, and does.... I'm quite sure it's a major factor in lung cancer in our society." 
Id. (omission in original). 
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In addition to intimidating researchers and canceling projects, the 
industry developed elaborate methods to deal with the adverse evi- 
dence that was generated before it was able to halt projects. For in- 
stance, B & W sought to avoid production of causation-related docu- 
ments during litigation by entirely removing such documents from the 
United States.448 As part of this removal project, lawyers for B & W's 
British parent company screened all information in studies that did not 
directly relate to the marketability of cigarettes in the United States.449 
Tobacco companies also created complex systems for limiting internal 
access to damaging causation information. B & W reformulated its 
document circulation policy in i985 so that in-house lawyers reviewed 
all documents relating to the health effects of smoking for dangerous 
statements, which could then be protected from disclosure within the 
company.450 The final and most well-known approach that the to- 
bacco industry employed to prevent disclosure of causation informa- 
tion was the creative use of the attorney-client privilege. For instance, 
CTR assigned control over all research projects that could possibly 
yield negative results to its attorneys in hopes that the privilege would 
apply to the results of such projects.45' 
448 In early i985, J.K. Wells, a lawyer for B & W, outlined a procedure by which potentially 
damaging materials and documents would be consolidated and then moved out of the United 
States. See Memorandum from J.K. Wells (Jan. I7, i985) (on file with the authors). Describing 
the procedure as removing "deadwood" from the company files, Wells articulated a system by 
which designated documents should be "pulled, put into boxes and stored" so that they could be 
shipped. Id. at 2. Wells suggested that the supervisor of the "deadwood" reduction program 
make sure that "neither he nor anyone else in the department should make any notes, memos or 
lists." Id. Included in this "deadwood" removal were the results of the Project JANUS series of 
experiments. See id. at i. 
449 See Memorandum from J.K. Wells to E. Pepples i (Nov. 9, I979) (on file with the authors). 
450 See Memorandum from H.F. Frigon to T.E. Sandefur 1, 4 (Feb. i, i985) (including attach- 
ments) (on file with the authors). 
451 See Haines v. Liggett Group, I40 F.R.D. 68i, 695 (D.N.J. I992) (quoting notes of general 
counsel committee meeting dated Sept. io, ig8i). Two B & W documents from 1979 most clearly 
demonstrate the attempt to protect documents from discovery through attorney-client privilege. 
The first memorandum spells out the steps for shielding documents: 
Continued Law Department control is essential for the best argument for privilege. At 
the same time, control should be exercised with flexibility to allow access of the R&D staff 
to the documents. The general policy should be clearly stated that access to the documents 
and storage of the documents is under control of the Law Department and access is 
granted only upon approval of request. 
. . . The abstracts of the documents should be circulated only for the less sensitive cate- 
gories and then only to a list given prior approval by the Law Department. 
Memorandum from J. Kendrick Wells to Ernest Pepples I-2 (June I5, 1979) (on file with the 
authors); see also GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at 24i-46 (quoting at length from related 
documents). Five months later, on November 9, 1979, a second "privileged" memorandum ex- 
plained that this procedure would provide work product coverage for documents under federal 
and Kentucky law: 
Regardless of the initial recipient of the documents, in order to be covered by the rules of 
civil procedure they must be "prepared in anticipation of litigation." Appropriate paper 
work should be established with BAT, including any amendments to the cost sharing 
agreement to establish that documents of a certain nature are prepared for B & W in an- 
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(b) The Role of Nicotine and Addiction. - If evidence that 
smoking causes disease has posed a serious threat to tobacco manufac- 
turers since the I950s, then a more recent medical finding - that ciga- 
rettes are addictive - has provided the industry with further incentive 
to engage in manipulative market practices. Not surprisingly, the in- 
dustry response has paralleled the defensive strategy it continues to 
employ against the causal-link evidence. 
Cigarette manufacturers were well aware of nicotine's addictive 
potential even in i964, when the Surgeon General referred to cigarettes 
as "an habituation rather than an addiction."452 Recently disclosed in- 
ternal reports provide considerable evidence that cigarette manufac- 
turers have known about the addictive properties of cigarettes since at 
least the early i96os. In i962, a BAT executive announced that 
"smoking is a habit of addiction," adding that "[n]icotine is not only a 
very fine drug, but the technique of administration by smoking has 
considerable psychological advantages ....""453 A research report 
commissioned the following year by B & W detailed withdrawal ef- 
fects: 
[E]ver-increasing dose levels of nicotine are necessary to maintain the de- 
sired action. ... If nicotine intake . .. is prohibited to chronic smokers, . . . 
these individuals are left with an unbalanced endocrine system. A body 
left in this unbalanced status craves for renewed drug intake in order to 
restore the physiological equilibrium. This unconscious desire explains the 
addiction of the individual to nicotine.454 
Two months later, Addison Yeaman, the general counsel at B & W, 
came to the same conclusion in an internal memorandum: nicotine is 
"an addictive drug effective in the release of stress mechanisms."455 
Philip Morris has held a particularly acute view of the role of nico- 
tine. Internal reports prepared in I972 and I978 identify customers as 
ticipation of litigation. I have in mind paper work which would make this statement as a 
policy between the parent and sibling, but that in the operational context BAT would send 
documents without attempting to distinguish which were and were not litigation docu- 
ments. 
Memorandum from Wells, supra note 448, at 1-2. 
452 GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at Is (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WEL- 
FARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON 
GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 34 (i964)). 
453 Charles Ellis, Smoking and Health: Policy on Research, Remarks at the Southampton Re- 
search Conference 4, i6 (i962) (transcript on file with the University of California San Francisco 
Library). 
454 C. Haselbach & 0. Libert, A Tentative Hypothesis on Nicotine Addiction I-2 (i963) (un- 
published essay, on file with the University of California San Francisco Library). 
455 Addison Yeaman, Implications of Battelle Hippo I & II and the Griffith Filter 4 (July 17, 
I963) (unpublished report, on file with the University of California at San Francisco Library). 
BAT did not hesitate to share its discoveries with its competitors. BAT officials circulated reports 
stemming from Project Hippo, a study of physiological and pharmacological effects of nicotine 
that began in ig6i, to other U.S. cigarette manufacturers, including B & W. See GLANTZ ET AL., 
supra note 259, at 69. 
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"nicotine seekers": "We think that most smokers can be considered 
nicotine seekers, for the pharmacological effect of nicotine is one of the 
rewards that comes] from smoking. When the smoker quits . .. [t]he 
change is very noticeable, he misses the reward, and so he returns to 
smoking."456 According to a more recent document drafted by Philip 
Morris, nicotine may be even more addictive than cocaine and mor- 
phine: 
Different people smoke cigarettes for different reasons. But the primary 
reason is to deliver nicotine into their bodies.... It is a physiologically ac- 
tive, nitrogen containing substance. Similar organic chemicals include 
nicotine, quinine, cocaine, atropine and morphine. While each of these 
substances can be used to affect human physiology, nicotine has a par- 
ticularly broad range of influence. 
During the smoking act, nicotine is inhaled into the lungs in smoke, 
enters the bloodstream and travels to the brain in about eight to ten sec- 
onds.457 
Although the tobacco industry's research into the addictive proper- 
ties of nicotine seems to have significantly outpaced public-sector sci- 
entific research,458 the industry used its advance knowledge strictly for 
commercial and exploitative purposes. The following proclamation in 
i963 by Addison Yeaman at B & W best captured this mentality: "We 
are ... in the business of selling nicotine ... ."59 Nine years later, an 
RJR executive agreed: "[T]he tobacco industry may be thought of as 
being a specialized, highly ritualized and stylized segment of the 
pharmaceutical industry. Tobacco products, uniquely, contain and de- 
liver nicotine, a potent drug with a variety of physiological effects."460 
Despite their promise to disclose material information about 
smoking and health in the Frank Statement, cigarette manufacturers 
suppressed their knowledge regarding addictiveness. One recently 
publicized incident suggests the lengths to which manufacturers went 
to keep their secrets safe. In i980, Philip Morris hired Victor DeNoble 
456 Memorandum from F.J. Ryan to Philip Morris Officials 2 (Mar. 1978) (on file with the 
authors). 
457 Memorandum from B. Reuter to Philip Morris Officials i (on file with the authors); cf. U.S. 
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE 
ADDICTION 9 (I988) ("Nicotine is the drug in tobacco that causes addiction [and t]he pharmaco- 
logic and behavioral processes that determine tobacco addiction are similar to those that deter- 
mine addiction to drugs such as heroin and cocaine."). 
458 See Hurt & Robertson, supra note 299, at II74-75 (noting that some of B & W's research, 
which had preceded published reports from the general scientific community by several years, 
was "at the cutting edge of nicotine pharmacology"). 
459 Yeaman, supra note 455, at 4. 
460 Memorandum from Claude E. Teague, Jr. to RJR Officials I (Apr. I4, 1972) (on file with the 
authors). Philip Morris's internal reports in the I970s captured an identical understanding of the 
cigarette as a pharmaceutical product: "The cigarette ought properly to be conceived of 'not as a 
product but as a package. The product is nicotine.... Think of the cigarette pack as a storage 
container for a day's supply of nicotine."' KLUGER, supra note 259, at 417. 
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to study the pharmacology of nicotine. Working at a secluded labora- 
tory, DeNoble and a colleague isolated two hallmarks of addiction 
among rats exposed to nicotine: self-administration and tolerance. 
Philip Morris's in-house counsel subsequently alerted DeNoble that his 
data posed a danger to the company.461 After the journal Psycho- 
pharmacology accepted a research paper by DeNoble showing that, in 
terms of addiction, "nicotine looked like heroin," Philip Morris ordered 
him to withdraw the paper.462 In April i984, the company abruptly 
closed DeNoble's nicotine research laboratory and threatened legal ac- 
tion if he published or talked about his work.463 
B. Reassessing the Debate over Smoker Risk Perceptions 
The preceding account of the practices and conduct of the tobacco 
companies over the past century illustrates a coordinated and multi- 
dimensional approach to expanding the industry's reach and profit- 
ability. Like any business in a free market,464 each tobacco manufac- 
turer sought to maintain its existing customers and attract new ones. 
Because of the substantial health risks posed by the product and the 
fact that consumers had some understanding of these risks, cigarette 
manufacturers had (and still have) particularly strong incentives to 
manipulate consumer risk perceptions. Although it may be deeply dis- 
appointing, it is not entirely surprising, therefore, that the industry 
employed such diverse manipulative strategies to increase profits. The 
history demonstrates the fundamental theme of this Article and its 
companion: the invisible hand rewards those who create the perception 
of a superior product, whatever the reality. The cigarette industry un- 
derstands that basic principle and has devoted considerably less energy 
toward developing a better mousetrap than it has toward breeding 
mice and otherwise altering consumers' perceptions of mousetraps.465 
461 See KLUGER, supra note 259, at 576. 
462 Letter from Herbert Barry, Field Editor, Psychopharmacology, to Victor DeNoble I (Sept. 
22, i986) (on file with the authors). 
463 See Justin Catanoso, Closing up the Doors at "The Mouse House", NEWS & REC., at I (on 
file with the authors). Other companies have been equally zealous in their attempts to conceal 
research work. In a confidential memorandum, ATC executive John T. Ashworth instructed em- 
ployees to obfuscate any possible paper trails leading to research involving nicotine: "In the fu- 
ture, our use of nicotine should be referred to as 'Compound W' in our experimental work, re- 
ports, and memorandums, either for distribution within the Department or for outside 
distribution." Memorandum from John T. Ashworth to W.W. Sadler et al. I (May I4, i969) (on 
file with the authors). 
464 Cf Hanson & Logue, supra note 256, at ii67-69 (explaining that regulation of cigarette 
manufacturers has been remarkably anemic). 
465 The cigarette industry, with its mastery of market manipulation, necessitates a rethinking of 
Ralph Waldo Emerson's famous statement: "If a man can write a better book, preach a better 
sermon, or make a better mousetrap than his neighbor, though he builds his house in the woods 
the world will make a beaten path to his door." BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 496 n.i 
(Isth ed. i98o). 
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i. The Irrelevance of Market Manipulation. - Although the ma- 
nipulative practices of cigarette manufacturers seem to have affected 
smoker risk perceptions, this finding does not necessarily indicate that 
consumers underestimate the relevant risks. Indeed, the primary liti- 
gation defense offered by the industry and its experts is that the con- 
duct described in section I.A does not change the fact that consumers 
(including smokers) know everything they need to know to make in- 
formed judgments regarding whether to smoke. That defense appears 
to have been quite effective so far466 and is a difficult position to rebut. 
After all, the vast majority of American consumers seem to understand 
at some level that long-term smoking may be dangerous.467 
Professor Kip Viscusi, in an influential book and series of articles, 
has dedicated considerable time and energy in recent years to demon- 
strating just how well aware consumers are of the risks of smoking.468 
Viscusi purports to have found that consumers - smokers and non- 
smokers of all ages -'overestimate the risks of long-term smoking. In 
telephone surveys "commissioned by the defense law firms in support 
of tobacco litigation efforts,"469 respondents were asked several ques- 
tions, including the following: "Among ioo cigarette smokers, how 
many of them do you think will get lung cancer because they 
466 See infra p. i505. 
467 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES 
OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL I82 tbl.4 (I989) 
[hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT i9891 (finding that more than 70% of all adults think 
that "any amount" of smoking is hazardous); Ron Borland, What Do People's Estimates of Smok- 
ing Risks Mean?, I2 PSYCHOL. & HEALTH 5I3, 5I4 (I997) ('People, including smokers, when 
asked the probability or percentage chance of dying from a smoking related illness or of getting 
lung cancer typically overestimate the risk."); Howard Leventhal, Kathleen Glynn & Raymond 
Fleming, Is the Smoking Decision an 'Informed Choice'?: Effect of Smoking Risk Factors on 
Smoking Beliefs, 257 JAMA 3373, 3374 (I987) ("On a general level, the hazards of smoking were 
well known [among urban youths]. At baseline, all participants were asked, 'Do you think that 
smoking can injure or hurt the body?'; 98.4% not only maintained that smoking is harmful, but 
accurately named one or more body parts that are adversely affected by smoking."); Jonathan D. 
Reppucci et al., Unrealistic Optimism Among Adolescent Smokers and Nonsmokers, II J. 
PRIMARY PREVENTION 227, 235 (i99i) (explaining that in two studies, "smokers and nonsmokers 
agreed that there is a strong relationship between cigarette smoking and the development of lung 
cancer"); Michael Schoenbaum, Do Smokers Understand the Mortality Effects of Smoking? Evi- 
dence from the Health and Retirement Survey, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 755, 755 (I997) ('[Tihe 
public has been aware for at least 2 decades that smoking poses health risks."); Suzanne C. Seger- 
strom et al., Optimistic Bias Among Cigarette Smokers, 23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. i6o6, i6o8 
(I993) ("Smokers, as a whole, acknowledge that smoking is increasing their risk of cancer, lung 
cancer, or heart attack relative to nonsmokers."). 
468 See VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 255; W. Kip Viscusi, Age Variations in Risk Perceptions 
and Smoking Decisions, 73 REV. EcON. & STAT. 577 (i99i); W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Taxation 
and the Social Consequences of Smoking, in NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, TAX POLICY 
AND THE ECONOMY 5i, 69-7I (James Poterba ed., i995); W. Kip Viscusi, Do Smokers Underes- 
timate Risks?, 98 J. POL. ECON. I253 (i99o); W. Kip Viscusi, Smoke & Mirrors: Understanding 
the New Scheme for Regulation, i6 BROOKINGS REV. I4 (i998) [hereinafter Viscusi, Smoke & 
Mirrors]; W. Kip Viscusi, Public Perceptions of Smoking Risks (Aug. i, i998) (unpublished paper, 
on file with the authors) [hereinafter Viscusi, Public Perceptions]. 
469 VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 255, at 84 n.6. 
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smoke?"470 The average response was that forty-three smokers would 
develop lung cancer, leading Viscusi to conclude that consumers be- 
lieve smoking has a forty-three percent chance of causing lung can- 
cer.471 Viscusi observes that this response substantially exceeds the 
"scientific estimate" of actual lung cancer risk, which he claims is be- 
tween five percent and ten percent.472 In short, according to Viscusi, 
"[t]he potential hazards of smoking are not a closely guarded secret, 
and if anything risk perceptions for some smoking risks, such as lung 
cancer, may be too high."473 In a more recent paper, Professor Viscusi 
reiterates this finding, concluding that the risks of smoking are "almost 
universally understood" and that "enormously powerful" market forces 
deal with the risks of smoking in a way that makes government regu- 
lation of the industry largely unnecessary474 Viscusi's findings grant 
considerable authority to many commentators' claims475 and, More 
importantly, to the arguments of tobacco defense counsel that smokers 
know the risks (indeed, may overestimate the risks) and that therefore 
the market for cigarettes should be left alone.476 
The evidence that Viscusi summarizes and the conclusions he 
draws from that evidence pose what may well be the biggest challenge 
to our manipulation hypothesis. Viscusi's evidence of overestimation 
indicates that even if manufacturers do attempt to manipulate con- 
sumer preferences and perceptions, their attempts have not been suc- 
cessful in counteracting the overestimation.477 Viewed another way, 
470 Id. at i55. 
471 See id. at 68. In a I997 study, the average response was 47. See Viscusi, Public Perceptions, 
supra note 468, at I3. 
472 Viscusi, Public Perceptions, supra note 468, at 68. One of us (with Kyle Logue) has chal- 
lenged those figures elsewhere. See infra p. I528. 
473 VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 255, at I45. Professor Viscusi has attempted to provide a 
"comprehensive perspective," incorporating the hazards of overall mortality risk and life expec- 
tancy loss. Viscusi, Public Perceptions, supra note 468, at 4. We focus on the same topic as Pro- 
fessor Viscusi, namely the lung-cancer hazards of smoking. We also briefly discuss how the diffi- 
culties with Professor Viscusi's position on that topic are largely replicated with respect to his 
views on overall mortality risk and life expectancy loss. 
474 Viscusi, Public Perceptions, supra note 468, at 25-26. 
475 Other efficiency-minded legal scholars share Viscusi's view that smokers do not underesti- 
mate the risks of smoking. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Tobacco Liability in the Courts, in 
SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE I3I, I56-57 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. 
Sugarman eds., I993) (arguing that strict liability principles "turn out to have no obvious applica- 
tion to cigarettes - products whose hazards (however extreme) are both inherent and reasonably 
well known by consumers"); Richard A. Epstein, Big Tobacco's Big Mistake, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 
I997, at Aiq (arguing that because consumers are well-informed of the hazards of smoking, "indi- 
vidual smokers should own up to the consequences of their actions" and "the tobacco industry's 
liability for smoking-related illnesses should be zero"). 
476 See Hanson & Logue, supra note 256, at II7I, II83 & n.68. Not surprisingly, therefore, Vis- 
cusi has served as a key expert witness on behalf of defendants in virtually all of the recent and 
ongoing tobacco litigation. 
477 Viscusi apparently believes that his is the only relevant evidence on point. See infra pp. 
i5io-ii. This claim is one that Viscusi has made several times in depositions. See, e.g., Deposi- 
tion of W. Kip Viscusi, State of Miss. Tobacco Litigation 2I3 (No. 94-I429) (Apr. 27, I997) ("I 
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Viscusi's evidence, coupled with the commonsense view that consum- 
ers know the risks of smoking, provides a special opportunity to test 
our hypothesis. We cannot think of any other product about which 
consumers have received more publicly provided (or mandated) risk 
information and "education" than cigarettes. And it certainly does 
seem plausible that consumers overestimate the risks of cigarettes. In 
any event, the widely held view that smokers are adequately informed 
of the risks of smoking has had a significant effect on policymaking in 
this area and has created an immense hurdle for any plaintiff suing to- 
bacco manufacturers for the costs that result from smoking.478 Thus, 
if we can show that consumers often do, in fact, underestimate the 
relevant risks of smoking and that they do so in part because of the 
manipulative efforts of the industry, then we have made a strong and 
important case, we think, for why behavioralism should be taken seri- 
ously. For both reasons - that is, both because it is difficult to dem- 
onstrate that consumers underestimate the risks of smoking and be- 
cause making such a demonstration would be so revealing - this 
section reviews evidence regarding smokers' risk assessments and par- 
ticularly Viscusi's evidence in considerable detail. 
2. The Actual Success of Market Manipulation. - To demonstrate 
the success of market manipulation of cigarette-related risks, we dis- 
cuss three types of evidence. First, we review "market" evidence that 
manufacturers' efforts to reduce consumer risk estimates have been 
successful. Second, we address a vast body of non-market (mostly 
survey) evidence, which has been largely ignored by Viscusi and other 
legal scholars but which strongly indicates that consumers are inade- 
quately informed of the risks of smoking. Both types of evidence are 
consistent with the manipulation story that we describe in the previous 
section. Third, we carefully examine the evidence on which Viscusi 
relies and his interpretations of that evidence. We argue that Viscusi's 
evidence and analysis are badly flawed, in large part because he fails 
to take behavioralism (and the problem of market manipulation) seri- 
ously. 
(a) Market Evidence. - Legal economists commonly look to the 
conduct of manufacturers and consumers to draw inferences regarding 
the efficiency or inefficiency of certain practices. The conduct from 
know of no studies other than my own that have ever done this in a valid manner."); Deposition of 
W. Kip Viscusi, Florida v. American Tobacco Co. I40-4I (No. 95-I466AH) (July 23, I997) ("Well, 
except for the Audits and Survey data and the way I redid the risk question, nobody else in the 
literature that's published has asked the questions in a meaningful way."); id. at IVI ("The value I 
would place on anybody else's studies, whether it's the tobacco industry or anything else, would 
be zilch because I already have the studies that have nailed down this effect. I know the an- 
swer."). We find this claim especially surprising given that "[iut is now proved beyond doubt that 
smoking is one of the leading causes of statistics." THE MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF QUOTA- 
TIONS 537 (i987) (quoting Fletcher Knebel from Reader's Digest, Dec. i96i). 
478 See Hanson & Logue, supra note 256, at ii69-7I, II83. 
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which the inferences are drawn is typically referred to as "market evi- 
dence."479 
(i) Manufacturer Conduct. - As described in section A, tobacco 
manufacturers have gone to incredible lengths to influence consumers' 
risk perceptions. Virtually all of the industry's conduct appears to be 
designed to generate positive first impressions (or a positive affect) in 
young smokers and then to maintain those impressions by, among 
other tactics, suggesting that cigarettes are healthful, emphasizing the 
non-health-related benefits of smoking, and denying and attempting to 
discredit the evidence that smoking is harmful. Such conduct is con- 
sistent with the predictions of our companion article regarding how 
sellers would take advantage of the affect heuristic.480 As we note 
there, behavioralists have observed a marked tendency for individuals 
possessing a positive affective response toward an item or activity to 
underestimate concomitantly the risks that the item or activity poses. 
These misperceptions are solidified and perpetuated through the op- 
eration of the confirmatory and perseverance biases,48' which cause in- 
dividuals to misinterpret, ignore, and even create evidence in self- 
serving ways. 
Cigarette manufacturers seem to have been aware of this process, 
considering their unmistakable assertion that "doubt is our product."482 
Similarly, the fact that tobacco manufacturers have targeted children 
in their marketing and advertising is unsurprising because children are 
fresh thinkers (as compared to non-smoking adults) with respect to the 
perceived harmfulness and addictiveness of smoking.483 The focus on 
young people is also predictable given that children likely have more 
pronounced time-variant preferences (that is, less concern for the long- 
term health consequences of smoking) than do non-smoking adults.484 
Unsurprising, too, is the fact that tobacco-advertising imagery is ubiq- 
uitous in our society and especially intense at convenience stores. In 
addition to enhancing the mere exposure effect, such imagery likely 
taps into the visceral impulses of addicted smokers.485 It is no accident 
that cigarettes have long been displayed for sale (together with other 
"impulse items") at grocery store check-out stations.486 Although non- 
smokers might not even notice a rack of cigarettes, few smokers will 
479 For an example of how legal economists sometimes rely on market evidence, see Steven P. 
Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in 
Tort Law, io8 HARV. L. REv. I785, i8oI-03 (I995), summarizing the market evidence on which 
the conventional wisdom that consumers do not demand pain-and-suffering insurance is based. 
480 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note i i, at notes 475-78 and accompanying text. 
481 See id. notes 53-74 and accompanying text. 
482 See supra pp. 1487-88. 
483 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note i i, at note 452 and accompanying text. 
484 See id at notes 2 I i-i8 and accompanying text. 
485 See id. at notes 502-05 and accompanying text. 
486 See supra p. 1448. 
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miss it or the opportunity to stock up for the day. Such product 
placement likely poses additional hurdles for smokers attempting to 
quit, for at every turn they are confronted with smoking imagery and 
opportunities to make an easy purchase. 
The tobacco industry also seems to have developed ways to take 
advantage of framing effects by portraying the product so as to mini- 
mize smoker risk perceptions. For instance, although a majority of 
smokers consume "light" cigarettes, they are not called "regulars," and 
regulars are not called "heavies." We explain above that the introduc- 
tion of "light" cigarettes reflected manufacturers' efforts to reassure 
smokers about the health consequences of smoking more than it re- 
flected their efforts to improve those consequences.487 Referring to 
these cigarettes as "lights" may have survived as an industry custom in 
part because the denomination also takes advantage of framing effects. 
Like all other manipulative practices we have identified in this Article, 
this use of framing need not be conscious on the part of manufacturers. 
Because the market rewards manipulation, it will evolve to contain 
manipulation, regardless of manufacturers' motivations. Indeed, 
manufacturers may have had completely unrelated and benign motives 
for adopting a certain practice. For instance, "lights" may have been 
adopted as a marketing term simply because these cigarettes were de- 
veloped after "regular" cigarettes. That innocuous origin, however, 
would not obviate the impact of framing effects. Below we describe 
other ways in which industry conduct appears to have been designed 
- or at least to have evolved - to influence consumer risk percep- 
tions. 
Here it is enough to point out that the tobacco industry conduct 
that we described in section A was and is intended to lower the per- 
ceived risks of cigarettes and has come at a steep financial cost to 
manufacturers. Indeed, with respect to just one component of those 
efforts, Viscusi notes that cigarettests have long been among the most 
highly advertised consumer products, with an annual advertising 
budget now in excess of $i billion and a promotional budget greater 
than $2 billion annually."488 The sheer size of those expenditures 
raises a serious question: How can they be justified if they fail to influ- 
ence consumer perceptions? Stated differently, if the investments were 
fruitless, then the manufacturers who made them should have been 
driven from the market years ago by lower-cost competitors - or at 
least these companies should have learned by now to stop wasting 
their money. 
Rather than acknowledge a desire to attract new smokers, tobacco 
manufacturers publicly claim that they incur these enormous adver- 
487 See supra pp. I473-75. 
488 VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 255, at 35. The FTC cites a combined advertising and pro- 
motion expenditure rate of $6 billion for I993. See supra p. I479. 
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tising costs solely to attract brand-switchers.489 However, research 
strongly suggests that these expenditures cannot be justified economi- 
cally as encouraging brand switching,490 largely because smokers tend 
to be remarkably brand loyal.491 Moreover, even when smokers do 
switch brands, they may often switch to another brand by the same 
manufacturer, with no obvious beneficial effect on that manufacturer's 
net profits. Simply put, the market for brand-switchers is too small to 
merit such massive advertising costs.492 
Manufacturers' claim that they advertise to attract brand-switchers 
seems particularly disingenuous in light of evidence that cigarette ad- 
vertising does promote new buyers. For example, a study of advertis- 
ing campaigns targeting one gender "clearly show[ed] that marked in- 
creases in the rate of smoking uptake in the particular gender group 
... were coincident with the beginning of each [campaign]." The same 
pattern "was not observed among the nontargeted gender."493 Simi- 
larly, research has confirmed that "tobacco advertising plays an impor- 
tant role in encouraging young people to [smoke]."494 
In any event, manufacturers' public claims about the goal of their 
advertising are not responsive to the charge that such advertising ma- 
nipulates consumers' risk perceptions. Even if manufacturers adver- 
tise only to attract brand-switchers, the tactic seems to include creating 
the illusion that their brand is safer than others (perhaps leading 
489 See Dolan Report, supra note 2 85, at 2 I. 
490 See id. at 22; Joe B. Tye, Kenneth E. Warner & Stanton A. Glantz, Tobacco Advertising and 
Consumption: Evidence of a Causal Relationship, 8 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 492, 494 (i987). 
491 See Tye, Warner & Glantz, supra note 490, at 493 ("Cigarettes enjoy one of the most tena- 
cious brand loyalties of any consumer product."); Philip H. Dougherty, A.M.A.'s Assault on To- 
bacco, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. I2, i985, at D29 ("Unlike most products you could name, cigarettes en- 
gender considerable brand loyalty.'). 
492 See Richard W. Pollay et al., The Last Straw? Cigarette Advertising and Realized Market 
Shares Among Youths and Adults, 1979-1993, J. MARKETING, Apr. i996, at i, 6. Pollay writes: 
The cigarette industry is . . . well known for its phenomenally high brand loyalty, the high- 
est of all consumer product categories. A relatively low rate of brand switching is evident, 
typically io% or less. There is nominal switching within brand families (e.g., from Brand 
X milds to Brand X lights), which is of little consequence to the firm's net profit. High 
brand loyalty resulting from nicotine 'satisfaction' of those addicted makes it difficult and 
expensive to convert competitors' customers. Most of the brand switching that does occur 
is by older, health-concerned, or symptomatic smokers trading down, typically within a 
brand family, to products with lower tar and nicotine labeling, in the misguided belief that 
those products are safer. As a result, the net present value of gaining the trade of these 
older customers is low compared with the value inherent in attracting young starters, the 
vast bulk of whom will be highly brand loyal for many years. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
493 John P Pierce & Elizabeth A. Gilpin, A Historical Analysis of Tobacco Marketing and the 
Uptake of Smoking by Youth in the United States: 1890-1977, I4 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 500, 504 
(I995). 
494 John P Pierce, Lora Lee & Elizabeth A. Gilpin, Smoking Initiation by Adolescent Girls, 
r944 Through I988: An Association with Targeted Advertising, 27I JAMA 6o8, 6ii (I994); see 
John P. Pierce et al., Does Tobacco Advertising Target Young People to Start Smoking? Evidence 
from California, 266 JAMA 3P54, passim (i9gi); DiFranza et al., supra note 34I, passim; Dolan 
Report, supra note 287, at 23-32. 
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smokers to discount their perception of the dangers of smoking).495 In 
other words, the manipulation of risk perceptions may be a conse- 
quence of advertising regardless of why manufacturers choose to ad- 
vertise. Moreover, the investments that tobacco manufacturers make 
(arguably) to manipulate risk perceptions go well beyond advertising 
expenses.496 
Economists might argue that the tobacco industry's excessive ad- 
vertising expenditures are intended to serve as a barrier to entry. Al- 
though some advertising expenditures can have that effect, it seems 
unlikely that even this questionable motive can fully account for the 
expenditures. To begin with, cigarette marketing practices are re- 
markably consistent with our predictions of manipulation. If those in- 
vestments do act as entry barriers, then they have the additional effect 
of manipulating consumers' risk perceptions.497 In addition, a great 
deal of the tobacco industry's activities, such as various "public 
health" initiatives and industry "research" groups, serve to promote 
cigarette smoking generally (as opposed to current brands of cigarettes) 
and thus do not operate as direct barriers to entry.498 Finally, the in- 
dustry itself seems to view its advertising and public relations cam- 
paigns not as measures to deter entry, but as ways to influence smoker 
behavior and perception.499 
In sum, the continued immensity of tobacco marketing supports a 
more troubling story: manufacturer efforts to manipulate consumers 
have helped to create and sustain a market for the deadliest consumer 
product ever.500 Although Viscusi appears somewhat confused by the 
use of health and safety advertising by tobacco manufacturers - "the 
mere mention of this negative attribute is highly unusual since it draws 
consumers' attention to an undesirable feature of cigarettes"'501 - we 
believe it represents the experimental efforts of manufacturers to com- 
bat increasing consumer awareness of the health hazards of smoking. 
What Viscusi views as simply "an implicit recognition . . . [of] a salient 
consumer concern,"502 we view as a blatant and misleading attempt to 
495 See Dolan Report, supra note 285, at 36. 
496 See supra section II.A.2. 
497 See Dolan Report, supra note 285, at i8-2I, 32-37. 
498 See supra section ll.A.2. 
499 See Richard W. Pollay & Anne M. Lavack, The Targeting of Youths by Cigarette Marketers: 
Archival Evidence on Trial, 20 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 266, 266 (1993) (noting that one 
tobacco company's mission statement included as an objective "[supporting] the continued social 
acceptability of smoking through industry and/or corporate actions (e.g., product quality, positive 
lifestyle advertising, selective field activities and marketing public relations programs)"); supra pp. 
1486-87. 
500 See infra p. 1519 (noting that cigarettes are responsible for more deaths than car accidents, 
alcohol abuse, and several other causes of death combined). 
501 VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 2 5 5, at 37. 
502 Id. at 39. 
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counteract a legitimate consumer concern.03 Similarly, although Vis- 
cusi finds it "striking . . . [that] advertising became a vehicle for com- 
municating findings in the scientific and medical literature,"504 we find 
it altogether predictable that manufacturers would seek to create for 
their safety-based messages an illusion of science and objectivity. 
(ii) Consumer Conduct. - Consumer behavior similarly exhibits 
reactions that seem more easily reconciled with our manufacturer ma- 
nipulation story than with Viscusi's consumer overestimation story. If 
consumers are fully aware of (or even overestimate) the risks of smok- 
ing when they begin the habit, then it is hard to understand why so 
many smokers later regret that decision, make numerous and some- 
times costly efforts to quit, and frequently have only negative things to 
say about their "chosen" habit.505 Viscusi has difficulty with that evi- 
dence too, conceding that "[o]ne would have expected almost all indi- 
viduals who currently purchase a product to be enthusiastic about it. 
What we find instead is that there are a large number of negative 
mentions of cigarettes from the smoking population."506 Elsewhere he 
makes the point even more emphatically: "What is most stunning is 
the overwhelmingly adverse sentiment against the product, even 
among current product users. . . . The diversity of the adverse reac- 
tions to cigarettes is quite striking and is possibly unequaled by any 
other widely used consumer product."507 Nevertheless, Viscusi does 
not permit this "stunning" and "striking" evidence to alter his view that 
decisions to smoke cigarettes are basically indistinguishable from ordi- 
nary consumption choices. And nowhere does he offer an explanation 
for the evidence. In our view, this common reaction among smokers is 
precisely what one would predict in consumers who, upon initiating a 
habit, vastly underestimate its future costs.508 
503 For example, Viscusi claims that "[e]ven before the government research reports and various 
regulatory actions against cigarettes, the health hazards of smoking were prominently featured ... 
in cigarette advertising." Id. at 6. Apparently he is referring to advertisements reproduced else- 
where in his book, advertisements such as "Kent - the one cigarette that can show you proof of 
greater health protection." Id. at 38. For an explanation of why such advertising techniques 
could lead consumers to underestimate the risks to themselves of smoking, see discussion below 
on pages 15 i6-I 7, which describes the problem of imperfect brand-specific information. 
504 VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 255, at 41. 
505 For a summary of that type of evidence, see Hanson & Logue, cited above in note 256, at 
I 93-94- 
506 VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 255, at go. 
507 Id. at 88. What Viscusi does not mention is that the adverse sentiment is particularly hard 
to comprehend if one assumes (as Viscusi claims to show) that consumers overestimate the down- 
side of the risk of smoking ex ante. 
508 One might respond that smokers are just complaining about the cost side of a two-sided 
transaction. But it seems to be much more. Many smokers say they wish they never had started 
- and they do so well before they experience any substantial ill-health effects of smoking. In 
contrast, we know of many people who take out home mortgages but do not later regret their de- 
cision or join support groups to help them avoid taking out more. Similarly, we know people 
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(b) Non-Industry Sponsored Survey Evidence. - While intro- 
ducing the survey evidence on which he relies, Viscusi complains that 
the question regarding how well "people in fact understand the risks of 
smoking ... has never been [previously] addressed," and he suggests 
that he has provided "the most comprehensive perspective to date on 
public perception of smoking risks."509 In our view, both of those 
claims are mistaken. To counter these claims, we devote significant 
attention in this section to a vast literature on the risk perceptions of 
smokers - a literature that has been given short shrift in the policy 
debates about smoking, including those taking place in legal academic 
literature.510 Many scholars have studied smokers' risk perceptions ex- 
tensively and have done so in ways more varied and illuminating (and 
more sensitive to behavioralist insights) than the tobacco-defense sur- 
veys upon which Viscusi primarily relies. 
Even assuming that Viscusi's evidence regarding base-rate risk es- 
timates is unassailable, the behavioralist literature identifies many 
ways in which smokers are inadequately informed of the risks associ- 
ated with smoking. This section provides six key examples, each of 
which suggests that manufacturers' investments in risk manipulation 
have paid off and that Viscusi's base-rate risk estimates shed virtually 
no meaningful light on the fundamental question whether consumers 
are adequately informed of the risks associated with smoking. 
(i) Evidence of Optimism Bias. - There are numerous cognitive 
biases of the sort that we described in our companion article that, par- 
ticularly when taken together, cigarette manufacturers could easily ex- 
ploit to encourage smokers to underestimate the risks to themselves of 
smoking. The most obvious candidate for exploitation is the optimism 
bias - that is, the tendency for consumers to assume that population 
risks they may well understand, or even overestimate, do not apply 
with equal force to themselves.51' Studies indicate that optimism bias 
who, when it comes time to pay their bill at a restaurant, do not typically wish they had not eaten 
in the first place. 
509 Viscusi, Public Perceptions, supra note 468, at 4. 
510 Although this section is unique in relying as much as it does on the vast behavioralist and 
public health research regarding consumer perceptions of the risks of smoking, the structure and 
substance of this section resemble work that one of us has done elsewhere with Kyle Logue. See 
Hanson & Logue, supra note 256, at ii86-I209. 
511 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note ii, at notes 93-III and accompanying text. To be 
clear, we should note that optimism bias does not lead individuals to believe that they are com- 
pletely immune to a risk; it simply leads them to perceive that they face less of a risk than does, 
say, the average consumer. See id. (providing examples). In other words, instead of believing that 
"it won't happen to me," individuals tend to believe that "it is much less likely to happen to me 
than to most people." The optimism bias is more or less evident depending upon how respondents 
are questioned. See Alexander J. Rothman et al., Absolute and Relative Biases in Estimations of 
Personal Risk, 26 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. I2I3, I22I (i996) (finding that across nine different 
hazards people exhibited a stronger optimism bias when making relative comparisons to other 
people than when making absolute estimates); see also Kevin D. McCaul & Susan M. O'Donnell, 
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is stronger for risks not evidenced by present symptoms and for risks 
that consumers believe can be controlled through behavior modifica- 
tion.512 Because the most significant risks of cigarettes are latent, and 
in light of manufacturers' efforts to give smokers the perceived ability 
to reduce risks through brand selection,513 it is hardly surprising that 
the optimism bias plays a significant role in smokers' perceptions of 
cigarette risks.514 
Considerable evidence suggests that smokers perceive smoking as 
significantly less risky for themselves than for other smokers, that 
smokers view their own risks as not significantly higher than those for 
non-smokers, and that smokers tend to underestimate the actual risks 
to themselves. For example, Victor Strecher, Matthew Kreuter, and 
Sarah Kobrin recently conducted a survey of 2785 North Carolinians 
who completed a health risk appraisal and answered questions about 
perceived risks of heart attack, stroke, and cancer.515 Although smok- 
ers in the study tended to perceive themselves as more susceptible to 
those ailments than nonsmokers, smokers also were 36% more likely 
than nonsmokers to underestimate their risk of heart attack, I37% 
more likely to underestimate their risk of cancer, and 55% more likely 
to underestimate their risk of stroke.516 Jonathan Reppucci and his 
colleagues observed similar trends when they asked high school stu- 
dents to fill out two questionnaires focusing on lung cancer, emphy- 
Naive Beliefs About Breast Cancer Risk, 4 WOMEN'S HEALTH: RES. ON GENDER, BEHAV. & 
POL'Y 93 (i998) (finding a similar result with respect to breast cancer risks). 
512 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note II, at notes io6-o9 and accompanying text (de- 
scribing optimism bias); id. at notes II 4-2 I and accompanying text (describing illusion of control); 
see also Paul Slovic, Do Adolescent Smokers Know the Risks?, 47 DuKE L.J. II33, II37 (i998) 
("Optimistic biases are greatest for hazards judged to be controllable by personal action, such as 
lifestyle risks. Biases are also likely to be large when people think that signs of vulnerability will 
appear early, because people then think that an absence of present signs means they are exempt 
from future risks.") (citing Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health 
Problems: Conclusions from a Community-Wide Sample, IO J. BEHAV. MED 48i, 488 (i987)) (in- 
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
513 See supra pp. I47I-73. 
514 See William B. Hansen & C. Kevin Malotte, Perceived Personal Immunity: The Develop- 
ment of Beliefs about Susceptibility to the Consequences of Smoking, I5 PREVENTIVE MED. 363, 
370-7I (i986); Hanson & Logue, supra note 256, at ii96-I202; Christina Lee, Perceptions of Im- 
munity to Disease in Adult Smokers, I2 J. BEHAV. MED. 267, 2 74-76 (I989); Sue Boney McCoy et 
al., Perceptions of Smoking Risk as a Function of Smoking Status, I5 J. BEHAV. MED. 469, 487 
(I992); F.P. McKenna, D.M. Warburton & M. Winwood, Exploring the Limits of Optimism: The 
Case of Smokers' Decision Making, 84 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 389, 393 (I993); Jonathan D. Reppucci 
et al., Unrealistic Optimism Among Adolescent Smokers and Nonsmokers, II J. PRIMARY PRE- 
VENTION 227, 235-36 (i99i); Suzanne C. Segerstrom et al., Optimistic Bias Among Cigarette 
Smokers, 23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. I6o6, I6I4-I7 (I993); Slovic, supra note 5I2, at I136-37; 
Victor J. Strecher, Matthew W. Kreuter & Sarah C. Kobrin, Do Cigarette Smokers Have Unrealis- 
tic Perceptions of Their Heart Attack, Cancer, and Stroke Risks?, i8 J. BEHAV. MED. 45, 49 
(I995); Neil D. Weinstein, Accuracy of Smokers' Risk Perceptions 7-9 (Jan. I5, I997) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the authors). 
515 See Strecher, Kreuter & Kobrin, supra note 5I4, at 48-49. 
516 See id. at 52-53. 
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sema, and heart attacks.5A7 They found that, although smokers and 
non-smokers both correctly perceived a link between smoking and 
those ailments, smokers rated their own chances of contracting the dis- 
eases as similar to those of the entire population of smokers and non- 
smokers combined - "a clearly unrealistic expectation."518 Most re- 
cently, John Ayanian and Paul Cleary found that most smokers do not 
believe they face an increased risk of heart attack or cancer as com- 
pared with that of other people in their age bracket.519 More specifi- 
cally, only twenty-nine percent of current smokers believed they were 
at higher-than-average risk of heart attack, and only forty percent be- 
lieved they were at higher-than-average risk of cancer.520 Among 
heavy smokers (those who consume more than two packs per day), the 
numbers are forty percent and forty-nine percent, respectively.521 
Similar evidence abounds in other studies.522 Indeed, having reviewed 
thirteen such studies, Neil Weinstein recently made the following con- 
clusion: 
Together, the studies . . . indicate that smokers substantially underesti- 
mate their own personal risk. For example, smokers tend to conclude that 
they are less likely to suffer health effects than other smokers, and among 
short-term smokers, there is no relationship between the amount they 
smoked and their perceived risk of illness. 
Smokers claim that their risk of smoking-related illnesses is "slightly 
less than," "equal to," or only "slightly greater than" that of the "average 
person." Their actual risk of lung cancer may be ten times the risk of a 
nonsmoker, but, at most, they say that their own risk is "a bit higher" than 
average.523 
517 See Reppucci et al., supra note 514, at 229-30. 
518 Id. at 235. 
519 See John Z. Ayanian & Paul D. Cleary, Perceived Risks of Heart Disease and Cancer Among 
Cigarette Smokers, 281 JAMA ioi9, 1020-21 (1999). 
520 See id. 
521 See id. at 1021. 
522 See, e.g., Hansen & Malotte, supra note 514, at 366 (showing that students between the ages 
of iO and i8 saw themselves as less vulnerable than others to the effects of smoking and that 
smokers viewed the consequences of smoking as less likely than did nonsmokers); Lee, supra note 
514, at 274-76 (finding that Australian smokers rated the risk to the average smoker of contract- 
ing certain diseases lower than did nonsmokers, and that smokers' assessments of their own risks 
were even lower than the risks they perceived to the average smoker); McCoy et al., supra note 
514, at 475-76 (concluding that smokers tended to perceive their own susceptibility to three 
smoking-related diseases - coronary heart disease, emphysema, and lung cancer - as lower than 
the risk level of the "typical smoker'); McKenna, Warburton & Winwood, supra note 5i4, at 393 
(finding that, although smokers rate their risk of contracting health problems as higher than do 
nonsmokers, smokers evaluate their own risk as lower than that of the average smoker); Wein- 
stein, supra note 512, at 494 (showing that, although risk judgments of lung cancer are strongly 
correlated with smoking, there is only a weak correlation between smoking and heart attack risk 
assessment and general cancer risk perception, and no significant correlation between smoking 
and stroke risk assessment). 
523 Weinstein, supra note 514, at 8 (citations omitted); see Michael Schoenbaum, Do Smokers 
Understand the Mortality Effects of Smoking?, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 755, 755, 758 (I997). 
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Whatever they perceive their absolute risk of contracting smoking- 
related diseases to be, smokers appear to underestimate the marginal 
risk of smoking to themselves. It bears noting - particularly in light 
of the fact that the vast majority of smokers begin their habit before 
they turn eighteen - that the optimism bias appears to be stronger in 
younger people.524 
That sort of evidence might be explained in part by other cognitive 
biases as well. The availability heuristic, for example, likely plays a 
role.525 Some scholars have surmised that consumers will systemati- 
cally underestimate "unavailable" product risks,526 and that manufac- 
turers may attempt to reduce the availability of information about 
their product's risks for many consumers.527 It seems plausible that 
the availability heuristic has played a role in lowering smokers' esti- 
mates of personal risks of cigarettes, given that smokers are rarely, at 
least in their day-to-day use of the product, injured by smoking; the 
diseases caused by smoking (unlike, say, the harms caused by torna- 
does, homicides, and airplane accidents) are not often depicted in the 
media or covered by the news;528 and manufacturers have inundated 
public spaces with healthful images of smoking.529 Relatedly, by giv- 
ing smokers countless options to choose from (many of which seem to 
be health-related), tobacco manufacturers may well have tapped into 
the illusion of control.530 Risk analysts have found that when an indi- 
524 See Nancy E. Avis, Kevin W. Smith & John B. McKinlay, Accuracy of Perceptions of Heart 
Attack Risk: What Influences Perceptions and Can they Be Changed?, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
i6o8, i6ii (i989); Hansen & Malotte, supra note 514, at 366-67, 371. 
525 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note ii, at notes 137-44 and accompanying text. 
526 See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 4i6-17 (i988) 
("[Diespite all the statistical evidence published over the last 25 years (and the warnings on ciga- 
rette packs), someone might underestimate the risk of getting cancer because she has an uncle 
who smoked till the day he died of a heart attack at age 95.... The problem arises because the 
consumer uses what is to her more believable information, what happens to her uncle, rather than 
[statistically accurate information] available from a more distant source."). 
527 See Valerie S. Folkes, The Availability Heuristic and Perceived Risk, I5 J. CONSUMER RES. 
13, 21 (i988). 
528 We do not mean to deny that the federal government and the media provide information 
pertaining to the risks of smoking. Our point is that they tend to provide the type of evidence 
that is not readily "available" to consumers in the sense of Kahneman and Tversky's availability 
heuristic. See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note i i, at notes 137-44 and accompanying text. 
529 Some scholars have suggested that the availability heuristic may play a key role in leading 
individuals to underestimate the risks of smoking. See, e.g., Margaret E. Mattson, Earl S. Pollack 
& Joseph W. Cullen, What Are the Odds That Smoking Will Kill You?, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
425, 425 (i987) ("[Ilt appears that the public does not understand the likelihood ... of an individ- 
ual's developing cancer if he/she is a nonsmoker, smoker, or a former smoker. Anecdotal state- 
ments suggest that segments of the public have a false sense of security from the observation that 
' not all smokers get cancer."'); id. at 42 8 ("Sudden and dramatic news of causes of death appear to 
be more impressive, especially of recent occurrences, than are constant warnings and reminders of 
hazards risks."); id. ("Likewise, a cause of death that affects a large group of people collectively 
(such as an accident or catastrophe) is often viewed as more impressive than a cause that affects 
the same number of people individually."). 
530 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note ii, at notes 114-2 and accompanying text. 
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vidual believes she can control whether a risk will occur through her 
own behavior - that is, when she views the risk as preventable - she 
will not adequately account for the risk in making consumption deci- 
sions.531 Smokers may also be subject to the representativeness bias 
and therefore focus on irrelevant factors while ignoring important 
base-rate information about smoking.532 That bias provides another 
example of how manufacturers can influence or manipulate consumer 
risk estimates. One would predict that manufacturers would provide 
- just as cigarette manufacturers have provided - information that 
explicitly or implicitly suggests that their product is reasonably safe.533 
Similarly, the irrelevant third option effect may also play a role in 
some smokers' decision to smoke. The very presence of a "regular" 
and "unfiltered" cigarette may encourage many would-be quitters to 
smoke the "light" and "filtered" brands - just as the presence of a par- 
ticularly indulgent dessert may encourage many would-be abstainers 
to order ice cream with fruit.534 Some advertising campaigns appear 
to seize on that tendency: "If You Smoke, Please Smoke Carlton."535 
Finally, the unrelenting campaign by tobacco industry groups to create 
controversy over the question of the health effects of cigarettes seems 
designed to capitalize on the effects of elastic justification.536 By cre- 
ating doubt over the health risks of smoking, manufacturers create 
elasticity for the health and safety attributes of their product; that is, 
they open a plausible spectrum of possibilities within which consumers 
may perceive the actual health and safety attributes of cigarettes to 
fall. Smokers, seeking a means to justify their behavior, naturally (and 
apparently unknowingly) perceive the health risks of smoking to be at 
the low end of the manufacturer-created spectrum. 
Somewhat related to those cognitive biases are various coping 
strategies that many beginning smokers seem to adopt. For instance, 
one longitudinal study found that adolescents who begin to smoke en- 
gage in cognitive manipulations: 
[These] cognitive manipulations ... allow [adolescents] to deal with the 
inherent contradiction between their behavior and their knowledge of the 
danger .... First, those adolescents who increased their risk normalized 
their actions by overestimating their peers' risk behaviors to a greater ex- 
tent than did other adolescents. Second, they decreased the influence 
health and safety concerns had on their risk behavior. Thus, they appar- 
ently avoided thinking about health and safety issues by putting such con- 
cerns out of their mind.... Furthermore, the data indicate that these cog- 
531 See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 5 I2, at 483-84. 
532 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note ii, at notes 145-57 and accompanying text. 
533 See supra pp. 1472-75. 
534 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note i I, at note 482-83 and accompanying text. 
535 Jeff I. Richards, Clearing the Air About Cigarettes: Will Advertisers' Rights Go up in 
Smoke?, i9 PAc. L.J. I, 42 (i987) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
536 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note ii, at notes 200-06 and accompanying text. 
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nitive manipulations were associated with subsequent increases in ... risk 
behaviors.537 
Similarly, a longitudinal study of smokers who joined a smoking- 
cessation clinic found that all joiners began with high (probabilistic) 
risk assessments of smoking. However, smokers who quit but then 
relapsed lowered their risk estimates significantly following the re- 
lapse. According to the authors of the study, the change in risk per- 
ception may have been "a form of dissonance reduction ... a defensive 
reaction prompted by the realization that the smoking cessation at- 
tempt had failed."538 
(ii) Imperfect Brand-Specific Information. - Even if smokers ac- 
curately perceived the general health risks to themselves associated 
with smoking, they would not be adequately informed unless they also 
knew the particular risks of individual brands and types of ciga- 
rettes.539 The available evidence indicates that smokers do not have 
good brand-specific risk information.540 For example, a recent study 
revealed that high-tar brands of cigarettes - which are widely per- 
ceived to be dangerous - were chosen by smokers more often than 
low-tar brands, relative to the availability of various brands on the 
market.541 This occurred despite the fact that the same study revealed 
that 53% of smokers believed that their cigarette was less dangerous 
than other brands, 30% claimed that their brand was equally as haz- 
ardous as others, and only 17% stated that their cigarette was more 
dangerous than other brands.542 Similarly, 48% of smokers stated that 
their cigarette contained less tar than other brands, 34.7% said that the 
tar level of their brand was about the same as others, and 17.3% stated 
537 Meg Gerrard et al., A Longitudinal Study of the Reciprocal Nature of Risk Behaviors and 
Cognitions in Adolescents: What You Do Shapes What You Think, and Vice Versa, I5 HEALTH 
PSYCHOL. 344, 350 (i996). 
538 Frederick X. Gibbons, Paul G. McGovern & Harry A. Lando, Relapse and Risk Perception 
Among Members of a Smoking Cessation Clinic, io HEALTH PSYCHOL. 42, 44 (I99I) (citation 
omitted); see also Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, IO8 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 49I- 
92 (i990) (arguing that this type of dissonance reduction is prompted not by inconsistency be- 
tween beliefs, but by the implication of "inconsistency to one's self . . . that one is a fool" for not 
having behaved consistently). 
539 For a description of the adverse deterrence implications of smokers' treating all cigarettes as 
equally dangerous, along with a summary of evidence indicating that many smokers do view ciga- 
rettes that way, see Hanson & Logue, cited above in note 256, at I188-90. This section focuses on 
faulty brand-specific distinctions made by consumers. 
Imperfect brand-specific risk information may partially explain the evidence of optimism de- 
scribed in the previous section. Therefore, treating imperfect brand-specific risk information and 
optimism as two separate topics overstates the extent to which consumers are inadequately in- 
formed (a form of double counting). We have chosen to treat these topics separately because they 
do not perfectly overlap and because there is separate evidence on consumers' brand-specific risk 
perceptions. 
540 See id. 
541 See Segerstrom et al., supra note 467, at i6io. 
542 See id. at i6io-ii. 
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that their cigarette had a higher tar content than other brands.543 Put 
differently, the number of smokers who thought that their chosen 
brand of cigarettes was less hazardous and contained less tar than the 
average cigarette was greater than the number of smokers who be- 
lieved that their cigarette was more hazardous and contained more tar 
than average by a ratio of over three-to-one. Even among a group of 
smokers who had changed cigarette brands precisely to reduce tar 
and/or nicotine intake, the study revealed that 8o% of those smokers 
underestimated the amount of tar in their new brand of choice.544 
The very fact that smokers have switched to low-tar cigarettes 
provides further support for the idea that individuals are easily led to 
believe that they have control over risks, a belief that in turn heightens 
their optimism.545 It appears, in other words, that smokers have been 
significantly reassured (or "lulled"546) by the misleading, although often 
only implicit, health claims of cigarette manufacturers regarding, for 
example, "filtered," "light," and "low-tar" cigarettes.547 Although 
smokers concerned about the health risks of cigarettes likely take some 
comfort in smoking seemingly safer brands,548 it is not at all clear that 
"lights" are any safer in practice than "regulars."549 It also appears 
that cigarette manufacturers have long been aware of the potential 
economic benefits of fostering these misleading perceptions in consum- 
ers. As described above, industry documents from a i968 conference 
of tobacco company scientists reveal that several participants in the 
conference stressed the difference between creating a "health image" or 
"health reassurance cigarette," such as "a low tar-low nicotine cigarette 
which the public accepts as a healthier cigarette," and a "health- 
oriented" product actually designed to be safer.550 
(iii) Imperfect Relative-Risk Information. - Even assuming that 
smokers know (or overestimate) the personal risks of smoking a par- 
ticular brand of cigarettes, it does not follow that they will be well- 
informed, for the extent to which consumers make well-informed deci- 
sions hinges also on their assessment of the risks of smoking relative to 
their assessments of other risks.55' If consumers tend to overestimate 
other risks to which they are exposed, they may behave as if they un- 
derestimated the risks of smoking. That is, to the extent that an indi- 
543 See id. at I6II-I2. 
544 See id. at I6I2-I3. 
545 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note I I, at note I07 and accompanying text. 
546 See id. at note 446 and accompanying text. 
547 See Kenneth E. Warner, John Slade & David T. Sweanor, The Emerging Market for Long- 
Term Nicotine Maintenance, 2 78 JAMA i087, io88 (I997). 
548 See Viscusi, SMOKING, supra note 255, at 67 ("Individuals who express concerns about the 
health consequences of smoking are much more likely to smoke low-tar cigarettes."). 
549 See supra pp. I475-77. 
550 GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at I29 (emphasis omitted). 
551 See Hanson & Logue, supra note 256, at II90-93. 
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vidual views nonsmoking activities as significantly threatening her 
health or life, she will give less significance, other things being equal, 
to the "marginal" risks of smoking. 
That problem is most acute when smokers dramatically overesti- 
mate the "risks of not smoking" relative to the risks of smoking. If 
smokers believe, for example, that smoking helps them keep weight off 
or reduce their stress levels, and that the risks associated with obesity 
or stress are of the same or greater magnitude than those they associ- 
ate with smoking, then their decisions would be dangerously misin- 
formed. 
Unfortunately, there is a great deal of evidence suggesting that 
smokers misestimate the relative risks of cigarettes and that they do, 
indeed, tend to view certain nonsmoking risks as being equivalent to 
or greater than the risks of smoking.552 For instance, a I993 study by 
the American Cancer Society concluded that "[a]lthough Americans 
are generally aware of the personal health risks associated with to- 
bacco use, the public seriously underestimates the magnitude of the 
impact cigarette smoking has on the health of the country as a whole" 
in comparison with other health risks.53 Asked what they view as the 
most serious health risk facing the country, for example, thirty-six per- 
552 See, e.g., J. Richard Eiser & Stephen R. Sutton, Smoking, Seat-Belts, and Beliefs About 
Health, 4 ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS 33I, 337 (I979) (reporting that, when asked to compare smok- 
ing to other risk factors, "[u]nder I4% of smokers realized that smoking caused more deaths," and 
that smokers were half as likely as nonsmokers to make the realization). In i983, Louis Harris & 
Associates conducted a nationwide phone survey of I254 randomly selected adults. See 
SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT i989, supra note 467, at 207; see also id. at 209 fig.I, 2I0 fig.2 
(summarizing the Harris survey). These adults were asked the following: "In helping people in 
general to live a long and healthy life, how would you rate the importance of" each of 24 health 
and safety factors on a scale of one to Io? Id. at 209 fig. I. The low end of the scale represented 
the response, "of low importance," and the high end represented, "of utmost importance." Id. 
The lowest mean ranking of all the safety factors was 6.42 (for "drinking no alcohol"), signifi- 
cantly above the scale's midpoint, suggesting that all health factors were viewed as significant, 
including gettingig 7-8 hours [of] sleep" (8.04) and eatingig breakfast daily" (7.6i). Id. Interest- 
ingly, the mean health ranking of "[n]ot smoking" (8.25) suggested that consumers had imperfect 
relative-risk information. Of the 24 health factors, "not smoking" had the tenth highest ranking, 
placing it directly ahead of havingig friends, relatives, neighbors" (8.i8) and behind "[n]ever 
driving after drinking" (9.25), "[k]eeping air quality acceptable" (9.ii), keepingig water quality 
acceptable" (8.95), havingig smoke detectors in home" (8.89), keepingig close to recommended 
weight" (8.54), "[hWaving blood pressure reading annually" (8.-5), takingig steps to control stress" 
(8.36), "[g]etting enough vitamins, minerals" (8.37), and "[e]xercising regularly" (8.32). Id. (empha- 
sis added). As part of the project, Louis Harris & Associates also sampled I03 health experts and 
asked them to rank the same 24 health factors with respect to the "overall health of the general 
population." Id. at 207, 2IO fig.2. Not surprisingly, they ranked "[n]ot smoking" as the most im- 
portant factor by far (with a mean ranking of 9.78). Id. at 2Io fig.2; id. at 207-I2 (summarizing 
five more recent studies, all of which confirm the conclusions of the Roper and Louis Harris & 
Associates studies); id. at 207, 2II tbl. I7 (presenting evidence that the inaccuracy of consumers' 
relative-risk information is particularly acute among smokers). 
553 Marttila & Kiley, Inc., Highlights from an American Cancer Society Survey of U.S. Voter 
Attitudes Toward Cigarette Smoking 2I (Sept. 9, I993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
authors). 
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cent of respondents cited the AIDS virus, and only nine percent an- 
swered smoking.554 Asked to choose from a list of the health risks re- 
sponsible for the greatest number of deaths, twenty-eight percent of 
respondents selected car accidents, sixteen percent identified illicit 
drugs, twelve percent named AIDS, another twelve percent chose al- 
cohol abuse, and seven percent said murders.555 Only twenty-one per- 
cent answered that cigarettes were the most frequent killer.556 Yet 
cigarettes are responsible for significantly more deaths than all the 
other causes of death combined.557 
In a more recent study, Ron Borland asked smokers in Australia 
which of seven causes of death (including smoking and six significantly 
less probable causes) was responsible for the most deaths, and only 
around one-third of the smokers picked smoking.558 Borland con- 
cludes that the evidence regarding smokers' perceptions of the relative 
risks indicates that smokers generally underestimate the total risks of 
smoking and "that many people have no clear idea about what the 
magnitude of the risk is."559 
A study by Baruch Fischhoff and Don MacGregor examining the 
effect of survey question formulations on responses illustrates dramati- 
cally the importance that relative-risk beliefs may have to the issue of 
smoking risk information. In the study, which is described more fully 
below,560 the survey respondents' absolute estimates of risk were 
highly influenced by the manner in which the survey questions were 
formulated. However, the ordinal ranking of risks was fairly consis- 
tent regardless of question formulation. "Apparently, people have a 
core of knowledge regarding relative lethality that emerges however 
they are queried."'561 That finding indicates that relative-risk estimates 
554 See id. 
555 See id. 
556 See id. 
557 See id. at 2I-23 
558 See Borland, supra note 467, at 5 I 7. 
559 Id. at 520. Stephen Sutton recently conducted a survey in Great Britain, in which respon- 
dents were asked the following: "On average, out of 1000 20 year olds in Britain who smoke ciga- 
rettes regularly and who carry on smoking, how many do you think will be murdered?, how many 
do you think will be killed on the roads, and how many do you think will be killed by smoking 
before the age of 70?" Stephen Sutton, How Ordinary People in Great Britain Perceive the 
Health Risks of Smoking, 52 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY COMMUNITY HEALTH 338, 338 (i998). Accord- 
ing to Sutton, the epidemiological estimate of those risks are i, 6, and 250, yet "[o]nly a small mi- 
nority of respondents gave estimates for the risk of being killed by smoking that came anywhere 
near the epidemiological ... estimate." Id. at 338-39. 
560 See infra pp. I537-38. 
561 Baruch Fischhoff & Don MacGregor, Judged Lethality: How Much People Seem to Know 
Depends Upon How They Are Asked, 3 RISK ANALYSIS 229, 232 (i983); see also Baruch Fischhoff, 
Ann Bostrom & Marilyn Jacobs Quadrel, Risk Perception and Communication, in 2 OXFORD 
TEXTBOOK OF PUBLIC HEALTH 987, 988 (Roger Detels et al. eds., I997) (explaining that numer- 
ous studies have found that relative-risk estimates are internally consistent within and across re- 
sponse modes). 
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may be far more revealing of consumers' risk estimates than are the 
industry survey questions eliciting estimates of absolute death (or dis- 
ease) rates. And, as has been shown in this section, individuals' rela- 
tive-risk estimates of smoking are, on the whole, unduly optimistic. 
Unfortunately, the tobacco industry appears to have actively pro- 
moted that sort of imperfect relative-risk information. From the older 
and quite explicit Lucky Strike advertising slogan, "Reach for a Lucky 
instead of a Sweet," to the more recent and nearly explicit ad cam- 
paigns for "Silva Thins" and "Virginia Slims," tobacco manufacturers 
appear to have aggressively promoted cigarettes as weight-loss de- 
vices.562 Stress relief also is often touted by industry spokespeople as 
one of the benefits of smoking. Indeed, just this year Geoffrey Bible, 
the chief executive officer of Philip Morris, was quoted arguing the 
merits of smoking by attempting to inflate the relative risks of not 
smoking: 
There's an interesting question you should ask the public-health people 
.... What do you think smokers would do if they didn't smoke? You get 
some pleasure from it, and you also get some other beneficial things, such 
as stress relief. Nobody knows what you'd turn to if you didn't smoke. 
Maybe you'd beat your wife. Maybe you'd drive cars fast. Who knows 
what the hell you'd do?563 
A consumer who shared Geoffrey Bible's implicit view of the rela- 
tive risks of smoking and stress would be much more likely to smoke 
than one who had an accurate perception of those relative risks. 
(iv) Imperfect Information Regarding the Extent and Nature of the 
Harm. - Even if consumers were otherwise well-informed regarding 
their chances of experiencing various smoking-related hazards, they 
are still not adequately informed if they fail to appreciate the extent 
and nature of the harms they might suffer.564 Yet there is evidence 
that healthy individuals are generally unable to understand the nature 
of serious illnesses or disabilities.565 And there is no reason to believe 
562 See, e.g., Pierce & Gilpin, supra note 493, at 500; Pierce, Lee & Gilpin, supra note 494, at 
6o8. 
563 Jeffrey Goldberg, Big Tobacco's Endgame, N.Y. TIMES, June 2 I, i998, ? 6 (Magazine), at 36, 
39. 
564 See Slovic, supra note 5I2, at II36 ("Appreciating the risks of smoking means appreciating 
the nature of the consequences as well as the probabilities of those consequences."). 
565 See Ellen Smith Pryor, The Tort Law Debate, Efficiency, and the Kingdom of the Ill: A Cri- 
tique of the Insurance Theory of Compensation, 79 VA. L. REV. 9I, IIO-I7 (I993) (describing evi- 
dence that healthy individuals do not understand what it means to be very ill or severely dis- 
abled); Slovic, supra note 5I2, at I I36 (noting that the underestimation of the impact of an illness 
has long been observed, for example, by medical practitioners describing to patients the risks in- 
herent in various potential treatments); cf Frank S. Sloan et al., Alternative Approaches to Valuing 
Intangible Health Losses: The Evidence for Multiple Sclerosis, I7 J. HEALTH ECON. 475, 476, 494 
(i998) (examining the extent to which people with multiple sclerosis (MS) differ in their "valua- 
tions of health status" from people without MS and finding that "the general public tends not to 
be able to discriminate well in rating the different symptoms of MS[,j impl[ying] that it is difficult 
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that smokers are exceptional in that regard. It seems doubtful, in 
other words, that consumers deciding whether to smoke "have realistic 
knowledge of what it is like to experience lung cancer, chronic obstruc- 
tive pulmonary disease, or any other of the fates awaiting smokers that 
many would consider 'worse than death."'566 
(v) Underestimation of Addiction. - There is yet another signifi- 
cant - perhaps the most significant - source of imperfect consumer 
information. In the last decade or so, evidence has accumulated indi- 
cating that cigarettes are addictive. As Dr. Jack Henningfield, a scien- 
tist at the Addiction Research Center, observes, the addictiveness of 
nicotine places it "right in the top tier with cocaine, heroin and alco- 
hol."567 That medical conclusion is borne out in the words and deeds 
of smokers, most of whom say they want to quit and many of whom 
have made unsuccessful attempts to quit.568 The regret expressed gen- 
erally begins to set in fairly early for smokers. A i989 study, for ex- 
ample, found that seventy-four percent of adolescent smokers had seri- 
ously considered quitting smoking, and nearly half had tried 
unsuccessfully within the previous six months.569 In i998, Paul Slovic 
surveyed college students who were daily smokers, asking the follow- 
ing: "If you could go back to the time when you first began to smoke, 
would you decide to smoke again?"570 The results of Slovic's survey 
are illuminating: 
The answer was no for 55.2 % of the smokers and yes for only 36.2%. 
Among those who had smoked for five years or more, 65% said they 
would not decide to smoke again compared to 27% who said they would. 
The fact that so many long-term smokers regret beginning to smoke at- 
tests to the difficulty of stopping smoking.571 
Underestimating the addictiveness of smoking has the same effect 
as underestimating the long-term risks because it causes the initiating 
smoker to discount the long-term harms associated with beginning to 
smoke. If the tobacco consumption decision is made strictly one pack 
at a time, then only the marginal risk (which is nominal) and the mar- 
to obtain very refined judgments from individuals who do not have direct personal experience 
with the disease"). 
566 Slovic, supra note 5I2, at II36. 
567 Frontline: The Nicotine War (WGBH radio broadcast, Jan. 3, I995). 
568 See Hanson & Logue, supra note 256, at II93. For example, one recent survey found that 
70% of the adults who currently smoke "would like to quit completely," and 34% try to quit in 
any given year. See id. (quoting Spencer Rich, Study Says Adult Smoking Dropped to 25% in 
I993; Researcher Describes Results as Encouraging, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1994, at A6). How- 
ever, only eight percent of those who try to quit in a given year are successful. See id. (citing 8% 
of Smokers Who Thy to Quit Succeed, Survey Says, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, I994, at A4). Other 
studies have produced similar results. See, e.g., LOUIS BINER ET. AL., I993 MASSACHUSETTS 
TOBACCO SURVEY 6 (I 994). 
569 See Slovic, supra note 5I2, at II40 (citing I989 Teenage Attitudes and Practices Survey). 
570 Id. at II4I. 
571 Id. 
1522 HARVARD LAW RE VIEW [VOL. 112:I420 
ginal benefit (which can be significant) of that pack is relevant to the 
consumer.572 Only when an initiator appreciates the addictiveness of 
cigarettes does she have any reason to take into account the immense 
long-term risks of smoking.573 
The question whether consumers are adequately informed of the 
risks of smoking turns very much on the question whether smokers an- 
ticipate the costs of quitting.574 Unfortunately, there is good reason to 
presume that consumers underestimate the addictiveness of cigarettes. 
After all, the various sources of optimism described above apply not 
just to the health effects of smoking, but also to its addictive effects.575 
572 See Hanson & Logue, supra note 256, at ii98-99. 
573 Insofar as the individual fails to anticipate substantial costs of quitting (created by the ad- 
dictiveness of cigarettes), she may choose to endure costs (of continued smoking or of quitting) 
that greatly exceed any benefits that she might have anticipated when initially deciding to smoke. 
In short, the initial choice to smoke may be inefficient if consumers underestimate the addictive- 
ness of smoking. See id. at ii96-I202. 
Even when addiction plays no role, some evidence exists that individuals care less, other 
things being equal, about risks that accumulate over time from many small exposures (such as 
cigarette smoking) than they are about risks that are significant with a single exposure (such as 
sky diving). William Diamond conducted a study that verified this phenomenon. See William D. 
Diamond, Effects of Describing Long-Term Risks as Cumulative or Noncumulative, II BASIC & 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 405 (i990). Diamond was interested in determining if people would re- 
act differently to essentially the same risk depending on whether it was framed a cumulative risk 
(e.g., brown lung disease) or as a noncumulative risk (e.g., the risk of AIDS, which can be con- 
tracted from a single exposure). Diamond's experiment compared the risks people would take 
when exposed to two hypothetical carcinogens - one whose effect was cumulative ("the poison 
builds up in your body") and one whose effect was not cumulative (each exposure either makes 
you sick or "will pass right through you without doing any harm") - each of which would make 
50 out of every ioo people sick after five exposures. Id. at 4I2-13. Diamond found that, despite 
the statistically identical likelihood of harm from five exposures to each toxin, participants in the 
experiment were "significantly" more willing to expose themselves to the carcinogen that operated 
cumulatively rather than in an all-or-nothing manner. See id. at 414-I5. According to Diamond, 
one implication of the study is that "the deliberate presentation of a risk as cumulative or noncu- 
mulative may affect voluntary risk taking." Id. at 4i8. 
574 Regarding this question, the only potentially relevant survey evidence that Viscusi discusses 
comes from a I974 study reporting that approximately 75% of children between the ages of 7 and 
I4 agreed with the statement that "[i]t is very hard to stop smoking." VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra 
note 255, at I2I tbl.6-i (citing F.W. Schneider & L.A. Vanmastrig, Adolescent & Preadolescent 
Differences in Beliefs and Attitudes About Cigarette Smoking, 87 J. PSYCHOL. 7I (I974)). Of 
course, that figure implies that 25% of those children did not agree that it is hard to stop smoking, 
significantly more than the current national teenage smoking rate of i6%. See Andrea Adelson, 
Is Anybody Getting the Picture? Despite Ads, Teen-Age Smoking Is Unabated, N.Y. TIMES, July 
I7, I997, at Di. 
575 Cf. Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks, 246 SCIENCE I232, I232 
(i989) ("Some biases occur when people compare themselves with an incorrect norm. The risk of 
becoming addicted to drugs really is small for most of the population, but it seems that people 
conclude incorrectly that their risk is far below average by comparing themselves to drug users 
a salient high-risk group - rather than to people like themselves who are far more numerous."); 
Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health Problems, 5 J. BEHAV. 
MED. 44I, 447 tbl.I (i982) (finding that of 45 health-and-life-threatening problems the optimistic 
bias was greatest for drug addiction); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibil- 
ity to Health Problems: Conclusions from a Community-Wide Sample, io J. BEHAV. MED. 48i, 
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Moreover, there is some indirect market evidence that smokers think 
of their decision as a short-term one. For instance, many smokers pur- 
chase cigarettes by the pack rather than by the carton even though 
doing otherwise would save them both money and time.576 The con- 
sumer's tendency to focus on the short-term consequences of smoking 
is strengthened by tobacco industry spokespeople's consistently main- 
taining that cigarettes are not addictive and contradicting the evidence 
indicating otherwise.577 In any event, the weight of scientific evidence 
confirms the presumption: beginning smokers appear to underestimate 
the addictiveness of cigarettes. 
As a primary example, long-term survey evidence from the Moni- 
toring the Future project578 regarding the extent to which young 
smokers see their decision to smoke as a lifelong decision strongly sug- 
gests that young smokers underestimate the addictiveness of their 
habit.579 Young smokers' "expectation to abstain from smoking in the 
future seemed overwhelmed by the strong forces that tend to maintain 
or advance smoking behavior once it is established."580 Other studies 
reveal similar results. For instance, in one study, adults and children 
reflecting the optimism bias considered themselves less likely than av- 
erage to become "hooked" on cigarettes.581 And a i989 survey found 
485-86 & tbl.i (i987) (finding that of 32 different health hazards optimism was the strongest for 
drug addiction). 
576 See Hanson & Logue, supra note 256, at 206-07. 
577 See supra pp. I500-02. 
578 The project is being conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the University of 
Michigan. The study results referred to in the text are unpublished, but are summarized in U.S. 
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE: A 
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 68-7I (I994). 
579 In that study, high school seniors were surveyed each year for one decade - from I976 to 
i986 - and then again five years after graduating. In the first stage of the survey, seniors were 
asked, "Do you think you will be smoking cigarettes five years from now?" Id. at 68. At the sec- 
ond stage of the survey, respondents were again asked about their current smoking status. Of 
those respondents who smoked at least one pack per day as high school seniors, 32 % of them pre- 
dicted at the first stage that they would "probably" or "definitely" stop smoking within five years. 
Id. at 68 tbl.ig. At the second stage of the survey, however, only I3% of those graduates had quit, 
while nearly 70% continued to smoke more than one pack per day. See id. at 69 tbl.20. Moreo- 
ver, nearly half of those seniors who had smoked about one-half pack per day had increased their 
habit five years out to more than one pack per day. See id. Finally, of the seniors who smoked 
only one to five cigarettes per day, 6i% believed that they would probably or definitely quit 
within five years. See id. at 68 tbl.ig. As it turned out, only 30% managed to quit, while nearly 
half at least doubled their smoking rates. See id. at 69 tbl.2o. As the Surgeon General's report 
summarized: "When earlier smoking behavior is controlled, seniors' expectations to smoke had 
very limited power to predict subsequent smoking behavior." Id. at 68. 
580 Id. at 7I. 
581 See Alida Benthin, Paul Slovic & Herbert Severson, A Psychometric Study of Adolescent 
Risk Perception, i6 J. ADOLESCENCE 153, i65 (I993); Lawrence D. Cohn et al., Risk-Perception: 
Differences Between Adolescents and Adults, I4 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 2I7, 2I8, 22I-22 (I995) (ar- 
guing that adolescents' underestimation of risks stems from "a failure to perceive dangerous situa- 
tions rather than a desire to pursue risks"); cf. Leventhal et al. supra note 467, at 3375 (finding a 
general lack of understanding among urban youth regarding the difficulties of smoking cessation). 
It may be that adult smokers have a better understanding than younger smokers of the strength of 
I524 HARVARD LAW RE VIEW [Vol. II2:I420 
that twenty-one percent of teenage smokers believed it was safe to 
smoke for only a year or two, whereas a mere three percent of teenage 
nonsmokers shared that view.582 Paul Slovic found evidence that vir- 
tually all adolescents - smokers and nonsmokers alike - agree that 
smoking one pack per day "will eventually harm" a person's health.583 
In contrast, adolescents are much more likely to deny that smoking has 
significant short-term risks, and among adolescents, smokers are espe- 
cially likely to deny those risks. For example, Slovic found the fol- 
lowing: 
[A]bout one-third of those who smoked more than six cigarettes per day 
believed that there is "really no risk at all" from smoking a pack of ciga- 
rettes daily for the first few years after starting to smoke, and about 40% 
saw no harm associated with the very next cigarette smoked .... Fifty 
percent of the smokers believed that harmful effects of smoking rarely oc- 
cur until a person has smoked steadily for many years ... 584 
Clearly, an individual can believe that long-term smoking is dan- 
gerous and still underestimate the risk of smoking the next pack, par- 
ticularly when that person does not appreciate the connection between 
the two risks. 
(vi) Imperfect Attributional Information and the Role of Reciproc- 
ity. - As we describe in our companion article, attribution theorists585 
have shown that consumers can be significantly influenced by their 
perceptions of a seller's conduct and intentions.A86 Consumers react 
differently (exhibit more anger and desire increased retribution) if they 
believe that manufacturers caused product failure and if the risks as- 
sociated with the unsafe product are a function of manufacturer 
choice. Evidence further suggests that preferences are reciprocal: peo- 
ple willingly sacrifice their material well-being to punish others who 
act unfairly or selfishly or to reward or assist those people who act co- 
operatively or benignly. 
The relevance of attribution theory to tobacco policy seems fairly 
clear.587 Consumers, to be adequately informed in the sense that they 
the addiction, simply because they have had more experience trying to overcome the addiction. 
In Mark Twain's words: "To cease smoking is the easiest thing I ever did. I ought to know be- 
cause I've done it a thousand times." THE MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 538 
(I987). 
582 Karen F. Allen et. al., Teenage Tobacco Use: Data Estimates from the Teenage Attitudes and 
Practices Survey, United States, 1989 Advance Data No. 224, at I, 9 tbl.2 (1993). 
583 Slovic, supra note 512, at 1139. 
584 Id. at 1140. 
585 Generally, "attribution theorists" seek to understand how people attribute causes to certain 
outcomes and how attributions influence those people's reactions to the outcomes. See generally 
SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 57-95 (2d ed. i99i) (reviewing the 
literature). 
586 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note ii, at notes 488-50i and accompanying text. 
587 One of us is currently co-authoring a paper discussing the role of attribution theory in ex- 
plaining (and perhaps justifying) tort law generally. See Jon D. Hanson & Ana C. Reyes, Law 
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truly have a free choice in the market, need to know more than just 
the information regarding the ill-health effects and addictiveness of 
cigarettes (outcomes). They also need to know the extent to which 
those outcomes are inherent and unavoidable in the product or the re- 
sult of volitional and even deliberate acts of manufacturers. Only with 
that information can consumers determine whether they should take 
one of the key options available to them - that is, eschewing the 
product. 
Several attributes are relevant in the consumer product context. 
For instance, locus concerns whether the cause of the product failure is 
attributable to the manufacturer or the consumer. Numerous experi- 
ments have shown that when a product failure is seller-related, con- 
sumers are thought to deserve restitution (such as a refund and, in 
some cases, an apology), but when the product failure is buyer-related, 
the seller is not thought to owe restitution.588 A desire to influence 
perceptions of locus seems to explain, among other things, the TIRC's 
widely distributed documents listing "human ills erroneously attributed 
to tobacco over the centuries"589 and the millions of dollars spent by 
the industry to support the research efforts of those scientists who ar- 
gued that genetics or environmental factors caused cancer.590 The to- 
bacco manufacturers used the work of these scientists in congressional 
hearings, lawsuits, brochures sent to doctors, and marketing.591 In 
other words, the tobacco companies placed the locus of smoking- 
related harms with the environment and consumers, thus depressing 
the public's anger toward, and feelings of retribution against, manu- 
facturers. As we explain above, however, the tobacco industry appears 
to have long known that cigarettes cause cancer - or, in other words, 
that locus belongs with the product (and its manufacturer). 
A second attribute relevant to products liability analysis, controlla- 
bility, concerns the extent to which an actor's volition caused an in- 
jury. If an injurer acts volitionally (i.e., the injurer "could have done 
otherwise'), then the victim is more likely to reciprocate or retaliate 
with negative actions. Matthew Rabin, a behavioral economist, notes, 
"A crucial feature of the psychology of reciprocity is that people de- 
termine their dispositions toward others according to motives attrib- 
and Attribution: Toward a New Positive Theory of Tort Law (working title for unpublished 
work-in-progress). 
588 See Valerie S. Folkes, Conflict in the Marketplace: Explaining Why Products Fail, in 
ATTRIBUTION THEORY I43, I50-5I (Sandra Graham & Valerie S. Folkes eds., i990); see also 
Marsha L. Richins, Negative Word-of-Mouth by Dissatisified Consumers: A Pilot Study, 47 J. 
MARKETING 68, 72 (I983) (finding that "when greater blame for a dissatisfaction is placed on 
marketing institutions than on the consumer, there will be more negative [word of mouth]"). 
589 HILTS, supra note 259, at I5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
590 See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at 29i-96; supra p. I490 
591 See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at 29I-96. 
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uted to these others, not solely according to actions taken."592 Manu- 
facturers can reduce negative consumer reaction to product failure by 
denying or downplaying its controllability. The evidence reviewed in 
section A indicates that a primary strategy of the tobacco industry has 
been to do just that. With respect to the addictiveness of smoking, for 
example, tobacco companies have continuously attempted to deny con- 
trollability by, among other strategies, characterizing smoking as a 
"habit" (like eating gummy bears is for some people, a habit593) and by 
denying that it is an "addiction."594 Similarly, cigarette manufacturers 
have defended their position by pointing to misleading statistics, such 
as the evidence that approximately half of all smokers manage to 
quit.595 According to the industry view, the control is with smokers. 
They choose to consume a product that they perceive to be risky (even 
if manufacturers deny those risks); consequently, the public should 
support unregulated tobacco as a means of protectingn] everyone's 
freedom against an overbearing government."596 Again, however, in- 
ternal industry documents indicate that controllability actually rests, to 
a considerable degree, with manufacturers.597 
Finally, attribution theorists have discovered a widely shared, 
strong preference for cooperation. Other things equal, individuals tend 
to prefer interacting or cooperating with those actors they view as be- 
having cooperatively or fairly. Notably, researchers have found that 
anger derived from volitional attributions or intentional misconduct 
can overcome the economists' assumption that actors attempt to 
maximize their economic self-interest.598 Unsurprisingly, therefore, 
cigarette manufacturers publicly portrayed themselves as deeply con- 
cerned for consumers' health and displayed an unadulterated willing- 
ness to "cooperate" with any research into smoking risks.599 This sem- 
blance of cooperation produces an affective response in a smoker that 
not only increases her willingness to bargain with tobacco manufactur- 
ers, but can also lower her perception of the risks of smoking. Ali Sid- 
diq Alhakami and Paul Slovic have found that affective attitudes 
about an item are often inversely correlated with risk perceptions of 
592 Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE II, 22 (i998). 
593 Cf Yukimo Ono, Mouthwash PR Bad-Mouths Star and Other Klutoy Campaigns, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 23, I997, at B5 (recounting how James Morgan, former CEO of Phillip Morris's U.S. 
tobacco division, compared cigarettes to gummy bears as only "behaviorally addictive"). 
594 See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at 4-5. 
595 See Hanson & Logue, supra note 256, at II94-95 (describing how the statistic understates 
the difficulty that smokers face in quitting). 
596 GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 259, at i85; see supra pp. I494-95. 
597 See supra pp. I496-I502. 
598 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note ii, at notes 2I9-28 and accompanying text. 
599 See supra pp. I484-89. 
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that item.600 Thus, by inspiring positive affect through an appearance 
of cooperation, manufacturers may also dull risk perceptions. 
Attribution theorists certainly would posit that consumers would 
have reacted negatively to the tobacco companies' uncooperative, un- 
fair, and intentionally deceptive practices. Consider, for example, the 
widespread and longstanding industry practice of discrediting scientific 
research that was inconsistent with a pro-tobacco stance by labeling it 
"bad science." Assume momentarily that the industry incorrectly, but 
honestly, believed that the studies indicated smoking did not pose a 
health risk. Alternatively assume, as seems to be the case, that the to- 
bacco industry knowingly and with the specific purpose to deceive 
consumers portrayed the health issue as a "continuing controversy" 
and "open debate" and simultaneously withheld their findings about 
the hazards of smoking from the public. The outcome in both cases 
would be the same with respect to consumers' risk perceptions 
(skewed, but skewed in similar fashions toward the same underestima- 
tion of risk). However, the consumers' resentment and aggression 
upon finding out the true motivations, would be significantly higher in 
the latter case than in the former. Consumers then would not be indif- 
ferent, and would not react indifferently, to the two situations. 
(c) Bias and Manipulation in Viscusi's Survey Evidence. - The 
preceding evidence suggests that the "enormously powerful" market 
forces championed by Viscusi have not ensured that the risks of ciga- 
rettes are "almost universally understood."60' Still, the question re- 
mains, what about the evidence on which Viscusi bases his pro-market 
conclusions? What about the evidence, for example, that survey re- 
spondents estimate that forty-three of every ioo smokers will get lung 
cancer, when the "true risk reference point" is between five and ten? 
Viscusi provides data to support his assertion that cigarette manu- 
facturer liability would serve no useful purpose. This data suggests 
that most people understand that smoking can have adverse health 
consequences. However, flaws in Viscusi's analysis raise serious doubt 
about whether one can reasonably infer from his data that consumers 
accurately perceive, much less overestimate, the general risks of long- 
term smoking.602 Moreover, Viscusi's evidence provides little or no 
suggestion that the various sources of informational inadequacies de- 
600 See A. Alhakami & P Slovic, A Psychological Study of the Inverse Relationship Between 
Perceived Risk and Perceived Benefit, I4 RISK ANALYSIS io85, io88 (I994) ('When the attitude 
[about a risk] is favorable, the activity or technology being judged may be seen as having high 
benefit and low risk. On the other hand, when the item being evaluated is viewed unfavorably, 
with negative affect, it may be seen as having low benefit and high risk. Our general attitudes or 
affective states may thus 'confound' the risk/benefit judgment."). 
601 Viscusi, Public Perceptions, supra note 468, at 25. 
602 See Ron Borland, supra note 467, at 5 I8-20; J. Richard Eiser, Risk Judgments Reflect Belief 
Strength, Not Bias, 9 PSYCHOL. & HEALTH I97, 198-99 (I994); Hanson & Logue, supra note 256, 
at I354-6I; Slovic, supra note 512, at 1135. 
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scribed above are not powerfully in play in the market for cigarettes. 
That is, even if his evidence provides a reliable measure of consumer 
estimates of the general population risk of smoking, it tells us virtually 
nothing about the individual, personal risks perceived by smokers at 
the point of purchase. 
In any case, Viscusi's interpretations of that data and his estima- 
tion of the actual risk to smokers are, at best, dubious.603 In previous 
work, one of us (with Kyle Logue) has reviewed much of Viscusi's evi- 
dence and concluded that the survey and the survey data on which 
Viscusi primarily relies are misleading.604 That work argued that Vis- 
cusi's "true risk reference points" (for example, that between 5 and io 
out of ioo smokers will get lung cancer and between i6 and 36 smok- 
ers will die from smoking) likely represent a significant underestima- 
tion of the actual risks that survey respondents thought they were es- 
timating - although it is impossible to be certain given that, among 
other problems, the surveys nowhere make clear what is meant by the 
term "smoker."605 We do not review that earlier critique here.606 
Instead, we wish to revisit Viscusi's evidence and offer a different 
type of critique of his survey method and conclusions. We examine the 
survey design through the lens of behavioralism, and our conclusion 
resonates with the predominant theme of this Article and its compan- 
ion: Viscusi should have taken behavioralism seriously. 
(i) Asking the Question Wrong. - A primary lesson of this Article 
and its companion is that through subtle trial-and-error manipulations, 
sellers can influence consumer risk perceptions. Precisely the same les- 
son holds true with respect to survey designs. In our view, one clear 
lesson of the behavioralist literature is that no single survey of risk 
perceptions can shed much more than a splash of light on a question 
as complex as whether consumers are adequately informed of a par- 
ticular risk. Similarly, no single number describes what people know 
or think. Survey responses vary dramatically in response to innumer- 
able variables with the way a survey is designed and administered. 
Thus, to place much confidence in a conclusion regarding, say, how 
well-informed consumers are regarding the risks of a particular prod- 
uct, it is necessary to consider a wide range of surveys that test for dif- 
ferent sources of imperfect information and pose their questions in dif- 
ferent ways. 
603 See Hanson & Logue, supra note 256, at 1354-6I. 
604 See id. 
605 Id. 
606 We will, however, mention a study that was not cited there but seems to provide further 
confirmation of our argument. See Richard Doll et al., Mortality in Relation to Smoking: 40 
Years' Observations on Male British Doctors, 3og BRIT. MED. J. 90g (I994) (finding that about 
half of all regular cigarette smokers will eventually be killed by their habit); see also Borland, su- 
pra note 467, at 5IS (reporting that the accepted range of risk of fatal illness falls between 20% 
and 40%). 
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Relatedly, anyone reviewing an industry's own survey evidence 
should exercise a healthy degree of skepticism. After all, there are the 
same incentives (and trial-and-error opportunities) for the industry 
(and its lawyers) to manipulate reported risk estimates on surveys as 
we argue there are for manufacturers to manipulate consumers' risk 
perceptions. Such suspicion seems particularly justified with respect to 
tobacco-industry surveys in light of the evidence that the industry and 
its lawyers have operated in precisely that fashion.607 Considering the 
source of Viscusi's data and the range of options available to the in- 
dustry in gathering that evidence, it should not be surprising that the 
surveys on which Viscusi relies appear well designed to generate the 
appearance of overestimation of smoking's risks. 
(A) Question-Order Elicitation Effects. - One relatively obvious 
way in which the surveys that Viscusi uses appear designed to elicit 
particularly high probability estimates is in the placement of questions 
that make the risk of cigarettes more salient (or "available") to respon- 
dents and otherwise encourage high risk assessments. For example, 
Viscusi's principal survey questions were preceded by one or both of 
two questions that seem likely to have biased upward the responses to 
the probabilistic question.608 
607 In August I997, industry documents were made public - over the strenuous objections of 
the industry - in a case in Florida. Among the documents was an eight-page letter and memo- 
randum dated May 23, i964, from Washington law firm Arnold & Porter, lawyers for Phillip Mor- 
ris, describing efforts to conduct a survey to show that "there is a very high level of public aware- 
ness concerning the health issue involving cigarette smoking." Letter from Abe Krash, Arnold, 
Fortas & Porter, to Henry Ramm et al. I (May 23, i964) (on file with the authors). A memoran- 
dum accompanying the letter outlined the law firm's strategy: 
We have been assured by [the researchers who would conduct the study] that they would 
transmit to us every interview and every copy of the analysis. Thus, when it is completed, 
there will be nothing in the record of [the researchers] to subpoena. The danger of a suc- 
cessful subpoena would be reduced (though not entirely eliminated) if the survey were in 
an attorney's files. 
Memorandum from Abe Krash, Arnold, Fortas & Porter, to Henry Ramm et al. 4-5 (on file with 
the authors). The memorandum continued, "In any event, if the returns were unfavorable, they 
could be destroyed and there would be no record in any office of the nature of the returns." Id. at 
4. Finally, the memorandum acknowledged the industry's deliberate attempt to draft the survey 
questions to yield favorable results: "In the attached draft questionnaire, we have tried to avoid 
that problem by avoiding unnecessary questions which might elicit answers harmful to us. The 
questionnaire has been revised to eliminate questions that might upset an otherwise favorable re- 
turn." Id. 
608 In most of the surveys, the following questions were asked first: "When I mention cigarettes, 
what comes to your mind? PROBE: Anything else?" VISCUSI, SMOKING, Supra note 255, at I54. 
According to Viscusi, that question elicited from respondents a "stunning" and "overwhelmingly 
adverse sentiment against the product." Id. at 88. As one of us (with Kyle Logue) explains else- 
where, the "what comes to mind" question appears to have called up (made salient) in the minds 
of many respondents a heightened awareness of cigarette health risks and negative attributes. See 
Hanson & Logue, supra note 256, at I355 n.795. Ironically, Viscusi himself notes that this effect 
could have influenced responses to the first question if the open-ended "what comes to mind" 
question had not been asked first: "[B]y placing this question at the start of a survey, one is able to 
obtain responses that are not tainted by subsequent questions that might, for example, highlight 
the importance of the product's risks as a salient product attribute." VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra 
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A less obvious but equally important example of a question-order 
elicitation effect is apparent in the way that Viscusi measures people's 
assessment of the total mortality effects of smoking. Viscusi recog- 
nized that his argument that survey respondents overestimate the 
chances of getting lung cancer was vulnerable to the claim that many 
survey respondents may have assumed that the phrase, "getting lung 
cancer," was equivalent to "dying from smoking."609 Overestimation of 
risk seems especially likely given that lung cancer, according to Vis- 
cusi, is the most salient of all smoking-related risks,610 that respon- 
dents might well use "lung cancer" as a catch-all term for "smoking- 
caused disease," and that respondents had just been asked about the 
general risks of smoking. If smokers had in fact interpreted the ques- 
tion to mean, "Among ioo smokers, how many of them do you think 
will die because they smoke?," then, according to Viscusi, the true risk 
reference point would be significantly higher than o.os and o.io. The 
note 255, at 88. He fails to see, however, how the order that he selected could have influenced 
later questions in exactly the same manner. Once negative impressions had been elicited by the 
"what comes to mind" question, for instance, subjects would tend to answer the ultimate question 
in a manner calculated to remain cognitively consistent with their earlier, negative responses. See 
Hanson & Logue, supra note 256, at 1355, n.795. 
In all of Viscusi's surveys, the following question was asked immediately prior to the proba- 
balistic question: Have you heard that smoking "will most likely shorten a person's life," "is dan- 
gerous to a person's health," "is bad for a person's health, but not dangerous," or "is not bad for a 
person's health"? VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 255, at 154-55. It seems fairly clear that the 
data generated by this question yield nothing of interest to our understanding of consumer knowl- 
edge: the fact that a consumer has heard something can in no way be construed to mean the con- 
sumer believes it. Viscusi suggests otherwise in a more recent paper, stating that "more than any 
other groups it seems that smokers are apprised of accurate information regarding the smoking 
hazards." Viscusi, Public Perceptions, supra note 468, at i6-I7. This interpretation is based on 
the observation that the statement "smoking is not bad for a person's health" had been heard by 
fewer current smokers (22%) than former smokers (32%) or nonsmokers (36%). Id. at 35 tbl.7. 
However, if not having heard this statement is being used as a proxy for "accurate information," 
Viscusi's argument is seemingly contradicted by the fact that nonsmokers who have heard it make 
above-average estimations of lung cancer risk. 
The preceding discussion raises a question: if we learn little or nothing from the oddly worded 
question, why keep adding it to each survey immediately prior to the probabilistic question? One 
hypothesis is that the question is included not for its own sake but because it elicits higher re- 
sponses to the subsequent probability question. There are three "ideas" listed that remind re- 
spondents of the cigarette-related warnings and admonitions that they have received from par- 
ents, teachers, public service advertisements, the U.S. Surgeon General, and so on. Moreover, in 
the fourth part of the introductory question, respondents are asked whether they have heard an 
idea that flies in the face of all that they have heard from those many credible sources. It is not 
surprising that the fewest people heard that "smoking is not bad for a person's health." What is 
significant, however, and what Viscusi does not really explore, is that the relatively small group 
who had heard that "smoking is not bad for a persons health" also had the highest risk estimates. 
In other words, Viscusi's evidence reveals the unsurprising fact that people do not believe every- 
thing they hear. 
609 VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 255, at 76-77. 
610 See id. at 77 ("[L]ung cancer risks have received the greatest attention for the longest period 
of time. The early antismoking efforts and the initial reports by the Surgeon General focused on 
lung cancer, and the risk continued to be the most prominent smoking hazard."). 
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estimates therefore may not have evidenced an overestimate as much 
as they reflected a misunderstanding of the question. 
Sensitive to that possibility, Viscusi conducted a different survey 
that asked two questions. First, it asked: "Among ioo cigarette smok- 
ers, how many of them do you think will die of lung cancer because 
they smoke?" Second, the survey asked: "Among ioo cigarette smok- 
ers, how many of them do you think will die of lung cancer, heart dis- 
ease, throat cancer, and all other illnesses because they smoke?" The 
average answer to the second question was fifty-four, which Viscusi 
points out "is I.42 times as large as the assessed lung cancer mortality 
rate for the same sample"611 and "two to three times as great"612 as 
what Viscusi claims is the true risk reference point of between eighteen 
and thirty-six.613 In other words, even when respondents are certainly 
thinking about the total mortality risks of smoking, they appear to 
overestimate the actual risk. Viscusi concedes that the degree of over- 
estimation is reduced when respondents are asked about total mortal- 
ity but concludes that "[t]he general spirit of the results is consistent 
with the lung cancer risk findings in that they indicate substantial 
awareness of the risks of smoking that are not sensitive to the wording 
of the telephone survey."'614 
But Viscusi's survey design is unsatisfactory. The first probabilistic 
question asks about the single risk that Viscusi acknowledges is the 
risk most likely to be substantially overestimated by consumers - 
dying of lung cancer. Then, after respondents give that answer, they 
are immediately asked to estimate the total risk of dying from any 
smoking-related cause, including "lung cancer, heart disease, throat 
cancer, and all other illnesses." In designing his sensitivity tests, Vis- 
cusi did not account for the effect that answers to the second question 
would be anchored to answers to the first question and would thus 
produce a high response to the first question and a necessarily higher 
response to the second.615 
611 Id. 
612 Id. 
613 See id. at 70. 
614 Id. at 77-78. 
615 Viscusi's 1997 survey first asked the following: "Out of every ioo cigarette smokers, how 
many of them do you think will develop lung cancer because they smoke?" The survey then que- 
ried, "Out of every ioo cigarette smokers, how many of them do you think will die from lung can- 
cer, heart disease, throat cancer, or any other illness because they smoke cigarettes?" Viscusi, 
Public Perceptions, supra note 468, at 33. The average answers were 46.8 and 50.1. Thus, the 
average death rate estimate was four percentage points lower than the average death rate estimate 
in the earlier survey. One explanation for the lower estimate in the more recent survey might be 
that this survey had a more limited anchoring effect. We suspect that the anchoring effect still 
played a significant role in the more recent survey, however, because many of the telephone re- 
spondents likely registered no difference between developingn] lung cancer" and dyingn] from 
lung cancer." 
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(B) The Elicitation Effects of Specifying Risks. - There are a cou- 
ple of ways in which surveys, such as Viscusi's, that request respon- 
dents' estimates of a single risk or a small number of specified risks 
may bias respondents' estimates upward. First, it seems likely that 
consumers would give a greater estimate of a particular risk when 
asked about it specifically on a survey than when making their con- 
sumption choices. The survey highlights a risk for consumers in a way 
that a purchase or consumption decision may not.616 Relatedly, when 
survey respondents are not asked specifically about a particular risk or 
set of risks of smoking, they tend not to be very good at identifying 
them. For example, a i990 survey in Canada put to respondents the 
following question: "To the best of your knowledge, what, if any, are 
the health hazards related to smoking?"617 Only forty-four percent of 
approximately one thousand respondents included lung cancer in their 
answers, and only twenty percent included heart disease.618 As that 
study reveals, particularly when compared to the tobacco industry's 
surveys, a person's willingness to give an estimate of a risk when 
prompted does not necessarily imply that the person accounts for that 
risk (much less that estimate) when not prompted. A bit of introspec- 
tion may remind the reader that contemplating risk probabilities when 
making consumption choices is rare - at least at the conscious level. 
A second and perhaps related reason why survey questions asking 
respondents about specified risks may tend to inflate their estimates 
stems from the fact that the industry survey on which Viscusi chiefly 
relies inquires about a specifically identified risk (or set of risks) - for 
example, lung cancer. The behavioralist literature brims with exam- 
ples of how such questions likely alter responses. In Kahnemann and 
Tversky's well-known experiment, one group of subjects was asked to 
estimate the number of seven-letter words ending in "ing" that ap- 
peared in a four-page excerpt from a novel, and another group was 
asked to estimate the number of seven-letter words ending with "_n_" 
in the same excerpt.619 The median estimate given in response to the 
first question was almost three times that given for the second (not- 
withstanding the fact that there were almost certainly more words of 
the second type, given that it includes the first).620 When described as 
ending in "ing" as opposed to "_n_", the subject class of words was 
616 See Latin, supra note 226, at I246 ("One explanation for the disparity between experimental 
evidence that low-probability risks are overweighted and observations that people often ignore 
these risks is that experimental methodology forces high salience for the risks under study while 
'real life' experiences seldom make low-probability risks available.'). 
617 ENVIRONICS RESEARCH GROUP LTD., AWARENESS OF HEALTH HAZARDS DUE TO SMOK- 
ING 22C (I99o) (on file with the authors). 
618 See id. 
619 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Con- 
junction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, go PSYCHOL. REV. 293, 295 (i983). 
620 See id. 
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identified for respondents in a manner specific enough to allow easier 
conceptualization and therefore tended to prompt far greater estima- 
tions. 
Tversky and Koehler cite to similar evidence in developing a new 
theory of subjective probability (Support Theory), "according to which 
different descriptions of the same event can give rise to different 
[probability] judgments."'621 A key prediction of Support Theory is 
that the act of specifying a particular risk in survey questions (as op- 
posed to leaving that risk implicit) will bias responses upward. This 
phenomenon is especially evident in a I978 study by Baruch Fischhoff, 
Paul Slovic, and Sarah Lichtenstein.622 These scholars asked car me- 
chanics and lay people to estimate probabilities for different causes of 
a car's failure to start. They discovered that estimates of the likeli- 
hood of the residual hypothesis - "The cause of failure is something 
other than the battery, the fuel system, or the engine" - increased 
from 0.22 to 0.44 when the hypothesis was broken up into more spe- 
cific causes (for example, the starting system, the ignition system).623 
The car mechanics, who had an average of fifteen years of experience, 
likely knew all of the possible residual causes but nonetheless reacted 
differently when those causes were listed explicitly.624 
Thus, the act of specifically identifying a risk appears to increase 
its perceived magnitude. This means that Viscusi's question may have 
elicited far higher responses than would have alternative questions 
such as, "How many smokers out of one hundred will die from a 
smoking-related disease other than heart disease, emphysema, and 
throat cancer?" 
Another factor contributing to the overestimation of specified risks 
in surveys such as Viscusi's seems to be the lack of a delimiting con- 
text for the survey question. By asking about the percentage of deaths 
from lung cancer in isolation, Viscusi essentially forces respondents to 
measure a distance without a ruler. Respondents in such surveys tend 
to ignore many other risks that they would also overestimate if speci- 
fied. Moreover, they feel relatively unconstrained by the fact that all 
causes of death must add up probabilistically to one. Again, the be- 
havioralist literature contains examples of how such questions by 
themselves can lead to overestimation. For instance, in a study con- 
ducted by Tversky and Koehler, Stanford undergraduates estimated 
the percentage of U.S. married couples with a given number of chil- 
621 Amos Tversky & Derek J. Koehler, Support Theory: A Nonextensional Representation of 
Subjective Probability, ioi PSYCHOL. REV. 547, 547 (I994). 
622 See Baruch Fishhoff, Paul Slovic & Sarah Lichtenstein, Fault Rees: Sensitivity of Esti- 
mated Failure Probabilities to Problem Representation, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUMAN 
PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE 330, 333-35 (I978). 
623 Id. 
624 See id. 
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dren.625 "Subjects were asked to write down the last digit of their 
telephone numbers and then to evaluate the percentage of couples 
having exactly that many children"626- a question similar in form to 
Viscusi's in that it asks about a specific probability in isolation. Sub- 
jects overestimated the percentage of couples in nine out of ten catego- 
ries.627 The average total response for all ten numbers was nearly 
200%. Generally speaking, then, the question elicited estimates two 
times the size of the actual percentages. 
In contrast to open-ended questions in the Stanford phone number 
study and in Viscusi's chief survey, we conducted a small written sur- 
vey that forced respondents to think about their estimations in context. 
When asked how many smokers out of ioo would die of emphysema (a 
question designed to mirror Viscusi's format), respondents in a Har- 
vard Law School first-year class (of approximately ioo students) esti- 
mated that I7.4I out of ioo smokers would die of emphysema. When 
other members of the same sample were asked about the risks of dying 
of fifteen different causes of death (including car accident, heart dis- 
ease, and the like) and were told that their total risk estimate must add 
up to icc, the average estimate dropped to 7.38 out of ico who would 
die of emphysema - a statistically significant difference (p = o.ooi). 
Thus, just by eliminating the open-ended nature of Viscusi's question 
format, estimates of emphysema fatalities dropped by more than half. 
In sum, there is nothing exceptional about Viscusi's finding that a 
specifically identified risk of lung cancer in a survey question produces 
overestimated responses. Although he attributes that finding to the 
fact that our culture has made the risk "salient" to consumers, the 
more accurate attribution may be to the survey question itself, which 
appears to have biased the responses upward.628 
625 See Tversky & Koehler, supra note 62i, at 553. 
626 Id. 
627 See id. 
628 Paul Slovic expressed the same basic point: "[O]ne can get almost any estimate one wishes 
for lung cancer (or other smoking-induced causes of death) simply by varying the number of other 
causes that are also being judged." See Paul Slovic, The Perils of Viscusi's Analyses of Smoking 
Risk Perceptions, I 2 J. BEHAv. DECISION MAKING (forthcoming i999) (manuscript at 7, on file 
with the Harvard Law School Library). 
Tversky and Koehler demonstrated how easy it is to elicit overestimation of actual risks from 
respondents in their famous work on Support Theory. In one study, for example, they asked Stan- 
ford undergraduates to estimate the probability of different possible causes of death. "The sub- 
jects were informed that each year approximately 2 million people in the United States (nearly I % 
of the population) die." Tversky & Koehler, supra note 62i, at 55I. Subjects were shown only 
one of two different types of lists of causes of death - constructed either so that the various 
causes were aggregated (that is, unspecified) or disaggregated (that is, specified). See id. at 55I- 
52. When asked about the probability of dying of "cancer" (in which all specific types of cancer 
are implicit), the mean estimate was 32%. See id. at 552. However, when asked about the 
probability of "respiratory cancer," "digestive cancer," "genitourinary cancer," "breast cancer," 
"urinary cancer," "leukemia," and "other cancer," the total estimates more than doubled to 70%. 
Id. The estimated actual risk of cancer-caused death is 25%. See id. 
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(C) The Elicitation Effects of Response Scales. - The response 
scale of a survey soliciting assessments of "objective" data almost al- 
ways produces an elicitation bias. When respondents do not have an 
opportunity independently to quantify their answers, they will look for 
cues from the range of acceptable responses with which they are pre- 
sented. By employing one or another response scale, survey designers 
can substantially alter the survey results. 
The claim that response scales are not simply objective criteria but 
are instead frames of reference finds support in several leading ex- 
perimentsP629 In one recent study, Paul Slovic and John Monahan 
compared response scales with different labels and different incre- 
ments.630 They asked respondents to assess the likelihood that hypo- 
thetical mental patients would harm others within three years of an 
examination.63' Half the respondents used a probability scale com- 
posed of eleven increments, as follows: 
Similarly, when respondents were asked to assess the aggregate probability of "accidental" 
causes of death, their mean response was 45%. See id. But when the category was disaggregated 
into "auto accident," "firearm accident," "accidental fall," "death in fire," "drowning," "accidental 
poisoning," and "other accident," the mean response nearly doubled to 83%. Id The estimated 
actual risk of accidental death is 57.9%. See id. 
629 For instance, a 1985 study asked respondents to "estimate the amount of television they 
watched along a category scale that ranged, in half-hour steps, either (a) from 'up to a half hour' 
to 'more than two and a half hours' or (b) from 'up to two and a half hours' to 'more than four 
and a half hours."' Norbert Schwarz et al., Response Scales: Effects of Category Range on Re- 
ported Behavior and Comparative Judgments, 49 PUB. OPINION Q. 388, 389 (i985). Respondents 
presented with the first response scale estimated that they watched less television than the other 
set of respondents. Only I6.2% of the respondents who used the lower response scale reported 
watching more than two and a half hours of television, but 37.5% of the respondents presented 
with the high category range reported doing so. See id. at 39o. Previous research had shown that 
average television consumption in Germany - where the interviews were conducted - was 
slightly less than three hours. See id. 
Similarly, a iggi study asked subjects to estimate how many people are likely to die within iQ 
years of 20 different possible causes of death. See J. Richard Eiser & Franziska Hoepfner, Acci- 
dents, Disease, and the Greenhouse Effect: Effects of Response Categories on Estimates of Risk, I2 
BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. I95, I98 (iggi). Respondents were presented with one of two 
different response scales. The first scale explicitly quantified low frequencies of occurrence: ioo 
or fewer; ioo to i000; I,ooo to io,ooo; i0,000 to i00,000; and ioo,000 or more. The second identi- 
fied higher frequencies: ioooo or fewer; i0,000 to I00,000; I00,000 to 1,000,000; I,000,000 to 
ioooo,ooo; and io,oooooo or more. See id. "Ratings were consistently high when subjects re- 
sponded on the higher-frequency scale." Id. at 200. 
630 See Paul Slovic & John Monahan, Probability, Danger, and Coercion: A Study of Risk Per- 
ception and Decision Making in Mental Health Law, i9 J. L. & HUMAN BEHAV. 49, 5 I-52 (I995). 
See generally Michael A. Diefenbach et al., Scales for Assessing Perceptions of Health Hazard 
Susceptibility, in 8 HEALTH EDUCATION RESEARCH: THEORY & PRACTICE I8I, passim (I993) 
(finding that increasing the number of scale increments did not necessarily improve subjects' per- 
formance). 
631 See Slovic & Monahan, supra note 630, at 49. 
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0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
I I 
no chance certain to 
harm 
The other half used a thirteen-step scale, as follows: 
<1/1000 1/1000 1% 2% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% >40% 
Each participant evaluated thirty-two patients.632 Controlling for 
the background characteristics attributed to each set of patients, the 
study shows a large effect from the change in probability response 
scale. Respondents using the first response scale assigned probabilities 
equal to or less than io% to only io.8% of cases. But among respon- 
dents using the second scale, six categories equal to or less than ten 
percent accounted for more than two-thirds of total responses.633 
Those results strongly suggest that the probabilities of harm were not 
meaningfully anchored. Notably, this distortion recurred in a subse- 
quent study using mental health professionals as subjects.634 
One might expect that Viscusi's study avoided that potential source 
of bias, given that it employed an undifferentiated scale of i to ioo. 
However, the evidence on the elicitation effect of response scales sug- 
gests that all response scales have a biasing effect as compared with 
alternative response scales. It is not difficult to imagine other response 
scales that would have elicited much lower estimates than the response 
scale used in the studies on which Viscusi relies. Moreover, there are 
reasons to believe that Viscusi's response scales would tend to lead to 
estimates well above the "true risk reference point" of between 0.05 
and o.io. 
One of us (with Kyle Logue) has already noted that Viscusi's data 
contains some unusual clustering (roughly one-quarter of all responses) 
around fifty percent and that this clustering might "reflect an attempt 
on the part of some respondents to answer 'I don't know."'635 More 
recently, behavioralists have conducted two experiments in which they 
have demonstrated that, indeed, surveys employing open-ended prob- 
632 See id 
633 See id. at 52, 55. 
634 See id. at 59-60. 
635 Hanson & Logue, supra note 256, at I360 n.824. 
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ability scales of the sort used by Viscusi will lead to an inappropriate 
"blip" at fifty: 
Apparently, the open-ended format leads some people to use the 50% op- 
tion as 'fifty-fifty,' an expression of having no idea as to the answer. As a 
result, the accuracy of people's reported beliefs depends on the response 
scale used, as well as on how it evokes and channels such feelings of epis- 
temic uncertainty.636 
Assuming that "I don't know" was the meaning of the "fifty per- 
cent" responses in Viscusi's survey, the response scale would have the 
effect of artifactually increasing the average risk estimate. Indeed, 
even if all other respondents (roughly three-quarters of the total) had 
estimated zero percent as their answer to the lung cancer question, the 
fact that one-quarter guessed fifty percent would make it possible for 
Viscusi to conclude that consumers overestimated the lung cancer risks 
of smoking. 
In sum, with a scale of o to ioo and a question type such as the one 
on which Viscusi relies, it is difficult to get answers that fall below five 
percent, which is what Viscusi indicates a survey would need to do be- 
fore he would be convinced that smokers underestimate the risks of 
smoking.637 Given results as drastic as these, it seems likely that re- 
spondents' overestimations follow more from survey design than from 
consumer pessimism. 
(D) The Elicitation Effects of Response Modes. - Risk analysts 
have demonstrated that surveys should question respondents in a form 
that is consistent with the way in which those respondents customarily 
think. Baruch Fischhoff and Don MacGregor explain this necessity: 
If the mental representation of [the respondents'] knowledge is different 
from the formulation required by the interviewer, then some translation is 
necessary, first to retrieve what they know and, second, to express what 
they retrieve. The greater the incompatibility, the more cumbersome the 
translation process becomes and the more knowledge is lost in transmis- 
sion.638 
636 See Baruch Fischhoff & Wandi Bruine de Bruin, Fifty-Fifty = 50%?, I2 J. BEHAV. 
DECISION MAKING (forthcoming i999) (manuscript at 4, on file with the Harvard Law School 
Library). As they discovered, the blip disappears when a response scale with explicit response 
options is used. One of the alternative response scales had ioi tick marks with the end points 
marked "o-no chance" and "iooscertainty." Id. at 2. Fischhoff and Bruine de Bruin also discov- 
ered that offering the option "absolutely no idea" had very little effect on reducing the blip created 
by the open-ended probability scale. Id. at 9. 
637 Indeed, in our small written survey, when respondents were asked to estimate the number of 
smokers out of ioo who would die of emphysema, the average answer given by students was 
17.41 - well above what Viscusi claims is the true risk reference point for lung cancer. Of 
course, the risk to smokers of dying of emphysema is far lower than that of dying from lung can- 
cer. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Cigarette Smoking-Related Mor- 
tality I (i996) (reporting annual mortality figures of 119,920 for lung cancer, I4,865 for bronchitis 
and emphysema, and 84,475 for all respiratory diseases) (report available at <http://www.cdc.gov/ 
nccdphp/osh/mortali.htm>) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
638 Fischhoff & MacGregor, supra note 56i, at 229-30. 
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Fischhoff and MacGregor demonstrate the significance of this po- 
tential problem in a survey eliciting laypeople's perceptions of the le- 
thality of twenty potential causes of death. The survey used four dif- 
ferent, but formally equivalent, response modes, represented in the 
following example of influenza questions: 
(a) Estimate death rate: In a normal year, for each ioo,ooo people who 
have influenza, how many do you think die of influenza? 
(b) Estimate number died: Last year, 8o,ooo,ooo people had influenza. 
How many of them do you think died of it? 
(c) Estimate survival rate: In a normal year, for each person who dies of 
influenza, how many do you think have influenza but do not die of it 
during the year? 
(d) Estimate number survived: In a normal year, 5000 people die of influ- 
enza. How many people do you think have influenza but do not die from 
it during the year?639 
After translating the responses from the four samples into the first 
response mode (death rate per one hundred thousand), Fischhoff and 
MacGregor could easily demonstrate the significant, independent in- 
fluence of response modes. Responses to the questions about the le- 
thality of influenza were fairly representative of all potential causes of 
death surveyed: (a) death rate was estimated at 393; (b) number that 
died was estimated at six; (c) survival rate was estimated at twenty-six; 
and (d) number that survived was estimated at 5I1 .640 The "statistical 
death rate" (or what Viscusi might call the "true risk reference point") 
for influenza is six.64I As was true for influenza, the death rate esti- 
mates (response mode (a)), which is roughly the response mode that 
Viscusi used in his surveys, yielded the highest or second-highest esti- 
mate in all but two of the twenty maladies considered.642 Generally 
speaking, "the statistical death rates fell in the middle of the four sets 
of estimated rates. Thus, whether these individuals tended to over- or 
under-estimate lethality depends upon how the question was asked."643 
Such evidence regarding the significant influence of response modes 
and, more specifically, the estimate-boosting effect of death-rate ques- 
tions,644 suggests that the "overestimation" of risk that Viscusi claims 
to have identified may be little more than an artifact of the question 
asked.645 
639 Id. at 230. 
640 See id. at 23I tbl.i. 
641 See id. 
642 See id. 
643 Id. at 232 (emphasis added). 
644 See id. at 23I tbl.i (reporting that death rate estimates exceeded statistical death rates in ii 
of 20 categories). 
645 Viscusi purports to be sensitive to the findings of Fischhoff and MacGregor. After briefly 
mentioning their study, he acknowledges that "[h]ow one asks the risk-perception question can be 
of substantial consequence" and that "whatever isk perception question wording is chosen should 
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Viscusi's own survey of the life-expectancy loss associated with 
smoking provides another good example of the way in which response 
modes can cause survey respondents to appear to overestimate risks. 
Viscusi recognizes that even if consumers were pessimists with respect 
to the probability that smokers will die from smoking, they may be op- 
timists with respect to the amount of life lost from smoking. 
Thus, he set out to test whether consumers were optimistic or pes- 
simistic with respect to the life expectancy of smokers by devising the 
following telephone survey question (which varied with the sex of the 
respondent): "The average life expectancy for a 2 i-year-old 
male(female) is that he(she) would live for another 53(59) years. What 
do you believe the life expectancy is for the average male (female) 
smoker?"646 The first thing to notice about that question is just how 
confusing it is and how difficult it would be for the respondents "to re- 
trieve what they know and . . . to express what they retrieve."647 Al- 
though we do not claim to know precisely how a smoker or a potential 
smoker might think about expected "duration of life lost" from smok- 
ing, we are confident that the thinking is not exactly as Viscusi seems 
to imagine.648 
be well understood by respondents." VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 255, at 74 (emphasis added). 
To determine whether results of the national survey provided "a reliable index of smoking risk 
beliefs," Viscusi conducted a number of telephone surveys in the Durham, North Carolina, area to 
explore "the sensitivity of the risk responses to variations in the question formulation." Id. at 76. 
Based on his summary review of those studies, Viscusi concludes that they were probably reliable. 
See id. at 82-83. 
For a variety of reasons, however, Viscusi's "sensitivity tests" with respect to different response 
modes are inadequate. Based on his description, there were only two North Carolina surveys that 
reworded the question on the national survey. In one of them, respondents were asked "how 
many among the 2 million cigarette smokers in North Carolina would get lung cancer because 
they smoke," and in the other they were asked "how many among iooO cigarette smokers would 
get lung cancer because they smoke." Id. at 76. Unfortunately, both of the alternative formula- 
tions elicited death rate estimates. Thus, although Viscusi may have changed the wording, he did 
not alter the underlying response mode of the industry survey. For additional criticisms of those 
sensitivity tests, see Hanson & Logue, cited above in note 256, at I356-57 n.8oi. 
646 VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 255, at 79. Viscusi's working paper does not give the exact 
wording of the question asked in the I997 survey, but it does indicate that the framing of the 
question was different. Respondents were told "the expected date of death of the individual." 
Viscusi, Public Perceptions, supra note 468, at i8. Presumably, respondents then had to give the 
date at which the average smoker would die. Viscusi does not explain why he chose to modify the 
wording of the question. 
647 Fischhoff & MacGregor, supra note 56 i, at 229-30. 
648 To justify the survey question regarding lung cancer risks, Viscusi emphasizes that the ques- 
tion was framed in a way that "provides a natural way to think about probabilities" and is "easy 
to comprehend within the context of a telephone interview." Therefore, he concludes that "clearly 
the results derived from a misleading or confusing question format may be different." Viscusi, 
SMOKING, supra note 255, at 75-76. For this quite confusing question, however, Viscusi makes no 
explicit mention of the effect caused by the unnatural framing of the question. Thus, at times, 
Viscusi seems sensitive to the elicitation effect of survey modes and at other times not. Similarly, 
by claiming that he did not ask respondents simply to assess the "life expectancy loss to avoid bi- 
asing the results by mentioning the prospect of a 'loss,"' id. at 79, Viscusi seems to be taking into 
account another possible elicitation effect. Apparently, Viscusi means to say that because of "loss 
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In our view, the most important source of confusion (or imperfect 
translation) is the lack of clarity regarding whether the question asks 
about the loss of life expectancy averaged across all smokers or about 
the loss of life expectancy of just those smokers who die from a smok- 
ing-related cause. Viscusi does not acknowledge this problem and in- 
stead assumes that survey respondents would interpret the question to 
mean expected loss to all smokers - a far more complicated estimate 
to make in response to an already complex question. Viscusi writes: 
"The life-expectancy loss estimates reflect the combined influence of 
the respondent's assessment of [the] shift in the mortality distribution 
from smoking and the years of life lost at that age."649 
Viscusi presents the life-expectancy loss data in a table, reproduced 
below, that examines the mean estimates of life expectancy loss "condi- 
tional on the respondent's assessed mortality risk level."650 
Table I: Viscusi's comparison of assessed life-expectancy loss 
and fatality risk from smoking 
Assessed mortality risk level Number Mean 
(deaths/ioo smokers) in cell (standard error) 
assessed life-expectancy loss 
0-20 25 7.0 (I.-3) 
2I-40 i8 8.3 (I-4) 
4i-60 35 I2.3 (I.2) 
6i-8o 32 I3.8 (i.o) 
8i-ioo Io i 8.8 (3.7) 
Sample size = I20651 
Referring to those numbers, Viscusi claims that the survey respon- 
dents' estimates came in well above the scientific estimates of the years 
aversion," see Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note II, at notes I9I-92 and accompanying text, 
including the word "loss" in a survey might influence its outcome. Arguably, therefore, Viscusi is 
implicitly and sensibly trading off one sort of elicitation effect (the problem of confusing response 
modes) for another (the problem of loss aversion). As far as we can tell, however, no such di- 
lemma exists. We know of no evidence indicating that people will overestimate or underestimate 
"losses" simply because they are characterized as losses. It is true that people's preferences appear 
to vary according to whether something is perceived as a loss, but that is not the issue here. Even 
if there were such a problem with risk perceptions, it would be present in Viscusi's other ques- 
tions that ask about "getting lung cancer" or "dying of lung cancer" or "dying" - all of which 
seem to imply losses. To minimize the possibility of loss-aversion effects, Viscusi might have 
avoided the problem by framing the question as a "gain" and asking how much longer a non- 
smoker would live than a smoker. 
649 VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 255, at 8o. 
6S0 Id. 
651 See id. at 8o tbl.4. No comparable figure is included in Viscusi's working paper discussing 
his I997 survey. Therefore, it is unclear whether the change in the wording of the question has 
eliminated the problems that we point to in the text that follows. 
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deducted from one's life by lifelong smoking, which he calculates to be 
between 3.6 and 7.2 years for all smokers.652 Comparing this "scien- 
tific estimate" to the respondents' estimates in Table i, Viscusi con- 
cludes that "[individuals' assessed life-expectancy loss is greater than 
the scientists' estimates of the loss attributable to smoking, so that this 
evidence is consistent with the risk-perception findings."653 ViSCUSi 
further indicates that, according to the numbers in Table i, those re- 
spondents with lower "mortality risk level" estimates also had lower 
"life-expectancy loss" estimates.654 According to Viscusi, thereee is 
clearly a strong correlation between the life-expectancy loss responses 
and the assessed mortality risk levels, which provides a consistency 
test of the responses."655 
Viscusi's data, however, are susceptible to a more plausible inter- 
pretation than the one that he offers: survey respondents appear not to 
have estimated the expectancy losses of all smokers, but only of those 
smokers who die from smoking-related causes. To see why that is 
true, one need only assume that Viscusi's numbers and interpretation 
are correct and back out of those numbers the implied expected loss of 
life for those smokers whose death results from smoking. This number 
may be estimated by assuming that the average estimate of "assessed 
mortality risk level (deaths/ioo smokers)" is the midpoint of the range 
given in Table i. If respondents were really thinking about loss of life 
averaged over all smokers, as Viscusi claims (rather than only those 
smokers who die from smoking-related causes, as we claim), then the 
average assessed mortality risk level implies that respondents esti- 
mated that ten out of ioo smokers will die from smoking, and that the 
estimated average loss of life duration for all ioo smokers is 7.0 years. 
If that estimate is correct, then it implies that respondents estimate the 
loss of life for each of the ten smokers who die from smoking-related 
causes to be seventy years. 
652 See id. To calculate a relatively recent "scientific" estimate of life-expectancy loss, Viscusi 
begins with his own range of "true risk reference points" for the rate of smoking-caused eath (.ig 
to 0.36). See Hanson & Logue, supra note 256, at 1354-56 (explaining how that estimate was cal- 
culated and why that estimate understates the true risk). He then multiplies the two extremes of 
the range by the Surgeon General's i989 estimate of years of life lost for those people who die 
from smoking-related fatality (20 years), yielding an estimated life-expectancy loss of between 3.6 
and 7.2 years for all smokers. See VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 255, at 80. 
653 VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 255, at 8o-8i. 
654 Id. at 80. 
655 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Table 2: Viscusi's implied mortality risk 
and life-expectancy loss of smoking 
Assessed mortality risk level Mean assessed life-expectancy 
(deaths/ioo smokers) loss of those smokers who 
(averaged across ranges) die from smoking-related causes 
I0 70.00 years 
30 27.67 years 
50 24.60 years 
70 I9.7I years 
90 20.89 years 
Table 2 lists the implied calculations for all categories according to 
Viscusi's interpretation of the data. If Viscusi's interpretation is cor- 
rect, then many of the responses are illogical. Roughly one-fifth of the 
respondents appear to believe that smokers who die from smoking will 
lose seventy years of life expectancy, surviving to the ripe age of four, 
if they are male, and ten, if they are female. Stated differently, smok- 
ers who die from smoking will die well before they have tried their 
first cigarette. Table 2 also demonstrates that the responses fail a basic 
consistency test. If we interpret Viscusi's data as he does, then it fol- 
lows that there is generally an inverse relationship between a respon- 
dent's estimation of the number of smokers out of ioo who die from 
smoking and the number of years lost by those smokers who die from 
smoking. It seems implausible that those who believe that smoking is 
most dangerous in terms of the rate of smoking-caused death would 
simultaneously believe that smoking is least dangerous in terms of the 
number of years lost. 
A more plausible interpretation of the responses is that they repre- 
sent (if anything) respondents' estimates of the number of years of life 
lost by those smokers who actually die from smoking-caused illnesses. 
Under that assumption, the estimations of mortality rates and loss-of- 
life-expectancy rates are consistent, and the implied absurdities disap- 
pear. Moreover, the implications for our more plausible interpretations 
of the data are dramatic. Under our interpretation, all categories of 
respondents in the first column of Table i would underestimate the 
expected loss of life for those who die from smoking (estimated by the 
Surgeon General to be approximately twenty years).656 Indeed, that 
would imply that current smokers estimate a loss-of-life expectancy of 
somewhere between one-third and one-half of the Surgeon General's es- 
timate. 
(ii) Asking the Wrong Question. - The preceding critique sug- 
gests that the questions used by Viscusi and the industry appear to 
656 See id. 
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have been designed in ways that produce the appearance of "overesti- 
mation" in consumers' perceptions of the risks of smoking. Here, we 
argue that in addition to asking their survey questions wrong, the to- 
bacco survey designers also asked the wrong questions. That is, in 
addition to designing survey questions in a manner likely to generate 
exaggerated or overestimated responses, Viscusi and the industry also 
asked the types of questions that were unlikely to produce any mean- 
ingful response at all, regardless of the questions' tendencies to lead to 
overestimated responses. 
(A) The Imprecision of Probabilistic Estimates. - Viscusi repeat- 
edly suggests that the surveys on which he relies are superior to other 
surveys, in significant part because his surveys elicit a quantitative or 
probabilistic estimate from respondents that has a precise meaning 
"a meaningful, well-defined probabilistic metric."657 He emphasizes 
this attribute in the abstract of one of his more recent papers on the 
topic: 
The various empirical reference points considered in this paper should be 
distinguished from those usually discussed in the literature since [the for- 
mer] focus on a meaningful quantitative assessment of the risk rather than 
qualitative measures from which no valid conclusions can be drawn re- 
garding the direction or degree of risk misperception.658 
According to Viscusi, the problem with qualitative risk estimates 
(for example, "very harmful" and "somewhat harmful') is that they 
"lack any corresponding quantitative reference point for any particular 
individual, [so that] to the extent that people differ with respect to the 
quantitative risk level that they regard as harmful[,] ... pooling the 
responses and making comparisons across respondent groups will not 
be meaningful."659 
Even if Viscusi's critique of qualitative risk estimates is appropri- 
ate,660 at least one major flaw in his reasoning remains. Viscusi as- 
sumes that quantitative estimates, because they are numeric, mean the 
same thing to all people and are not themselves subject to elicitation 
effects. The behavioral literature suggests otherwise, as Derek Koehler 
and Amos Tversky explain: 
[T]he question of whether degree of belief can, or should be, represented 
by the calculus of chance has been the focus of a long and lively debate. 
In contrast to the Bayesian school, which represents degree of belief by an 
additive probability measure, there are many skeptics who question the 
657 Id. at 49. 
658 Viscusi, Public Perceptions, supra note 468, at 2. 
659 Id. at i i. 
660 For reasons that we briefly discuss below on pp. I546-47, we believe that the problem Vis- 
cusi has identified with respect to "qualitative" risk estimates is trivial. See Hanson & Logue, 
supra note 256, at I358. Moreover, Viscusi is wrong to suggest that his study is unique in eliciting 
numeric responses. See id. 
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possibility and the wisdom of quantifying subjective uncertainty and are 
reluctant to apply the laws of chance to the analysis of belief.661 
There is also growing evidence that people (particularly smokers) 
have considerable difficulty expressing their risk estimates numerically. 
Isaac Lipkus, a risk communication expert at the Duke Comprehen- 
sive Cancer Center, has examined the public's "numeracy" - the abil- 
ity to understand and perform very simple numerical operations re- 
lated to risk and probabilities. One questionnaire included queries 
such as, "Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of 
getting a disease? i in ioo[;] i in iooo[; and] i in iO."662 
Roughly twenty percent of the respondents (and thirty percent of the 
respondents who smoke) answered that question incorrectly.663 Like- 
wise, the questionnaire asked: "If the chance of getting a disease is 20 
out of ioo, this would be the same as having a __% chance of getting 
the disease."664 Almost thirty percent of all respondents (and nearly 
fifty percent of smokers) answered incorrectly665 Other studies have 
reinforced this finding of a significant "innumeracy" problem.666 Sev- 
eral surveys regarding the risks of smoking have produced similar re- 
sults.667 
(B) The Dangerous Illusion of Precision. - Mindful of the pre- 
ceding considerations, it is illuminating to return to Viscusi's data. Al- 
though Viscusi claims that he has measured consumer risk assessments 
with a quantitative, "meaningful, [and] well-defined probabalistic met- 
ric,"668 this precision is likely illusory. 
To be sure, the respondents' answers to Viscusi's survey questions 
are numerical. Nevertheless, it seems less likely that the respondents 
actually considered the problem in numeric terms than that they sim- 
ply translated their qualitative risk assessments into numeric equiva- 
lents. Because any such translation would have been only an ap- 
proximation, respondents likely converted their estimates into well- 
661 Tversky & Koehler, supra note 62 I, at 547. 
662 Isaac Lipkus, Numeracy Questionnaire (unpublished materials, on file with the authors). 
663 See id. 
664 Id. 
665 See id. 
666 See, e.g., id.; Lisa M. Schwartz et al., The Role of Numeracy in Understanding the Benefit of 
Screening Mammography, I27 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 966 (I997). 
667 One survey revealed that of smokers who estimated that smoking posed a fatality risk of 
50% or more, only 43% were among the one-third of smokers who estimated that smoking was 
the most likely cause of death relative to six other significantly less likely causes of death. See 
Borland, supra note 467, at 5I7. The person who conducted the survey concluded: "These data 
cannot be resolved if the responses to the probability questions are treated as true probability es- 
timates, [and thus] one or both questions are giving a distorted view of the smokers' risk percep- 
tions." Id.; see also Christina Lee, Perceptions of Immunity to Disease in Adult Smokers, I2 J. 
BEHAV. MED. 267, 269, 273 (i989) (finding that surveyed smokers perceived risks summed to a 
total risk of around I20%, thereby indicating that some people's estimates defy the laws of prob- 
abilities). 
668 VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 255, at 49. 
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known "focal" numbers along the provided scale.669 This prediction 
informs the analysis of certain key features of Viscusi's survey data. 
For example, even those respondents who viewed claims of the harms 
of smoking as false or dubious estimated the probability of contracting 
lung cancer as a result of smoking to be approximately twenty-five 
percent.670 In other words, Viscusi's study yields the doubtful conclu- 
sion that those who perceive smoking as virtually or entirely harmless 
overestimate the "true risk" of smoking by a factor of between two and 
five. This conclusion should give pause to those who view numeric as- 
sessments as anything more than loose proxies for qualitative judg- 
ments.671 
If quantitative assessments are nothing more than vague approxi- 
mations, then the conclusion inevitably follows that Viscusi's criticisms 
of qualitative surveys apply with equal force to his own "quantitative" 
survey. It would be impossible, therefore, to determine whether a 
twenty-five percent response is pessimistic or optimistic. Despite the 
illusion of numeric precision, it is unclear whether Viscusi's evidence 
can teach us more than we already know - that is, most consumers 
understand at some level that smoking can be dangerous. Ron Bor- 
land is more blunt: "[A]rgument[s] about smoking based on the as- 
sumption that risk estimates are probability estimates ... are ground- 
less and their conclusions should be treated with the utmost 
skepticism."1672 
The apparent quantitative precision of the industry's surveys is 
also illusory in the sense that a survey respondent must guess (con- 
sciously or not) what a question is really asking whenever that ques- 
tion is ambiguous. The industry surveys upon which Viscusi relies 
failed to provide a precise (quantitative) definition of a key term: 
669 To conceptualize this phenomenon, assume that (as at least one cognitive psychologist 
claims) individuals understand just "four degrees of probability for an event: very likely, some- 
what likely (more likely to happen than not), somewhat unlikely (more likely not to happen), and 
very unlikely." Individuals otherwise do not differentiate among degrees of probability: "Inside 
those four compartments all is gray." Piattelli-Palmarini, supra note I3, at 32. This model might 
lead one to predict that answers would be clustered at focal numbers representing the edges of the 
four quarters of ioo. For instance, those who believe that smoking poses virtually no risk might 
choose zero (or perhaps some other low focal number such as 5% or io%). Those who believe 
that smoking poses a relatively slight risk might translate their estimate to 25%. Those who be- 
lieve smoking poses a medium-sized risk might choose So%. And those who believe smoking pre- 
sents a very significant risk might choose 75% or even ioo%. 
670 See VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 255, at 88 tbl.5-I. The mean risk perception of those 
respondents was 26.6%; current smokers within that group estimated 23.5%. See id. 
671 Indeed, Viscusi notes that the responses in his survey cluster consistently with the four- 
category prediction. See id. at 68. His only response is that "the direction of bias imparted by 
such rounding is unclear." Id. Viscusi seems to maintain that the responses at issue are precise 
but then rounded to the nearest quartile. Viscusi inadvertently endorses the quartile model when 
he states that those smokers who estimate the risk of lung cancer at Ioo% actually perceive lung 
cancer as a "highly likely but not certain outcome." Id. at 124-25. 
672 Borland, supra note 467, at 5 i8. 
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"smoker."673 When answering the question, "Out of ioo smokers, how 
many of them will die of lung cancer?," respondents were forced to 
speculate regarding many relevant factors. These included: at what 
age does a "smoker" begin to smoke?; is a "smoker" someone who 
smokes an entire lifetime or someone who at some time during her life 
smokes at least one cigarette?; how many packs per day does a 
"smoker" smoke? For the answers to the survey questions to be pre- 
cisely comparable, respondents must have attached the same answers 
to each of those questions and many more like them. 
To understand the significance of that source of imprecision, con- 
sider an experiment conducted by Baruch Fischhoff, in which he 
asked subjects the following: "How likely do you think it is that a per- 
son will get the AIDS virus from sharing plates, forks, or glasses with 
someone who has AIDS?"674 He then asked respondents to describe 
the amount and kind of sharing that they believed the question im- 
plied. According to Fischhoff, respondents generally agreed about the 
kind of sharing - over eighty percent understood that to mean shar- 
ing during a meal - but generally disagreed with respect to the fre- 
quency of sharing.675 Thirty-nine percent assumed sharing on a single 
occasion; twenty percent assumed several occasions; twenty-eight per- 
cent assumed routine sharing; and twelve percent were uncertain.676 
The respondents were answering a variety of questions, and there is no 
clear way to interpret the aggregated data. What is more, all of the 
subjects who reported uncertainty about the frequency and intensity of 
sharing were nonetheless happy to give likelihood estimates. In short, 
just because survey respondents are willing to provide precise numeri- 
cal answers does not mean that the answers should be viewed as pre- 
cise renderings of respondents' risk perceptions.677 The appearance of 
precision is not the same as actual precision, and Viscusi's data pro- 
vide only the former. 
(C) The Potential Benefits of Qualitative Assessments. - Thus far, 
we have discussed the difficulties associated with relying on numeric 
or probabilistic risk assessments. It is important also to mention that 
there may be some significant advantages to using qualitative assess- 
ments. For example, evidence indicates that verbal risk categories can 
be more reliable and that individuals find verbal risk categories a bet- 
ter reflection of their own thoughts about risk than they do numerical 
risk estimates.678 As Viscusi himself acknowledges, "people generally 
673 See Hanson & Logue, supra note 256, at I354-55. 
674 Fischoff, Bostrom & Quadrel, supra note 56i, at 993. 
675 See id. 
676 See id. 
677 See id. ("If people are willing to respond to survey questions that they do not understand, 
any relationship between their reported beliefs and behaviors would tend to be blurred."). 
678 See Diefenbach et al., supra note 630, at i90 (finding that college students participating in 
their studies felt that scales of risk with verbal labels - for example, "very unlikely" - were eas- 
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find it easier to process verbal information than a detailed list of statis- 
tics pertaining to the risk."679 Furthermore, psychological research in- 
dicates that Viscusi's methodology has a tendency to elicit responses 
"demonstrating" a greater awareness of risks than smokers actually 
possess. 
In a recent study assessing the relative merits of numeric and ver- 
bal measures of uncertainty, Paul Windschitl and Gary Wells conclude 
that each method may be appropriate under different circumstances.680 
When asked to provide numeric measures, people tend to respond with 
"deliberate and rule-based thinking."'68' This may be appropriate 
when, for example, assessing people's "ab[ility] to think according to 
logical or normative rules," or studying subjects who are accustomed 
to thinking in terms of numeric responses (such as "statisticians, seis- 
mologists, decision scientists, or financial forecasters").682 However, 
prompting people to employ rule-based thinking in situations in which 
they usually do not "may lead to a somewhat skewed assessment."683 
Research demonstrates that verbal measures may provide a "large and 
reliable advantage"684 in these cases because they do not prompt an 
unnatural thought process.685 Windschitl and Wells explain this find- 
ing: 
[U]ncertainty measures are often key means of assessing constructs such as 
people's perceived vulnerability to disease and misfortune, their illusions 
of control, their perceptions of product reliability, their expectations re- 
garding the interpersonal behavior of others, their confidence in causal 
hypotheses, and their expectations of success on challenging academic 
tasks. Situations in which such constructs are important are often not 
characterized by deliberate and rule-based thinking, and the participants 
in research about such constructs are not statisticians, professional fore- 
casters, or psychological scientists, but rather teenagers in high-risk 
groups, consumers, students, and others in the general population. Hence, 
for areas of research involving these types of constructs, verbal measures 
should be considered as an alternative and possibly more informative 
method of assessing human uncertainty.686 
In sum, qualitative measures more accurately capture people's thought 
processes in certain situations. 
ier to use and a better representation of their true feelings than were numerical scales using either 
odds or percentages). 
679 Viscusi, Public Perceptions, supra note 468, at 8. 
680 See Paul D. Windschitl & Gary L. Wells, Measuring Psychological Uncertainty: Verbal Ver- 
sus Numeric Methods, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 343, 343 (i996). 
681 Id. at 358. 
682 Id. at 359. 
683 Id. at 358. 
684 Id. at 357. 
685 See id. at 354. 
686 Id. at 359. 
I548 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. II2:I420 
The topic at issue in Viscusi's studies is paradigmatic of a subject 
matter for which numeric reasoning is ill-suited. The hazards of lung 
cancer (and smoking risks generally) resonate in the phrases "perceived 
vulnerability to disease and misfortune," "illusion of control," "percep- 
tions of product reliability," "confidence in causal hypotheses," and 
"teenagers in high-risk groups." Thus, what Viscusi believes is the 
greatest strength of his evidence may actually be one of its more sig- 
nificant weaknesses. 
(iii) Selective Recognition of the Role of Behavioralism and Ma- 
nipulation. - The primary goal of this section is to provide strong 
evidence that market manipulation can be extremely effective, even for 
a product like cigarettes, which most consumers seem to understand 
may pose a substantial health risk. Another goal of this section is to 
clarify just how sensitive people's risk assessments are to the context 
in which they are made. The third goal of this section is to echo a 
general insight that we highlight in our companion article. Legal 
economists who take behavioralism into account but who treat risks 
assessments as exogenous misunderstand the most fundamental mes- 
sage of the literature: market pressures will lead sellers to manipulate 
risk preferences. Careful scrutiny of the survey evidence on which 
Viscusi relies significantly advances each of these goals. 
The problem is not that Viscusi ignores behavioralism or the possi- 
bility of manipulation. To the contrary, behavioralist research and the 
problem of manipulable consumers are, as it turns out, important 
components of his story. According to Viscusi, the very reason that 
consumers supposedly overestimate the risks of smoking is that the 
government and the media have made those risks salient to them.687 If 
Viscusi really believes that an "anti-smoking campaign" by "anti- 
smoking zealots and the public health community"688 has led consum- 
ers to overestimate the risks of smoking, then it is puzzling that he 
gives short shrift to the possibility that a pro-smoking campaign has 
influenced consumer perceptions or that industry-provided survey data 
reflect such a pro-smoking bias. We agree there has been an anti- 
smoking campaign that has had some effect. But Viscusi's failure to 
687 Viscusi makes the following claim: 
The finding that individuals overestimate lung cancer risks of smoking is quite consis- 
tent with the literature on highly publicized events. Cigarettes are a highly publicized risk, 
as the potential hazards of smoking have been the subject of media coverage and substan- 
tial social pressures. The overestimate of the lung cancer risks in the presence of such sub- 
stantial information does not indicate a failure in individuals' ability to learn, but rather 
reflects the character of the information provided, as these informational efforts have at- 
tempted to raise risk perceptions. 
VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 255, at 70; see Viscusi, Public Perceptions, supra note 468, at 9. 
Similarly, Viscusi attributes the fact that the youngest age group in his sample had the highest risk 
perceptions to the sort of information that group had received. See VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra 
note 255, at 72. 
688 Viscusi, Public Perceptions, supra note 468, at 25. 
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consider how the industry itself might have influenced consumer risk 
perceptions and preferences is glaring in light of the evidence of suc- 
cessful industry efforts to counteract the "anti-smoking" campaign.689 
Another problem with Viscusi's interpretation of his survey evi- 
dence is that it presents, at best, a still-shot of consumer perceptions 
when one needs a motion picture.690 Our discussion of the possibility 
of manufacturer manipulation, as well as our review of the history of 
marketing practices from the tobacco industry, demonstrates that con- 
sumer risk perceptions are subject to a dynamic process of market 
manipulation. It is simply not enough to assess consumer risk percep- 
tions at any one point in time, in any particular cognitive state, or 
from any single frame of reference. Given the existence of systematic 
cognitive biases, manufacturers inevitably seek to manipulate con- 
sumer perceptions. 
Thus, even if public health warnings and salient media coverage 
cause smokers to overestimate the risks of smoking in response to a 
particular question in a telephone survey, manufacturers will still at- 
tempt to shape smokers' risk perceptionsfrom that point. As our his- 
tory of tobacco marketing shows, manufacturers have rapidly and ef- 
fectively adapted their advertising and promotional techniques to suit 
(and to manipulate) current cultural attitudes toward, and scientific 
knowledge of, smoking. They have done so in a fashion approximat- 
ing a trial-and-error method, testing every manipulative strategy 
imaginable to lower risk perceptions and concomitantly to increase 
demand, and sticking with those strategies that work best. Over time 
this process has resulted in a veritable arsenal of marketing techniques 
that not only have served the tobacco industry well, but also have been 
adopted by product manufacturers from other markets.691 
We suspect that Viscusi's disregard of these dynamic aspects of risk 
perception stems from his general tendency to treat risk perceptions as 
exogenous to his model of consumer behavior.692 Viscusi's approach to 
the question of smoker risk perceptions is similar, although somewhat 
more refined. He acknowledges that individual risk assessments are 
subject to the influence of a variety of cognitive biases but views the 
689 See supra pp. I484-I502. Not only did the industry manage to counteract many "anti- 
smoking' regulations and sources of information, it actually managed to obtain regulations that 
appeared significant but were in reality toothless. For a thorough review of the industry's regula- 
tory triumphs, see Kelder & Daynard, cited above in note 319, at 66-70, and Hanson & Logue, 
cited above in note 2 56, at I i67-73. 
690 Viscusi partially recognizes this limitation: 'The character of the data requires the analysis 
to focus on static consumption decisions. What are the individuals' risk perceptions and tastes, 
and how do these affect observed smoking behavior? The nature of the data analyzed conse- 
quently does not permit consideration of changes in smoking behavior ... .>. ViScusi, SMOKING, 
supra note 255, at 87. 
691 See, e.g., LARRY TYE, THE FATHER OF SPIN: EDWARD L. BERNAYS & THE BIRTH OF 
PUBLIC RELATIONS 5 I-76 (I 998). 
692 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note ii, at notes 358-92, 444-46 and accompanying text. 
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effect of these biases as indeterminate ex ante.693 Thus, Viscusi uses 
his survey evidence to determine ex post which cognitive bias is most 
consistent with the observed smoker behavior.694 
In this manner, Viscusi is able to reduce the complex implications 
of the behavioral research for smoker risk perceptions to one simple 
and fixed proposition regarding the availability heuristic. The prob- 
lem with this approach is that it ignores the immensely rich and rele- 
vant findings of the behavioralist movement, and it does so based on 
survey evidence that, as described above, is methodologically flawed 
and insensitive to the teachings of the very movement it is used to dis- 
credit. 
Again, Viscusi does recognize that consumer manipulation is a 
problem. But by treating as irrelevant both the potential for market 
manipulation and the evidence that the tobacco industry has in fact 
attempted to manipulate consumer risk estimates, Viscusi implicitly 
takes what for him may be two irreconcilable positions. The first posi- 
tion is that the market should be left largely unregulated because of its 
overwhelming and benign power to ensure social efficiency. In calling 
for less regulation of cigarettes, Viscusi writes, "State and federal gov- 
ernments alike should abandon their combative stance, take a more 
open-minded approach to the safety of tobacco products, and make 
advancement of consumer welfare the paramount concern."695 He 
claims that thereee is tremendous evidence that market forces are 
enormously powerful, not only with respect to smoking but also with 
respect to [consumers'] risky choices."696 More specifically, Viscusi 
points to the success of "safety competition" between cigarette manu- 
facturers during the three-year "tar derby" of I957-i960, when "the 
average tar and nicotine of the cigarettes purchased dropped by one 
third" before regulators, in effect, prohibited that form of competi- 
tion.697 In short, Viscusi calls for greater use of market forces because 
he believes that market forces are far more powerful and effective than 
regulators. 
However, Viscusi's second position, which is largely implicit, seems 
to be that government regulators are far more effective than the mar- 
ket at manipulating the risk perceptions and preferences of consumers. 
Had Viscusi taken behavioralism seriously, he would have seen that 
there are many other sources of manipulation in addition to the 
sources that he considered. More importantly, he would have seriously 
693 See VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 255, at 20 ("Systematic biases in risk perceptions are 
prevalent, but these biases may be in either direction."). 
694 See id. at I42 ("Smoking risk perceptions that reflect an overestimate of the risk are consis- 
tent with patterns of individual response that have been observed more generally with respect to 
highly publicized risks."). 
695 Viscusi, Smoke & Mirrors, supra note 468, at i9. 
696 Id. at 25. 
697 Viscusi, Public Perceptions, supra note 468, at 6-7. 
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considered the possibility that the market is a more effective manipula- 
tor of risk perceptions than regulators, for all the reasons that he be- 
lieves that the market is more effective than regulators at accomplish- 
ing most goals. In essence, Viscusi adopts a conflicted view of the 
smoking question: he argues that "enormously powerful" market forces 
can produce safer cigarettes, but he does not recognize that those same 
powerful forces can manipulate consumers. 
C. Some Thoughts on Competition and Market Power 
The history of cigarette industry practices represents our most ex- 
tensive and powerful evidence of manufacturer manipulation. How- 
ever, the concentrated nature of the cigarette industry suggests a po- 
tential objection to our theory: perhaps manipulative manufacturer 
practices are only possible in the absence of robust market competi- 
tion. In a competitive market, manipulation might be driven out by 
manufacturers who refuse to engage in such practices and thereby gain 
a competitive advantage over their less scrupulous peers. 
We have two theoretical responses to that argument. First, for 
nonmanipulative manufacturers to gain an advantage over their ma- 
nipulative peers, consumers need to distinguish the situations in which 
they are being manipulated from those in which they are not being 
manipulated - a distinction that behavioral research has demon- 
strated individuals cannot make. As a result, manufacturers will be 
driven to engage in manipulative practices in a process similar to the 
unraveling of product safety standards that results when consumers 
cannot distinguish between the risks of different brands of a prod- 
uct.698 Because consumers are unable to appreciate the benefits of 
nonmanipulative marketing practices, all manufacturers will be forced 
to adopt manipulative practices. 
Our second response is that even if debiasing - that is, making 
consumers aware of manufacturer manipulation - were possible, the 
costs would be significant, perhaps prohibitively so. At the very least, 
debiasing would require creating conditions similar to those that 
Kahneman and Tversky identify as requisite for learning.699 Moreo- 
ver, manufacturers would likely be deterred from conducting costly 
debiasing campaigns by the difficulty of capturing the benefits of such 
campaigns. Any attempts by manufacturers to educate consumers 
would be a public good, and such goods are typically underprovided. 
If a manufacturer did succeed in debiasing consumers with respect to 
a particular manipulative practice, other manufacturers could simply 
698 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489-go (I970); see also Croley & Hanson, supra note 3, at 776-78 
(providing a thorough account of the unraveling problem). 
699 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note ii, at notes 272-73 and accompanying text. 
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mirror the non-manipulative practices and secure at least some of the 
benefits of the first manufacturer's efforts. 
Apart from those theoretical arguments, there are empirical reasons 
to be skeptical of the likelihood of debiasing. Much of the empirical 
evidence that we offer in Part I is drawn from competitive rather than 
oligopolistic markets. Indeed, we discuss a host of deceptive and ma- 
nipulative practices from some very competitive markets - for exam- 
ple, gas stations, car lots, and grocery stores. 
For both theoretical and empirical reasons, therefore, we do not 
view competition as an antidote to the problem of market manipula- 
tion. We do, however, recognize that market concentration may in- 
crease the severity of manipulation, as evidenced by our description of 
the history of tobacco marketing in section A. The increased ease of 
such tactics as coordinated marketing, shared research, and product- 
design conspiracies makes an oligopolistic industry likely to exhibit 
more pronounced manipulative practices than competitive industries. 
Indeed, particularly egregious practices, such as the outright suppres- 
sion of product safety improvements, are likely to occur only in a mar- 
ket permitting collusion between manufacturers. Thus, although we 
do not view the evidence of tobacco industry manipulation as an ex- 
ception to some general rule of competition, we acknowledge that it 
may represent a particularly sharp rendering of practices common to 
virtually all consumer product markets. 
The reader might note that our model - in which firms with mar- 
ket power manipulate consumer risk perceptions and product safety 
designs - contradicts the widely accepted model in which firms with 
market power exploit consumers only along the price dimension.700 
That conventional model suffers from the same defect exhibited by 
earlier applications of behavioral research: that is, a failure to appreci- 
ate the endogenous nature of consumer perceptions. By positing risk 
information as a fixed, external influence on consumer behavior, schol- 
ars leave manufacturers with only one means of exploiting market 
power - price increases. But in fact consumer product perceptions 
are shaped and re-shaped in a dynamic process involving a variety of 
factors, including manufacturer behavior. Therefore, manufacturers 
with market power need not take consumer risk perceptions as given; 
instead, they can actively manipulate those perceptions to create opti- 
mism with respect to product risks. Such shaping of perceptions shifts 
upward the total consumer demand curve, a result that manufacturers 
prefer to a simple price increase. 
In addition to opposing the notion that manufacturers with market 
power do not exploit the malleability of consumer perceptions, we con- 
700 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract 
Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. I387, 1402-06 (I983); 
see also Croley & Hanson, supra note 3, at 7I7-I9 (summarizing the conventional wisdom). 
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ceive of competitive markets in a manner that conflicts with the 
widely shared view that firms in such markets will produce the level of 
safety that is demanded, so long as it is technologically feasible.70' 
Our view instead is that firms will produce a perception that they have 
provided the desired level of safety; that is, once one takes behavioral 
research seriously, one's focus shifts from actual product safety levels 
to perceived safety levels. Just as supermarket managers offer the 
"idea rather than the actuality of the 'good deal,"'702 and just as ciga- 
rette companies developed "health reassurance cigarettes" rather than 
actual safety improvements,703 product manufacturers will spend a 
great deal of time and effort devoted solely to manipulating consumer 
risk perceptions. We are not certain that manufacturers will manipu- 
late consumer perceptions instead of, rather than simply in addition to, 
producing actual safety improvements; often, the manufacturer will 
probably benefit most from producing both actual and perceived safety 
improvements. Regardless, the findings of behavioral research suggest 
that manufacturers have a capacity for manipulating perceptions that 
must be accounted for by any model of consumer product markets. 
III. A POTENTIAL RESPONSE TO MARKET MANIPULATION: 
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY 
The foregoing analysis poses a serious challenge to scholars of 
products liability. Because manufacturers manipulate consumer per- 
ceptions, consumer product markets may reflect lower-than-optimal 
safety investments and higher-than-optimal purchasing levels. Under 
such circumstances, the choice of liability standards for product-caused 
injuries becomes more significant for at least two reasons. First, ana- 
lyzing the choice within the newly refined endogenous framework 
promises to further the continuing development of economic analysis 
in legal scholarship. Appropriately, this evolution would occur in the 
field of products liability, long the proving ground of law and eco- 
nomics. Second, and more significantly, revisiting the choice among 
liability rules would offer the opportunity to improve the current ef- 
forts to regulate the incidence and severity of product-caused acci- 
dents. With a sharpened understanding of manufacturer incentives 
and the problem of market manipulation, this fresh analysis could 
701 Richard Epstein articulates this position: 
The modern faith in regulation should not ... be allowed to obscure the strong impact 
of market incentives. Each firm when acting in its own self-interest will improve safety 
levels even in the absence of exposure to products liability suits .... Complacent firms run 
the risk of displacement and bankruptcy at the hands of competitors who provide better 
and safer products to their customers. 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 89 (i980). 
702 See STATT, supra note 42, at 248. 
703 See supra p. 1473. 
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produce significant advances over past efforts to regulate consumer 
product markets. 
In previous articles, one of us (with Steven Croley and Kyle Logue) 
argued that enterprise liability is the most effective products liability 
response to the problem of consumer underestimation of product 
risks.704 Given a state in which consumers do not fully appreciate 
product hazards, enterprise liability is the most desirable products li- 
ability regime because it forces manufacturers, as the primary holders 
of pertinent product information, to evaluate safety considerations 
when designing and marketing products. Enterprise liability gives 
manufacturers an incentive to make all cost-justified investments in 
product safety because, by doing so, they gain a competitive advantage 
over firms that do not make the investments (and therefore face higher 
liability costs). Enterprise liability also represents the only products 
liability regime capable of providing consumers with an independent 
source of information about expected product accident costs - price. 
Only under such a regime will the nominal price of each product re- 
flect all of that product's expected accident costs. Thus, even if con- 
sumers remain unduly optimistic with respect to product risks, the 
price of products under an enterprise liability regime will encourage 
consumers to act as if they are well-informed. 
The preceding arguments in favor of enterprise liability are prem- 
ised on the notion that consumers underestimate product risks. In 
large part, the products liability debates of recent decades have all 
hinged on this underlying question of the accuracy of consumer risk 
perceptions.705 Those debates, however, all occurred before the rele- 
vance of behavioralism to economic analysis became clear. With one 
or two possible exceptions, products liability scholarship did not care- 
fully consider the implications of the cognitive-bias and marketing lit- 
eratures for consumer risk perceptions and the choice among liability 
regimes; that is, it did not fully consider the problem of market ma- 
nipulation. 
In this Part, we sketch the argument (that we will flesh out in the 
third part of this project7O6) that the possibility for manufacturers to 
manipulate consumer product perceptions presents the latest, and per- 
704 See Croley & Hanson, supra note 3, at 786-95 (arguing that products liability provides an 
answer to market failures such as inadequate consumer information); Hanson & Logue, supra 
note 256, at II8I-I223 (concluding that manufacturer liability would "educate" consumers about 
the dangers of cigarette use by raising prices); Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at i68-89 (arguing 
that enterprise liability optimizes activity levels and manufacturer care). 
705 See generally Croley & Hanson, supra note 3, at 707-o8, 706-17, 770-79 (describing the role 
of consumer-information issues in the products liability debates). 
706 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to 
Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 2000, Symposium Issue: 
Rational Actors or Rational Fools? The Implications of Psychology for Products Liability) (manu- 
script on file with the authors). 
I999] TAKING BEHAVIORALISM SERIOUSLY I555 
haps the strongest, justification for enacting an enterprise liability re- 
gime. In light of behavioralist findings, the determinative issue for 
products liability scholars is no longer whether consumers underesti- 
mate or overestimate product risks. The endogenous implications of 
behavioralism - specifically, the possibility of manipulation by manu- 
facturers - render that question moot because evolutionary market 
forces require manufacturers to make every effort to induce consumer 
underestimation, and the evidence suggests that those efforts are suc- 
cessful. Therefore, the choice among products liability standards must 
now be sensitive to market-provided incentives to manipulate con- 
sumer risk perceptions. In section A, we argue that only a liability 
rule, such as enterprise liability, that realigns powerful market forces 
(rather than attempting to anticipate and outmaneuver them) stands a 
chance of significantly ameliorating the problem of market manipula- 
tion. 
A. Taking Enterprise Liability Seriously 
The problem of market manipulation is, at bottom, a problem with 
the market. Manipulation of consumers occurs because it must. To 
succeed in any reasonably competitive market, sellers must minimize 
the perceived price of their product. Put differently, the invisible hand 
of the market guarantees that the most successful sellers will be those 
who, wittingly or not, are the most successful manipulators. The pol- 
icy challenge, therefore, is to devise a system of regulation that equals 
the manipulative market in resourcefulness and tireless zeal to influ- 
ence consumer behavior. As we argue in this section, the only institu- 
tion capable of doing so is the market itself. Thus, the question for 
products liability scholars is not how to regulate product markets, but 
how to make product markets regulate themselves. 
I. The Basic Case for Enterprise Liability. -Because market ma- 
nipulation is incredibly subtle and slippery, it does not lend itself to 
traditional command-and-control regulatory solutions. It is subtle in 
the sense that consumers are not the only ones who will fail to recog- 
nize manipulation. Regulators will also fail to see precisely how con- 
sumers are being manipulated. It is slippery in the sense that any par- 
ticular attempt to prevent or to counteract it will often lead to new and 
unanticipated forms of manipulation. A perfect solution would make 
the most profitable sellers those sellers with the best-informed consum- 
ers. Although no solution will be perfect in that sense, the best (imper- 
fect) solution very well may be the one promoted by the first genera- 
tion of products liability scholars: enterprise liability. 
The advantages of incentive-based, or market-based, regulatory 
schemes such as enterprise liability are recounted by one of us (with 
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Kyle Logue) elsewhere.707 We mention here only the features that 
have led many commentators to view incentive-based systems as supe- 
rior to other forms of regulation. Those features highlight why we be- 
lieve that only a market-based system such as enterprise liability can 
effectively combat the problem of market manipulation. 
First, incentive-based systems enjoy a comparative advantage over 
other systems because they encourage decentralized, independent deci- 
sion-making. Such systems render it unnecessary to conduct complex 
cost-benefit analyses or to determine the most efficient technology for a 
firm or an industry to adopt. Instead, regulators need only ensure that 
negative externalities are internalized - for instance, by requiring that 
manufacturers pay the costs of product-caused accidents. With that 
limitation, many individual actors in the market attempt to minimize 
the total costs of their activity, including the newly internalized costs. 
The competitive process ensures that those market actors who are best 
able to lower total costs will thrive and those who are worst able will 
fail. Second, market actors have financial incentives that most com- 
mentators agree are more powerful than the incentives faced by gov- 
ernment regulators. As a result, market actors operating under incen- 
tive-based systems are more likely to achieve regulatory goals simply 
because they have a stronger desire to achieve them. Finally, market 
actors typically have more extensive information regarding the object 
of the regulation and thus are generally better-equipped to find solu- 
tions in a cost-effective and accurate manner. Government regulators, 
on the other hand, are frequently criticized for enacting costly and in- 
effective regulations and must often rely on the regulated industry for 
information. In sum, for the same basic reasons that most economists 
prefer our market economy to a command-and-control economy, they 
also prefer market-based regulation to command-and-control regula- 
tion. 
For this reason, we are skeptical of the view that current regulation 
of deceptive trade practices is sufficient to combat market manipula- 
tion. Admittedly, much of the conduct identified in this Article could 
be classified as fraud under existing consumer protection statutes. In- 
deed, much of our evidence was uncovered by the FTC or a similar 
state actor. Nevertheless, we do not believe that the FTC's command- 
and-control approach could ever equal the power of enterprise liability 
to constrain market manipulation. Government agencies do not have 
the incentives or the resources necessary to identify and to act against 
market manipulation in all of its ever-shifting incarnations. Thus, the 
practices challenged by the FTC and other regulatory agencies may 
represent only those that have been around long enough or are egre- 
gious enough to become transparent. 
707 See Hanson & Logue, supra note 256, at II73-78, I263-8I. 
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Under enterprise liability, on the other hand, even those practices 
that are unknown to regulators (or to manufacturers themselves) be- 
come effectively "regulated" in the sense that they are no longer eco- 
nomically attractive for manufacturers to follow. As such, manufac- 
turers essentially regulate themselves, avoiding manipulative behavior 
in order to avoid increased liability costs that result from such behav- 
ior. In short, while consumer protection agencies following a com- 
mand-and-control approach valiantly attempt to spot and to stamp out 
fires of manipulation as they arise, enterprise liability combats ma- 
nipulation by simply eliminating the touchwood altogether.708 
The advantages of enterprise liability stem from its market-driven 
focus. In essence, enterprise liability preserves the power of the mar- 
ket and simply realigns its incentives so that market actors are com- 
pelled to manage what would otherwise have been social costs. By 
forcing manufacturers to bear the costs of all product-caused accidents, 
enterprise liability can beneficially affect manufacturer incentives.709 
Under enterprise liability, manufacturers of relatively dangerous prod- 
ucts will have to charge more - all else being equal - than manufac- 
turers of relatively safe products. And because consumers prefer pay- 
ing lower prices, other things being equal, manufacturers will have a 
market incentive to prevent those accidents that they can prevent cost- 
justifiably. Preventing accidents will allow manufacturers to lower the 
price of their products and thus to gain a competitive advantage. In 
addition, enterprise liability forces manufacturers to charge a price 
that reflects the expected accident costs of their products. Conse- 
quently, consumers confront the total costs of the products they pur- 
chase (even if, as we are assuming, they are optimistic with respect to 
product risks) and thus consume the appropriate quantity of each 
product, in both an absolute and relative sense. These benefits are 
discussed at considerable length elsewhere.710 
Additional benefits of enterprise liability become evident once con- 
sumer optimism is understood as the result of endogenous influences 
-that is, market manipulation. Enterprise liability simply eliminates 
much of the incentive that manufacturers otherwise would have to 
708 See id. at II 74-75 (summarizing the arguments for ex post incentive-based forms of regula- 
tion, such as enterprise liability); id. at 1273-8I (making a sustained case for ex post incentive- 
based forms of regulation); id. at ii68-69 n.9 (summarizing evidence that previous efforts to 
regulate the cigarette market through command-and-control mechanisms have backfired). 
709 We assume here that consumers are not adequately informed by current product warnings. 
As we argue below, there are many reasons to suppose that product warnings are ineffective, and 
most of those reasons stem from the fact that manufacturers have strong incentives to ensure that 
the effect of otherwise exculpatory warnings are ineffective. Consequently, manufacturers will 
attempt to ensure that warnings either will not be read and understood or will be effectively neu- 
tralized by manipulative marketing efforts that vastly overshadow the warnings. For a discussion 
of such inefficiencies in the context of cigarette warnings, see Hanson & Logue, cited above in 
note 256, at I323-24. 
710 See supra note 704. 
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manipulate consumer risk perceptions. The intuition behind that con- 
clusion is quite straightforward: a manufacturer who persuades con- 
sumers to underestimate the accident costs of its product gains little 
given that, roughly speaking, the manufacturer must ultimately bear 
those costs. In other words, enterprise liability takes much of the 
profit (and fun) out of market manipulation. Furthermore, enterprise 
liability creates an incentive for manufacturers to inform consumers of 
some product risks. Because manufacturers are liable for all product- 
caused accidents under an enterprise liability regime, manufacturers 
will have strong incentives to alert consumers to risks that the con- 
sumers can prevent cost-justifiably.7"' That is, if product warnings 
could conceivably minimize accidents through influencing consumer 
behavior, then manufacturers will have an incentive to issue such 
warnings in order to minimize costs (and, as we describe below, they 
will issue warnings that are far more effective and tailored than the 
warnings that any regulatory body could design). 
In sum, we predict that once manufacturers are made to feel the 
costs of their manipulation, it will become significantly less attractive 
for them to manipulate. Rather than permitting the costs of misguided 
consumption to be externalized onto society at large, enterprise liability 
would force the costs onto the spreadsheets of the very agents who 
cause misguided consumption - manufacturers. For this simple rea- 
son, enterprise liability would go a long way toward removing many of 
the harmful aspects of our "consumer culture" - most notably, the in- 
centive to manipulate consumer perceptions of product health and 
safety risks - without fundamentally altering the market economy's 
ability to produce and to allocate goods on a mass scale. 
2. Stimulating a Better Warning System. -,In contrast to our 
policy conclusion, the wide consensus among products liability scholars 
is that the ideal way to regulate product safety in response to imperfect 
consumer information is through the provision of hazard warnings. 
The value of warnings, these scholars argue, is that they provide a 
way to achieve "first-best" efficiency: that is, efficiency of both con- 
sumer care levels and activity levels. Informing consumers through 
hazard warning information eliminates the problem of consumer opti- 
mism, which we took as given in the previous section (and which ren- 
ders our policy conclusion a "second-best" solution). This theory ar- 
gues that once consumers are fully informed, they will demand an 
optimal level of safety and purchase only those products whose mar- 
ginal benefits exceed marginal costs. 
711 Under alternative products liability regimes (including the current regime), on the other 
hand, manufacturers have strong incentives to manipulate consumer risk perceptions inasmuch as 
they can frequently escape liability for the costs caused by their products and shift those losses to 
optimistic consumers, insurers, health care providers, taxpayers, and future generations. 
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As Howard Latin points out, however, this conception fails to dis- 
tinguish between information costs and cognitive biases.712 Although 
product warnings conceivably can remedy deficiencies in consumer in- 
formation, deficiencies in consumer cognitive processes are far more 
subtle and troublesome. In response to such reasoning, more recent 
advocates of product warnings argue that warnings should be carefully 
designed by regulators to account for cognitive biases. Viscusi, for in- 
stance, asserts that a regulatory agency charged with constructing and 
testing the effects of product warnings would provide the best response 
to the problem: "The best practical solution to the problem of com- 
peting risks of labelling is pre-testing the warning - its language and 
its presentation of information - for its ability to accomplish the in- 
tended objective.'713 
As we argue with respect to Viscusi's study of smoking perceptions, 
however, his solution appears sensitive to the operation of cognitive 
biases but ultimately fails to take behavioralism seriously. The prob- 
lem is again the failure to recognize the endogenous effects of cognitive 
biases in consumer product markets. Viscusi's solution discounts com- 
pletely the impact of manufacturers' efforts to counteract product 
warnings. The market is far more capable of influencing consumer 
behavior than any regulator devising product warnings, and the mar- 
ket's incentives are squarely to diminish the effect of warnings. Con- 
sumers who fail to appreciate hazards of products also fail to see the 
true costs of those products and therefore overconsume them. 
With that prospect of excess demand, manufacturers have an inter- 
est in marketing products in a manner that dulls the appreciation of 
product risks. As long as legally adequate warnings are included in 
product documentation, a product's remaining marketing materials 
can encourage, with impunity, a culture of overconsumption. Indeed, 
the very goal of the marketing materials may be to undermine the ef- 
fect of the legally mandated warnings. We believe that this problem is 
significant, especially considering that American consumers are ex- 
posed to twenty-five thousand commercials each year714 and total an- 
nual worldwide advertising expenditures exceed $350 billion.715 
712 See Latin, supra note 226, at I229-41 (outlining reasons that people may fail to understand 
warnings even when information costs do not prevent them from reading the warnings). 
713 W. Kip Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 137 (igg I) [hereinafter Viscusi, 
REFORMING]; see also VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 255, at I50 ("A more appropriate strategy 
would be to identify the diverse risks of cigarettes that we wish to communicate and to undertake 
experimental studies with different consumer groups to identify the most effective way to com- 
municate this information in an accurate and convincing manner."). 
714 See Duane Elgin, Living More Simply and Civilization Revitalization, excerpted in THE 
CONSUMER SOCIETY, supra note 64, at 363, 365. 
715 See EVANS & BERMAN, supra note i9, at I7. We leave the reader to estimate whether com- 
parable resources are devoted to designing and observing product warnings. 
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No product illustrates our position more acutely than do cigarettes. 
Cigarette manufacturers have been able to minimize the effect of the 
FDA's warning requirements at every stage in the agency's campaign 
against cigarettes.716 The unparalleled marketing expenditures of the 
industry seem in many cases simply to have overwhelmed the warn- 
ings. Faced with the industry's barrage of images, slogans, cartoons, 
and other "lifestyle" marketing techniques - all of which are backed 
by an advertising budget several orders of magnitude greater than that 
of any public health agency - consumers have, not surprisingly, failed 
to receive the message about cigarette health risks. Moreover, the in- 
dustry is well aware that warnings may be positioned to have a for- 
bidden-fruit appeal to minors. As one industry insider noted, the 
"warning label on the package may be a plus"717 when it comes to re- 
cruiting new, underage smokers. These are just two examples of ways 
in which the hazard warnings of regulators may prove ineffective, or 
even counter-effective, when combined with the marketing efforts of 
manufacturers. 
The only hope of substantially reducing manufacturer manipula- 
tion is to eliminate the incentive to manipulate in the first place. Un- 
der an enterprise liability regime, because there would no longer be a 
mechanism for avoiding liability for product-caused accidents, manu- 
facturers' incentives to manipulate product risk perceptions would be 
diminished, if not eradicated. In fact, we believe manufacturers would 
actually have an incentive to sharpen consumer awareness of many 
product hazards under such a regime. Only through such awareness 
could certain accidents be avoided and manufacturer liability be 
minimized. 
A chief advantage of harnessing manufacturer expertise in this 
fashion is that it helps to overcome the widely recognized difficulty of 
constructing effective product warnings.718 As Latin has noted, 
warning construction necessarily entails imperfectet tradeoffss 
[a]mong [d]etail, clarityt, and [i]mpact,"719 as well as textualul 
716 For a summary of these industry triumphs, see Hanson & Logue, cited above in note 256, at 
ii68 n.g. 
717 See Claude E. Teague, Jr., Some Thoughts About New Brands of Cigarettes for the Youth 
Market 8 (Feb. 2, I973) (research memorandum) (memorandum available at <http:llwww.gate.net/ 
-jcannon/documents/730202rI.txt>) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
718 See, e.g., VISCUSI, REFORMING, supra note 713, at 139-40. Viscusi observes the following: 
Detailed examination of the information that individuals retain from hazard warnings 
indicates that even with very detailed and well-designed warning labels, individuals can 
seldom recall more than six pieces of information from a label. Much of what is retained 
regards aspects of the product other than precautions and risk levels - for example, how 
to use the product. With the addition of more information, individuals eventually reach a 
saturation point. There is a fundamental trade-off in terms of the information that is re- 
tained by consumerss. 
Id. 
719 Latin, supra note 2 2 6, at I 2 2 I. 
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[a]mbiguity."720 Moreover, individual readers' "ability to understand 
information is influenced by educational backgrounds, personality 
traits, and motivation levels, by socioeconomic status, and group af- 
filiations, and by idiosyncratic personal experiences and prejudices."'72' 
Given those constraints, it is extremely difficult for regulators to design 
product warnings that will effectively convey risk information to a 
wide range of product users. Under an enterprise liability regime, the 
market would force manufacturers to experiment with product warn- 
ings by altering their form and content to overcome consumer cogni- 
tive failings to produce effective informational disclosures. Corporate 
manipulation of risk perceptions would be replaced by corporate man- 
agement of risk information. 
The preceding discussion is not mere fanciful theorizing. Through 
a process known as market segmentation,722 manufacturers already en- 
gage in highly sophisticated analyses of consumer "educational back- 
grounds, personality traits, ... motivation levels, ... socioeconomic 
status, and"723- the very attributes commentators say determine 
product warning effectiveness.724 This process allows manufacturers 
to subdivide "large mass markets into smaller segments, each contain- 
ing a relatively homogeneous group of consumers."725 As a result, 
manufacturers are able to design more effective marketing strategies 
because they are "directing resources at specific and identifiable groups 
of people rather than at diverse collections of individuals."726 
Segmentation can occur along several divides. For example, 
through a process of geographic segmentation, the manufacturers of 
Campbell's Soup have divided the United States into twenty-two geo- 
graphic regions and have tailored product lines to suit prevailing tastes 
in those regions. As a result of their analysis, the company uses a 
spicier version of its nacho cheese sauce in California than in the 
Midwest7 27 
720 Id. at I222. 
721 Id. at I 2 2 7 (citations omitted). 
722 See Wendell R. Smith, Product Differentiation and Market Segmentation as Alternative 
Marketing Strategies, 21 J. MARKETING 3, 5-6 (I956). 
723 Latin, supra note 226, at I227. 
724 In an earlier article, one of us (with Kyle Logue) notes that the homogeneity of certain con- 
sumer groups lends itself to this type of segmentation. See Hanson and Logue, supra note 3, at 
154-57. At the time of making that observation, however, the author was blissfully unaware of 
the actual extent to which consumer groups already were studied and classed by manufacturers. 
Such actions have far different implications in a market that is not regulated by enterprise liabil- 
ity for, as we have argued, the nature of manufacturer incentives in the absence of enterprise li- 
ability is to exploit knowledge of consumer behavior and perception, rather than to use it for 
safety gains. 
725 FOXALL & GOLDSMITH, supra note 44, at 9 (citation omitted). 
726 Id. 
727 See STATT, supra note 42, at 14. 
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For our purposes, the two most important ways that manufacturers 
classify consumers are through geodemographic segmentation and psy- 
chographic segmentation. Geodemographic segmentation enables 
manufacturers to act on the basis of demographic and consumption 
profiles of particular neighborhoods.728 
In the United States, for instance, the Potential Rating Index by 
Zip Market (PRIZM) system has condensed the country's approxi- 
mately thirty-six thousand postal districts into forty primary types of 
neighborhood clusters, ranging from "Public Assistance" to "Blue 
Blood Estates," and including such clusters as "Money & Brains" and 
"Kids & Cul-de-Sacs" in between.729 Each neighborhood cluster has its 
own demographic profile: "Furs and Station Wagons," for instance, are 
"typified by 'new money' living in expensive new neighborhoods. 
These are well-educated, mobile professionals and managers with the 
nation's highest incidence of school-age children. They are winners 
big producers and big spenders."730 
In addition to thumbnail descriptions such as this one, PRIZM 
provides highly detailed data concerning consumption habits, em- 
ployment and salary levels, asset information, educational back- 
grounds, travel and leisure preferences, and so on. Using this technol- 
ogy, manufacturers are able to target increasingly narrow subgroups of 
consumers rather than attempt to find a level of homogeneity across 
the entire marketplace.731 This practice has become widespread: "Sys- 
tems such as ... PRIZM are now routinely used for direct marketing 
via leaflets, mailing lists and local newspaper inserts, as well as plan- 
ning the most appropriate sites for new stores and stocking existing 
stores."732 
We believe that these systems would be useful in devising effective 
product warnings. Rather than attempting to construct "warnings 
[that] pass muster for the entire market,"733 as Viscusi's regulators 
would be required to do, manufacturers could devise warnings tailored 
to suit the residents of particular demographic landscapes, such as the 
"Sun Belt Singles," "Norma Rae-ville," and even "Marlboro Country." 
Rather than settling for a single warning that seeks "the greatest net 
benefit to society" by trying to reach "the entire marketplace,"734 an 
728 See id. at i8-i9. 
729 See SOLOMON, supra note 24, at i87; STATT, supra note 42, at i8I-9. 
730 CLARK, supra note 45, at I76. 
731 For instance, Time and Newsweek magazines have sorted their mailing lists by cluster, al- 
lowing for special luxury advertisement sections to be reserved for neighborhoods like "Furs & 
Station Wagons" and "Money & Brains." See SOLOMON, supra note 24, at i88. Similarly, Col- 
gate-Palmolive was able to send samples of a new detergent developed for young families to all 
zip codes in the "Blue-Collar Nursery" cluster. Id. 
732 STATT, supra note 42, at ig. 
733 W. Kip Viscusi, Individual Rationality, Hazard Warnings, and the Foundations of Tort Law, 
48 RUTGERS L. REv. 625, 668 (I996). 
734 Id. 
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enterprise liability regime would prompt manufacturers to utilize their 
expertise in geodemographic segmentation to produce highly focused, 
viewer-specific product warnings.735 
From the perspective of tort reform and product warning construc- 
tion, an even more promising method of market segmentation might 
prove to be psychographic segmentation. This type of segmentation fo- 
cuses on "creat[ing] marketing mixes that reflect consumers' subjective 
perceptual and cognitive processing of information [as well as] their 
personal lifestyle, values and motivations."736 The most elaborate psy- 
chographic system was developed by the Stanford Research Institute 
of California and is known as VALS, which is an acronym for "values 
and life styles."737 VALS relies on census data and proprietary surveys 
to classify people into nine representative lifestyles, each with a de- 
tailed description of psychological traits.738 For instance, members of 
one of the groups, "Belongers," are described as follows: 
[T]he largest group (35 percent of the population)[] are so-called because 
their affiliation needs are high. They strive to fit in and conform at all 
costs and care deeply about what the neighbors think. They believe in the 
status quo and aren't suspicious or fearful. They are middle-class, tradi- 
tional, "moral," and family-oriented. Most are white (95 percent), and 
many are housewives (30 percent) who are middle of the road in every- 
thing from their levels of education to their incomes and ages. They tend 
to live in small rural towns or open country. Their contented existence is 
rarely touched by the cruel realities of the world. Instead, they read ro- 
mance novels and watch a lot of television, especially soap operas. They 
often abstain from alcohol, have strong traditional values, and feel that 
mothers should be unselfish, forgiving, and stay at home. They are mark- 
edly more supportive of authority figures than the lower groups, and they 
have the finances to plan for the years ahead. They are happiest when 
they feel like an insider and find the most comfort when surrounded by 
the familiar.739 
Such information enables manufacturers to address every aspect of 
retailing - from original product design to advertisement construction 
- with the personality attributes of the end user firmly in mind. To- 
day, psychographics is an omnipresent feature of consumer product 
735 Indeed, one marketing company, purporting to have a computer database of 73 million 
households comprising some 90% of the U.S. population, claims that it can provide geodemo- 
graphic information for individual households rather than just neighborhoods. See CLARK, supra 
note 45, at 177. Such a capability would obviously help construct effective product warnings be- 
cause, as we have seen, individual social characteristics influence the manner in which one per- 
ceives warning information. 
736 FOXALL & GOLDSMITH, supra note 44, at 9. For a helpful historical account of the devel- 
opment of psychographics, see REBECCA PIIRTO, BEYOND MIND GAMES: THE MARKETING 
POWER OF PSYCHOGRAPHICS 6-94 (I991). 
737 STATT, supra note 42, at 2 I. 
738 See ARNOLD MITCHELL, THE NINE AMERICAN LIFESTYLES: WHO WE ARE AND WHERE 
WE'RE GOING 3-24 (i983). 
739 PIIRTO, supra note 736, at 39-40. 
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marketing and has considerably sharpened manufacturers' ability to 
communicate with consumer subgroups.740 
Manufacturers could similarly employ techniques such as geode- 
mographic and psychographic segmentation to create effective product 
warnings. Motivated by enterprise liability, manufacturers would use 
their well-developed understanding of consumer psychology to con- 
struct warnings responsive to particular safety fears, risk attitudes, and 
any other personality traits that emerge as determinant of product 
warning effectiveness. Under enterprise liability, manufacturers would 
determine which warnings work for which groups, just as they now do 
for advertisements. 
As an example of that type of warning construction, the American 
Cancer Society (ACS) used geodemographic and psychographic profil- 
ing to improve chronically low cancer screening rates among low- 
income elderly minority women.741 The ACS began by commissioning 
a geodemographic study: "A PRIZM map and report were produced to 
determine what types of lifestyle clusters reside in the areas of greater 
propensity for older, poor women."742 In addition, the ACS identified 
those product markets that low-income minority women access with 
greatest frequency and which forms of media they were most likely to 
encounter. The ACS also sought "attitudinal/perceptual data" that 
evaluated the "greatest barriers to [the subject] women's seeking 
mammograms [including] the lack of physician referrals, cost, fear and 
a realistic attitude about access to follow-up health care."743 From this 
wealth of data, the ACS was able to develop a media campaign spe- 
cifically tailored to low-income minority women, in contrast to tradi- 
tional campaigns that sought a common denominator among all 
women at risk of breast cancer. The results were clear: "The use of 
nontraditional media in carrying the mammography screening message 
to poor African-American women who are older is strongly correlated 
with increase in first-time mammography behavior."744 We believe 
that precisely this type of improvement in information conveyance 
740 The VALS system, in one of its earliest and best-known applications, was used to revamp 
the Merrill Lynch advertising campaign of the i980s. Merrill Lynch had long portrayed a stam- 
pede of bulls in its advertising. After consulting VALS research, its advertisers discovered that 
the campaign conveyed a message of conformity and herd mentality, which directly conflicted 
with the preferences of the "Achievers" who made up Merrill Lynch's target audience. The result: 
Merrill Lynch's advertisers created an entirely new ad campaign featuring a lone bull and the 
slogan, "A Breed Apart." Not surprisingly, the campaign was successful. Id. at 44. 
741 See Cynthia Currence, Demographic and Lifestyle Data: A Practical Application to Stimu- 
lating Compliance with Mammography Guidelines Among Poor Women, in SOCIAL MARKETING: 
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES III (Marvin E. Goldberg, Martin Fishbein & 
Susan E. Middlestadt eds., I997). 
742 Id. at II4. 
743 Id. at II7. 
744 Id. at ii9. The Blood Center of Southeastern Wisconsin achieved similar success when it 
used pyschographic surveys to increase blood donations. See PiiRTO, supra note 736, at II9-22. 
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would occur with product warnings under an enterprise liability re- 
gime. With such a regime in place, every manufacturer would display 
the same public service intentions and the marketing ingenuity of the 
American Cancer Society - if they did not, their products would be 
driven out by more capable manufacturers, whose consumers would 
suffer fewer injuries. 
Before turning to the possible limitations of enterprise liability, we 
wish to point out one additional potential benefit. In this section, we 
argue that under an enterprise liability regime, manufacturer incen- 
tives to warn consumers effectively of product dangers would be sig- 
nificantly improved. Additionally, an enterprise liability regime might 
actually improve consumer care incentives. Such a suggestion may not 
be paradoxical inasmuch as enterprise liability would effect a cultural 
change in the way consumers view manufacturers and their product 
warnings. 
Currently, consumers are inclined to view product warnings as the 
handiwork of overly cautious manufacturer attorneys, rather than as 
earnest or legitimate attempts to inform customers of proper product 
use. As Latin has noted, "I[c]onsumers ometimes fail to follow product 
warnings because they do not find the disclosures credible.... As 
warnings proliferate in number and length, consumers may come to 
believe that some (or many) are included more to protect manufactur- 
ers against potential liability than to inform users of significant dan- 
gers."745 Under enterprise liability, on the other hand, we believe that 
consumers may come to view product warnings as something other 
than self-interested manufacturer disclaimers. With the knowledge 
that manufacturers must compensate for accident costs, consumers 
would be more likely to recognize product warnings as important 
sources of safety information, intended to educate consumers rather 
than to absolve manufacturers. Thus, not only would manufacturers 
have incentives to construct product warnings in an effective manner, 
consumers would also have incentives to read, comprehend, and follow 
them. Product warnings might finally achieve their aim: to "inform a 
product user [effectively] of a risk and of behavior that will reduce that 
risk."746 
3. A Few Words of Caution. - Although we argue that enterprise 
liability is tort law's best response to the problem of manufacturer 
manipulation, we recognize such a regime has inherent limitations. An 
enterprise liability regime may not entirely remedy much of the ma- 
nipulation that we identify in Part I, because the particular risks posed 
by a product may result in injuries which have a causal link to the 
product that is too difficult to prove, or which are too diffuse to confer 
745 Latin, supra note 226, at 1247. 
746 Viscusi, REFORMNG, supra note 7I3, at I44. 
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standing on any particular person. For instance, any litigant attempt- 
ing to show that her health problems arose from the ingestion of a par- 
ticular manufacturer's fatty foods may face difficult issues of causa- 
tion.747 Likewise, the long-term effects of environmentally hazardous 
products such as those that emit ozone gases would be dispersed across 
a large group of victims, making it difficult for a potential plaintiff to 
show a particularized, legally cognizable injury. 
Given these difficulties, even enterprise liability might not force 
manufacturers to internalize all of the harms posed by certain prod- 
ucts. We consider this problem an operational shortcoming of enter- 
prise liability that policymakers would need to address before the full 
benefits of such a regime were realized. Of course, we also view the 
shortcoming as one that equally plagues all other standards of tort li- 
ability for products regulation. 
We must also acknowledge that the ability of price to convey a 
product's risk has yet to be empirically verified.748 Although it seems 
theoretically sound to argue that product prices that included expected 
accident costs would inspire more efficient consumer behavior than a 
regime in which consumers estimated expected accident costs on their 
own, empirical support for that contention is unavailable - because, 
of course, a true enterprise liability regime has yet to be enacted for 
product-caused accidents. Moreover, given the many ways in which 
manufacturers have been shown to manipulate consumer perceptions 
through the price dimension,749 manufacturers may be able to ma- 
nipulate consumer price perceptions even under a legal regime that 
forced the internalization of all product-related accident costs. Never- 
theless, enterprise liability would make the accomplishment of such 
consumer manipulation markedly more difficult than any other prod- 
ucts liability regime because it constricts the range within which 
manufacturers could manipulate price perceptions. By so restricting 
the opportunity for manufacturer manipulation of consumer price per- 
ceptions, enterprise liability would promote a more efficient use of 
consumer income. 
A final potential limitation of enterprise liability stems from the 
fact that many of the manufacturers' manipulative practices may in- 
flate consumers' perceptions of a product's overall desirability, rather 
than simply affecting consumers' product risk perceptions. Although 
enterprise liability would force manufacturers to internalize the costs 
of all product-caused accidents, it is theoretically possible that manu- 
facturers could manipulate consumer preferences so that excess con- 
sumption would still occur. For instance, although the expected acci- 
dent costs of bottled soda would be incorporated into the product's 
747 See Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at i66 n.I55. 
748 See supra p. 1557. 
749 See supra pp. 1440-42, 1449-50. 
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price under enterprise liability, manufacturers might still be able to 
manipulate consumers into thinking that they value soda in bottles (as 
opposed to, say, cans) enough to compensate for the increased price. 
The consumers' misperception would result in inefficient purchases if 
consumers would not have valued soda in bottles enough to account 
for the price increase prior to the manipulation. For this reason, one 
might say that enterprise liability has the potential to solve only half of 
the problem of manipulation - the manipulation of consumer percep- 
tions of product costs, and not of product benefits. 
Although we do acknowledge this point, we wish to emphasize that 
the limitation applies to all tort liability regimes, not just to enterprise 
liability. Thus, if soda manufacturers can increase the perceived bene- 
fits of their soda while selling it in bottles, then they will do so irre- 
spective of tort law. Whatever consumer preferences exist after that 
effort by manufacturers, however, we still ought to care about mini- 
mizing the costs of accidents, given those preferences. That is, we still 
should adopt enterprise liability in order to assure that manufacturers 
and consumers internalize products' expected accident costs; if we do 
so, then consumers may overestimate the benefits of the products they 
purchase, but at least they will not underestimate the costs. Therefore, 
even though enterprise liability may solve only half of the problem of 
manipulation, it is the only half of the problem that products liability 
can realistically address. 
B. The First Generation of Products Liability Scholars Revived 
In the first article of our project, we argued that legal economists 
typically (though rarely explicitly) assume that market forces are far 
more powerful than any command-and-control effort to regulate 
them.750 In that article we argued further that consumers are subject 
to unyielding cognitive biases that make them susceptible to manufac- 
turer manipulation. In light of those arguments, the findings of this 
Article are hardly surprising: there is substantial evidence of sustained 
and deliberate efforts on the part of manufacturers and sellers to shape 
consumer perceptions and preferences, and there is also compelling 
evidence that those efforts have been successful. 
What we do find surprising is modern legal scholarship's failure to 
acknowledge or take seriously the possibility of such market manipula- 
tion. Our evidence of market manipulation no doubt has relevance to 
many areas of law.75' This evidence poses an especially significant 
750 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note ii, at note 535 and accompanying text. 
751 Although we have focused in this Article on the application of behavioral research to prod- 
ucts liability law, we believe that our views with respect to manipulation have far-reaching impli- 
cations. Scholars have already begun to explore, through behavioral research, the possibilities for 
investor manipulation in securities markets, raising the question whether the current regulatory 
approach is inadequate to prevent fraud. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling 
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challenge to products liability scholars, the most influential of whom 
have employed law-and-economics style reasoning to criticize the 
revolutionary trends that characterized products liability law from the 
1960s through the mid-ig8os, and to justify the many counterrevolu- 
tionary reforms that have since been adopted at their urging.752 We 
think the challenge particularly strong because the early advocates for 
the expansion of products liability law relied heavily on the argument 
that manufacturers manipulate consumers' perceptions - an argu- 
ment that has never been squarely addressed by legal economists criti- 
cal of the law's expansion. 
To be sure, the arguments made by early enthusiasts of expanding 
products liability might have been easily dismissed, considering that 
they were articulated long before behavioral research had become a 
robust field of study. Instead of drawing from the studies of social sci- 
entists, the legal scholars and judges who called for expansion toward 
enterprise liability seemed to have relied on their own intuitive under- 
standing of human psychology and consumer product markets.753 
Nonetheless, they appear to have appreciated the problem of market 
manipulation. In an early and important products liability opinion, 
Justice Traynor eloquently captured the sense, if not the science, be- 
hind the problem: 
The consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for him- 
self the soundness of a product, even when it is not contained in a sealed 
package, and his erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of 
manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising and marketing devices 
754 
Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated 
Customers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 627 (i996). 
Consumer protection law is another obvious context in which to study the existence and im- 
pact of manipulative trade practices: both advertising and consumer credit regulation are areas 
that may be illuminated by the application of behavioral research principles. The health care in- 
dustry presents perhaps the most dramatic forum within which to study manipulation. Its long- 
recognized information asymmetries have now been coupled with powerful market incentives and 
a diminished role for the physician as patient-advocate to produce an opportunity unfortunately 
well-suited for manipulation of health care consumers. Even the judicial system itself might be 
better understood through the lens of behavioralism, with its focus on manipulation. For in- 
stance, the much-debated role of expert testimony in civil litigation could benefit from a view of 
the jury as a body of "lay scientists," hampered by all of the non-scientific tendencies described in 
our accompanying article. See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note ii, at notes 51-178 and ac- 
companying text. In short, we believe that the most significant implication of behavioral research 
for legal analysis is its evidence of the possibility of manipulation - a possibility demonstrated in 
our analysis of consumer products markets, but also evident whenever one actor exerts influence 
over the decisionmaking context of another. 
752 For a review of the intellectual underpinnings of the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary 
trends in products liability law, see Croley & Hanson, cited above in note 3, at 695-767. 
753 See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note ii, at note 295 and accompanying text (sum- 
marizing Guido Calabresi's position on consumer optimism). 
754 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., I5o P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. I944) (Traynor, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
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This theme of consumer lulling was taken up with even greater 
emphasis in the leading case755 of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 
Inc.756 For opponents of strict liability, Henningsen has long repre- 
sented the benchmark against which their theories must be weighed.757 
In that regard, it is highly significant that critics of strict liability have 
never directly responded to the following language from the Henning- 
sen opinion: 
[A modern manufacturer] not only processes [its product] and dresses it up 
so as to make it appear appetizing, but he uses the newspapers, magazines, 
billboards, and the radio to build up the psychology to buy and consume 
his products. 
[Moreover, u]nder modem conditions the ordinary layman, on re- 
sponding to the importuning of colorful advertising, has neither the oppor- 
tunity nor the capacity to inspect or to determine the fitness of [a product] 
for use; he must rely on the manufacturer who has control of its construc- 
tion.. 758 
Indeed, the Henningsen court believed that judicialal notice may 
be taken of the fact that automobile manufacturers, including [defen- 
dant] Chrysler Corporation, undertake large scale advertising pro- 
grams over television, radio, in newspapers, magazines and all media 
of communication in order to persuade the public to buy their prod- 
ucts."759 Thus, in addition to the belief that consumers lacked suffi- 
cient information to make well-informed consumption choices - a 
view that has been thoroughly analyzed by products liability schol- 
ars760- the Henningsen court also believed that manufacturers exac- 
erbated consumers' lack of information by designing marketing tech- 
niques to entice consumers without informing them. Scholars have 
never taken this latter aspect of Henningsen seriously. 
Instead, critics have chosen to characterize early advocates of strict 
liability as merely intuitive thinkers lacking the scientific rigor of more 
recent products liability scholars.761 George Priest, for instance, has 
755 See John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, ig Sw. L.J. 5, 8 (1965). 
756 i6i A.2d 69 (N.J. i960). 
757 Dean William Prosser even attributed the "fall of the citadel of privity" to Henningsen: 
"[Tlhe date of the fall of the citadel of privity can be fixed with some certainty. It was May 9, 
i960, when the Supreme Court of New Jersey announced the decision in Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors, Inc." William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con- 
sumer), go MINN. L. REV. 79I, 79I (i966). 
758 Henningsen, i6i A.2d at 82-83 (quoting Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, i64 S.W.2d 828, 
832-33 (Tex. 1942)). 
759 Id. at 84. 
760 See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note ii, at note 285. 
761 See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSE- 
QUENCES ii (i988) ("[Early products liability scholars] promised the world that [strict liability] 
... would bring measurable progress toward ... protecting life and limb, and helping the injured 
when accidents do happen .... [But their] record is a mountain of pretentious failure."); VIscusI, 
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contrasted "this 'culture' of enterprise liability"762 with his own "care- 
ful, scientific study"763 of product markets. The former is "impres- 
sionistic and imprecise,"764 "extremely crude,"765 "anti-conceptual and 
often unreasoning."766 The latter is "relentlessly functional and utili- 
tarian,"767 steeped in the tenets of "modern science,"768 and character- 
ized by a "sharpened focus"769 that is capable of revealing "a new view 
of the world."770 By using his scientific approach rather than the in- 
tuition of earlier scholars, Priest believed that he was able to arrive at 
the most informed judgment about the effects of products liability 
law.771 
Recognizing that "[t]he only useful way to evaluate a theory is to 
confront it with evidence,"772 we believe that the evidence presented in 
this Article and its companion poses a serious challenge to any theory, 
such as Priest's, that dismisses the possibility of manufacturer ma- 
nipulation of consumers. In our view, the arguments of thinkers like 
Justice lTaynor and now-Judge Calabresi have been partly vindicated 
by the emergence of a theory of market manipulation grounded in be- 
havioralism. Even Priest acknowledges that "[m]ost of us ... share 
some intuitive feeling that manufacturers possess bargaining power 
superior to any consumer. 773 In this Article, "intuition is restated rig- 
orously"774 as a proposition supported both by economic theory and by 
market evidence. As a consequence, it should no longer be possible for 
scholars to criticize the argument for enterprise liability based on 
method alone. Indeed, with evidence that "experts who have rich 
models of the system in question are more likely to exhibit overconfi- 
dence than lay people who have a very limited understanding of these 
systems,"775 scholars should be a bit more reluctant to criticize any ar- 
REFORMING, supra note 7I3, at 5 ("This kind of empirical foundation and comprehensive assess- 
ment of the appropriate role of products liability was missing from the proposals for the earlier 
expansion in products liability."); Epstein, supra note 5, at 2204 (describing the arguments of two 
earlier products liability scholars as "flawed," "badly misguided," and "wholly misguided"). 
762 Priest, supra note 2, at 702. 
763 Priest, supra note 9, at I400. 
764 Id. at I399. 
765 Priest, supra note 2, at 702. 
766 Id. at 703. 
767 Id. 
768 Priest, supra note 9, at I390. 
769 Id. at I400. 
770 Id. 
771 See id. 
772 Id. at I390. 
773 Id. at I399. 
774 Id. 
775 Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confi- 
dence, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 4II, 430 (I992) (citing supporting studies in FRANK J. YATES, 
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 87 (i990), and Stuart Oskamp, Overconfidence in Case- 
Study Judgments, 29 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 26I, 26i-65 (I965)). 
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gument for lacking "scientific" rigor. As we show, the hunches of 
judges can prove accurate in the long run while the elaborate scientific 
models of scholars turn out to be merely a byproduct of overconfi- 
dence. 
CONCLUSION 
Drafts of this Article and its companion provoked two fairly com- 
mon criticisms from readers. First, some readers complained that our 
thesis went too far in suggesting that consumers are susceptible to 
seemingly limitless manipulation. It is simply not the case, these read- 
ers argued, that consumers can be convinced to purchase any product, 
regardless of its dubious benefits or serious risks. After all, the over- 
whelming majority of new products that are introduced each year fail, 
at least indirectly supporting the notion that consumers have prefer- 
ences that are independent of and sovereign over manufacturers' ef- 
forts to manipulate. Second, other leaders contended that what we 
have characterized as manipulation is not really manipulation at all, 
but rather revelation. For instance, when supermarket managers place 
chips next to dip and inspire an unplanned purchase by the grocery 
shopper, the managers are not constructing artificial preferences, but 
rather are revealing true preferences that were simply unrecognized by 
the shopper prior to the manager's subtle suggestion. 
The first group of readers denied that manipulation happens, while 
the second denied that what happens is manipulation. Thus, we are 
simultaneously criticized for representing that manufacturer efforts to 
influence consumer perceptions succeed more than they actually do, 
and for characterizing as manipulation what are actually benign in- 
formation-providing services by manufacturers that result in efficient 
consumer transactions. Readers holding the second view would pre- 
sumably prefer that manufacturers actually did succeed in manipulat- 
ing consumers as much as readers of the first view appear to think our 
Article contends. 
Our position lies between those extremes. We do not disagree with 
the proposition that manufacturers' ability to manipulate consumers is 
subject to limitations. Indeed, we do not disagree with the contentions 
that manufacturers must accommodate existing consumer preferences 
in their attempts to manipulate and that often those attempts will fail. 
Likewise, we view it as likely that at least some of the manufacturer 
practices described in this Article and its companion are benign; that 
is, they result in an efficient transaction by reminding shoppers that, 
yes, they did feel like chips and dip all along. 
Neither of these concessions, however, alters our fundamental mes- 
sage about consumer risk perceptions and the efficiency of product 
markets. It may well be that consumer preferences are either more 
stable than much of our evidence would indicate, as readers holding 
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the first view would argue, or are more fully realized as a result of 
manufacturer "manipulation," as readers holding the second view 
would argue. 
Nevertheless, in both situations, one must conclude that consumer 
perceptions are at least partially subject to manufacturer influence or, 
as we prefer to call it, manipulation. If consumers buy more of a 
product when it is labeled seventy-five percent fat free, rather than 
twenty-five percent fat, we do not know which label more effectively 
alerts consumers' to their true preferences. We do know, however, that 
consumers perceive the product differently depending on the manufac- 
turer's use of a non-substantive information frame. That fact alone 
represents evidence that, under certain circumstances, consumer per- 
ceptions of product risks can be altered by manufacturer manipulation. 
Accepting that possibility, all the logic of economic theory tells us that 
manufacturers will manipulate consumer perception in the direction 
that benefits them most - toward the underestimation of product 
risks. And all the evidence of consumer product markets suggests that 
this manipulation has been successful and will continue to be so until 
policymakers take behavioralism as seriously as marketers do. 
In our forthcoming article, we will attempt to begin that project, by 
discussing more exhaustively how enterprise liability can alleviate the 
problem of market manipulation. A chief concern in that article will 
be to discern whether, in proposing enterprise liability as a response to 
manipulation, we have taken behavioralism seriously enough, or 
whether, instead, the market forces behind manipulation are strong 
enough to evade even enterprise liability. If the latter is true, then the 
problem of market manipulation will require policy solutions far more 
dramatic than anything previously discussed in products liability 
scholarship. 
